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argue that attitudes do not matter. These examples, plus his apt use of metaphor and his folksy tone, render a potentially obtuse subject accessible not only to social scientists and other academics but also to agency personnel, natural resource managers, and environmental advocates. His use of examples from his own personal experience makes this a particularly interesting book to read. This book is appropriate for graduate and advanced undergraduate-level courses and for scholars involved in several areas of sociology, including environmental sociology, social psychology, and applied sociology; additionally it is a valuable addition to the libraries of natural resource managers and of researchers, teachers, and students involved in the human dimensions of natural resource management.

*Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism.* By Gino Germani. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. Pp. xi+292.

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Every generation discusses the great political issues. But each does so in its own way. One writes of the burdens and evils of empire, another of the possibilities and problems of democracy. Still another studies the duties and pathologies of administration. Behind them all lie questions of rights and obligations, conflict and rebellion, interest and altruism. But while these great political issues are everywhere the same, they are nonetheless everywhere experienced through the particularities of a time and a place. Politics cannot exist purely in the abstract, but is always incarnate in real interests and real conflicts.

Since the here-and-now is always changing, political knowledge of it must also change, and so in the course of their own political theorizing, generations always set aside that of their predecessors. Sometimes they ignore it; sometimes they reject it ritualistically; sometimes they enshrine it in anachronistic splendor. In the "digital age," past writers were reduced to index terms for this or that current political position, like the names of forgotten capitalists on university buildings. A complex and nuanced lifework became a few "keywords"; an impassioned life became a superficial encyclopedia entry.

To reread the past for itself, then, is to recover the complex and impassioned here-and-now of another. Our present reading requires such an exercise. Surprising as it may seem 100 years later, the second half of the 20th century was centrally concerned with the "crisis of democracy." How had formal democracy produced Fascism and Nazism? How could one understand the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? Even the few surviving

\*Another review from 2052 to share with *AJS* readers.—*Ed.*

democracies had seen authoritarian currents like McCarthyism and *Action Française*. And of course thinkers from the colonized world were rightly questioning the democracy of those “democracies” in the first place. The discussion was everywhere tense, even extravagant. In the Cold War, there could be no apolitical discussions of politics.

Through this tortured landscape, the writings of Gino Germani provide a road less traveled. Hounded out of Italy as an undesirable, Germani soon found himself embroiled in the baroque politics of Argentina. From Argentina he would flee to the United States, where he worked uncomfortably as a “pure social scientist” before returning—with equal unease—to postfascist Italy. His work is one long inquiry into the fascism and authoritarianism that set the terms of his quietly tumultuous life. Yet it sees those phenomena from the viewpoint of the sojourner. Germani was nowhere at home.

The child of a socialist tailor, Gino Germani was born February 4, 1911, in Rome. At 19 his erratic—often autodidactic—education was interrupted by a short imprisonment for antifascist leafleting. Exhausted by the subsequent police surveillance, Germani and his widowed mother left for Argentina in 1934. (The Italian embassy there would continue to harass him episodically until 1945.) In Buenos Aires he worked for his uncle and became active in antifascist activities. (For many reasons, not least among them the cumbersome procedures, immigrants generally did not naturalize in Argentina. They therefore could not vote and turned their political activity toward their home nations.) In 1938, a government job enabled Germani to begin part-time study at the University of Buenos Aires. Active in student politics, he eventually took his degree in 1944. Politics in Argentina were notably complex in those years, with coups in 1943 and 1945. Political positions ranged from extreme conservatism and nativism to the furthest edges of communism, and they addressed not only Argentine issues, but also fascism and war abroad. More immediately, there were repeated student demonstrations and government suppressions at the universities; Germani had two more trips to jail.

During Germani’s university years, historian Ricardo Levene recruited him to the Institute of Sociology. There he discovered some unopened boxes full of contemporary sociological work from the United States, which turned him in a strongly empirical direction and also introduced him to writers like W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, George Lundberg, and Talcott Parsons. Although still a student, Germani was already in his thirties and became the leader of the empirical program of the institute, undertaking major research projects on the middle classes, public opinion, and other topics. He also became the institute’s representative to the Fourth Argentine National Census, where the characteristically incisive questions he recommended were uniformly rejected by the conservative commissioners. In 1945 the first Perón administration sent Germani into internal exile; he worked in publishing and taught at the Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores, an alternate university. In 1955 Perón fell, and Germani returned to the university as director of the Institute for Sociology, where he rapidly developed the field,

following an empirical agenda parallel to that of sociology in the United States at the time.

In the early 1960s, however, Argentina's liberal development project foundered, and a newly left student politics flowered in the wake of the Cuban revolution. Germani was redefined as a pettifogging empiricist and accused on the one hand of uncritically accepting the new American sociology and on the other (somewhat inconsistently) of recycling familiar Argentine theories. His skeptical appropriation of Marx alienated the leftist students, while his frank antifascism alienated their rightist peers. In a haze of visa difficulties, delays, and accusations reminiscent of his departure from Italy 30 years before, Germani left Argentina in 1966. Three months after his departure came the first of the military takeovers that would begin Argentina's slow descent into a time of disappearances, torture, and death.

Germani had no illusions. In a biography of her father, his daughter quotes him as foreseeing either "an extremely shallow and calm life in the United States" or "an excessively unpredictable and chaotic one in Argentina" (Ana Alejandra Germani, *Antifascism and Sociology* [New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 2008], p. 159). Although the American students were themselves restless, the veteran of three imprisonments and two exiles was unimpressed: "I find that these American youngsters are not very talented. I would like to teach a course on riots Latin American style" (p. 163). Germani was usually on the road when not teaching the bewildered Harvard undergraduates. Cambridge, too, was unbearable. He wrote his daughter:

The problem is that I get thoroughly depressed by the sight of Americans' very serious faces. But do you think it's possible to express emotions in New England, or, even worse, among Harvard sociologists? . . . It's true there is less noise, everything seems smooth, but there does not seem to be life, or at least not what I have learned to call life since I was young—laughter, tears, anxiety, anger, fights, voices. (*Antifascism and Sociology*, p. 200)

In the mid-1970s and with extraordinary difficulty, he reestablished his Italian citizenship in order to take a part-time position at the University of Naples and find a home in his native Rome. He died there in 1979.

*Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism* is one of three books issued at the close of Germani's career. The original manuscript was most likely a compilation of various existing materials, for Germani tells us in the introduction that it was written in a mixture of English, Spanish, and Italian. Translators have flattened this exciting hybrid language into dutiful but occasionally misleading English: Germani himself surely never used the English word "peronism" in his life.

The book's main argument is that fascism proper should be seen as primarily a middle-class reactionary movement, while lower-class authoritarianism of the Argentinian sort demands a separate category, which Germani calls *national populism*. The book's first section sets out theoretical positions, beginning with general presuppositions and then turning to the two

core concepts of middle- and lower-class authoritarianism. The second analyzes the roots of national populism in Argentina, employing methods from historical and cultural study to demography and detailed political and institutional analysis. The third section comprises a single chapter on the political socialization of the young in Italy and Spain, revisiting in retrospect the experiences that had started the young Germani on his long odyssey.

Germani's opening section dutifully situates his analysis with respect to contemporary metropolitan theoretical writing, which was then (for quite obvious reasons) seeking a definition of totalitarianism that would put all the enemies of the United States in one category and that would simultaneously define the fascisms of Germany, Italy, and Spain as passing events in "fundamentally democratic" societies. Germani cared little about this effort to square the circle. Like so many social scientists, he was mainly interested to understand his own life, and in particular the two authoritarian movements that had transformed it: Mussolini's Fascism and the Argentinian movement that, following Latin American custom, is known by its leader's name: *el peronismo*.

Germani's opening chapters also ventriloquize the functionalist theories of political development that were common at Harvard when he arrived in the mid-1960s. One hears echoes of Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, Gabriel Almond, and the other believers in "institutionalized social change." Curiously, however, these functionalist references are far fewer than those in the opening chapters of Germani's prior analysis of Argentina (*Política y sociedad en una época de transición* [Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1968]). Familiarity had apparently bred contempt. And it is soon evident that the functionalism, too, is largely unrelated to Germani's analysis.

We meet the real Germani in the empirical chapters of *Authoritarianism's* second section. Here he details the political heritage of *el peronismo* and the pattern of underlying social structural changes that produced its constituencies. He then undertakes an internal comparison between the rise of *el peronismo* and that of the middle-class Argentine populism of the 1890s, which had culminated in the universal male franchise of the Saenz Peña law of 1912. The second section closes with a comparison of the Argentine and Italian cases. These four chapters are the heart of the book, painstakingly researched and argued, at once both subtle and compelling.

As these core chapters make clear, the book is an inductive attempt to derive from two closely argued empirical cases a theory of two pathways leading from the breakdown of democracy to authoritarianism: one the better-known route from middle-class mobilization to fascism, the other the less familiar route from lower-class mobilization to authoritarian populism. Germani tries to discover within his cases a sequence of stages or configurations of powers that will capture—even explain—the inevitability of these stories. In choosing a stage theory framework, he follows the metropolitan social science mainstream of the time, which found stage theories very appealing, perhaps because they provided a first (and, for the metropolitan countries, a self-interested and optimistic) way to think about decoloniza-

tion. But stage theories were also common in psychology as well, Sigmund Freud and Jean Piaget being well-known practitioners. They were perhaps a broader intellectual fad, although a momentary one: stage theories disappeared almost completely in the latter years of the 20th century.

As Germani's argument proceeds, his stage conceptions break down into the complex contingencies more characteristic of ecological arguments. The demographic foundations of *el peronismo* prove to lie in a combination of four things: dramatic upward mobility in the large immigrant working class of the Argentine littoral, sudden cessation of external immigration around 1930, expansion of the rural latifundia and cattle grounds at the expense of smallholders and peasants, and continuing industrial demand, which gradually increased as international depression drove Argentina toward import substitution. As Germani shows with extensive demographic data (most of it his own or reworkings of the very scarce census material), this combination resulted in a massive flood of rural workers to the cities, where they became a new and unabsorbed working class, relatively disconnected from the strong unions of the immigrants. Unlike the immigrants, these internal migrants could and did vote, and when Perón became minister of labor in 1943, he immediately recognized them as the potential foundation of a mass party.

Thus Germani's stages relax into a conjunctural account based on alignments of somewhat independent trends in a constrained system of political actors with various means and levels of political input, all of them subject to dramatic forces from abroad (depression and war in particular) because of Argentina's international position as a food-exporting powerhouse. But Germani's stage theories are unusual for another reason—their insistence that there can be stages leading to fascism as well as to democracy, to economic regression as well as to economic development. There is no uniform direction, as in most stage thinking. There is only a ceaseless rearranging of power and control, occasionally arriving at the temporarily stable authoritarianism that was Germani's principal concern. If in his summaries he presents lists of sequential factors that lead ineluctably to totalitarianism, the care of the analysis belies those lists; at heart Germani was a pure conjuncturalist.

Germani's distance from the metropolitan mainstream is also evident in his idiosyncratic use of the various concepts he borrows from it. Thus, he speaks of center and periphery in Argentina, but he doesn't mean by this the metaphysical "center of society" that Edward Shils had idealized but rather the literal geographic contrast between the modern littoral and the more conservative, smallholder, and traditional areas beyond the commercial agricultural heartland. This was for Germani a contrast recalling the "civilization and barbarism" of Sarmiento's *Facundo* (which Germani had cited in *Política y sociedad*). But, typically, Germani insisted on complicating that earlier contrast by noting the creole nature of migrants, their peculiar relation to the cattle barons, their low skill levels, and their lack of the urban culture of syndicalism.

Similarly, Germani's definition of "integration" is much less metaphysical than that of Talcott Parsons (or of Parsons's master Émile Durkheim). By integration Germani means simply political participation that is (1) within channels provided by the current regime and (2) perceived and experienced as legitimate by both sides (i.e., regime and participant; p. 107.) Integration could occur via institutional forms completely repugnant to the Anglo-American tradition—riots and demonstrations, for example. For similar reasons, Germani's concepts of mobilization and demobilization are very broad. Voting was only one among many institutionalized means of political influence in Argentina, alongside strikes, corporate action, mass marches, Church politics, and so on. This broad concept of political participation sets Germani strongly apart from conventional metropolitan political science, with its intensive focus on voting. (All Argentines knew that the voting system was hopelessly corrupt, after all.)

It is also particularly noticeable that Germani focuses on demobilization as much as on mobilization. For he sees that, although politics changes as continuously as does the weather, there are occasional calm days. Yet at the same time, for Germani demobilization could be coercive; groups could be denied political access as easily as they could gain it. And therefore no regime could be permanent. His world is one of ceaseless change.

Germani's work is conspicuously eclectic in methodology. I have already noted his extensive demographic analyses. Indeed, his earlier-published summary of Argentine social structure was the first of its kind. But he also used the new inferential statistics: ecological level regressions investigating the class origins of *el peronismo* appear in the work under review here. Side by side with these quantitative and empirical approaches, however, are elegant interpretive analyses. There is, for example, a fine discussion of how economic liberalism was early defined as conservative in Argentina and, perhaps more important, how democracy became a pejorative term for many Argentines because of the hostile trade policies of the metropolitan democracies, which profoundly disturbed the country's economy. Germani also spends a good deal of time on the institutional and structural analysis of elites, focusing especially on the union leaders whose divisions and choices would play into Perón's hands during the crucial years between 1943 and 1945 (pp. 174–85).

All these institutional and interpretive analyses complement the quantitative ones, making the empirical sections of the book singularly compelling. But in the context of Germani's own life, perhaps the most telling chapter is the last, a thoughtful analysis of fascist indoctrination of the young, focusing on Italy, but treating Spain as a short comparative case. Germani emphasizes the self-defeating quality of fascist indoctrination. On the one hand the fascists needed the dynamism and excitement of the young, which could be released only by open discussion and debate. ("Discussion is a fascist obligation," says one astounding quote from the fascist press; p. 259). On the other, they needed conformity with their general project of protecting vested interests and demobilizing the lower class. As if this dilemma were

not enough, the fascists also had no institutional plan to bring young people into the party hierarchy. The resultant ambivalence and blockage drove young people to apathy, conformist alienation, and—once the war started—underground opposition.

Germani himself left Italy long before that. As he said, he believed that life meant laughter, tears, anxiety, anger, fights, and voices, and his own voice had been one too many for the fascists of the late 1920s. But his voice may also have been one too many—or at least one too loud—for Harvard as well. There is no idealizing of the United States in the book, as there was in so much Cold War social science. Germani quotes without comment a fascist's remark that elite replacement in the United States takes place via the spoils system. He notes the size of the U.S. underclass (p. 62), takes for granted the hegemonic and deleterious nature of U.S. political and military interventions (pp. 72, 113), and remarks that there is considerable authoritarian support for U.S. "democracy" (p. 93). His judgment of American politics probably echoed his judgment of the Harvard sociology department: uninspired, unemotional, uninvolved—thoughtless and dominant at one and the same time.

But in the end Germani's own politics are themselves elusive. He favored liberty and inclusion. But he wrote a whole book on marginality without mentioning his own life as a marginal man. He favored fights and voices, but spent his life analyzing loud men who fought too much. Germani was a sojourner, and we hear his story without really knowing whence he came and where he wanted to go. His work is all the more powerful for that very silence.