Although lacking in methodological detail, the book is grounded in the literature and contains several strong sections. The overall focus on RV living is detailed, the comparison of PIT counts demonstrate important problems with the processes, and the emphasis on regulation and resistance is impressive. Despite all the impressive qualities of the book, it never felt put together, the chapters at times reading like separate projects. In spite of this criticism, I am able to recommend the book because of its multiple strengths. Many readers, however, might find that focusing on sections rather than the whole will give them insights into the complexities of vehicle living, the establishment of service programs, the impact of antihomelss regulations, and the difficulty of estimating the number of individuals living without homes.


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If W. E. B. Dubois thought the 20th century the century of race, there were others who thought it the century of religion. Such were the Bolsheviks with their secular religion of development, the Islamic modernists with their dovetailing of religion and modernity, the many and diverse fundamentalists, the millions of practitioners of growing religious groups like the Latter Day Saints and Falun Gong, and the secular spiritualists who took up yoga, meditation, and other byproducts of Hinduism and Buddhism. But long before all this, Edward Blyden had combined the two themes—religion and race—examining the role of religion in the development of a new Africa. In the process, Blyden began to set forth a general analysis of domination.

Edward Wilmot Blyden was born in St. Thomas (then Danish) in the Virgin Islands in 1832. His father was a tailor and his mother a teacher, both free (slavery was abolished in St. Thomas only in 1848) and both literate. The family claimed “pure Ibo” ancestry, a fact that would be of great importance in Blyden’s later polemics against mulattoes. The Blydens lived in Venezuela from 1842 to 1844; Blyden there learned Spanish, the first of his many foreign languages. After his return to the Virgin Islands, his education prospered, and he made connections with a Dutch Reformed clergyman, whose attempt to send the young man to his denomination’s American seminary failed because of racial prejudice. While Blyden was on this futile visit, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 came into full effect. He felt seriously

*Another review from 2053 to share with AJS readers.—Ed.
threatened and jumped at a chance to emigrate to Liberia, which had recently become a sovereign nation.

Blyden remained in Liberia for 22 years. He enrolled in the tiny Alexander High School, where he studied Hebrew and the classics. He became an ordained Presbyterian minister and, eventually, principal of the school. Like any well-educated citizen of a new country, he was active in public debates and served in various official missions, both to the world powers and to the Islamic kingdoms of interior West Africa. From 1862 to 1871 he was professor of classics at the new University of Liberia. He began to learn Arabic and also served briefly as secretary of state (1864–66). Distantly involved in the 1871 controversies surrounding Liberia’s foreign loans, he was nearly lynched and went into exile in Sierra Leone, then a British dependency. He spent two years in Sierra Leone: writing actively, undertaking missions to the interior for the British, and working with British missionary societies. Through correspondence, writing, and travel he became known internationally, particularly to the British Liberal elite, which he met through statesman William Ewart Gladstone and A. P. Stanley, dean of Westminster Abbey.

On his return to Liberia in 1873, Blyden briefly headed the Alexander High School and then again became professor at Liberia College, of which he was the president, 1880–84. In this period he was also ambassador to Britain and secretary of the interior. When he lost a bid for the Liberian presidency in 1885, he returned to Sierra Leone, where he remained most the rest of his life, with brief work for Liberia as ambassador to Britain (1892) and as head of Liberia College (1900). He was now heralded as one of the leaders of West Africa, despite his often controversial views. He loosened his ties with white Christianity, espousing a Native African Church that would, like Islam, embrace most aspects of traditional African life, possibly including polygamy. From 1901 to 1906 he was director of Muslim education in Sierra Leone. Blyden was supported in his old age mainly by African friends and the income of his writings, with additional help from a small pension arranged by an old acquaintance in the British Colonial Office. He died in 1912.

Published in 1887 by W. B. Whittingham, and with a second edition following a year later, Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race contains 14 of Blyden’s occasional pieces: articles, speeches, and three new pieces written for the book. The texts are stylish and erudite, widely informed on current events and literature, and garnished with references from Blyden’s broad reading in original sources. With the exceptions of one early article and the papers written for the volume, the chapters all date from the period 1875–84. As these dates imply, Blyden wrote just before the so-called “scramble for Africa,” in which metropolitan nations concerned for markets, raw materials, and strategic protection suddenly “partitioned” the to-them-largely-unknown continent. This rush to formal imperialism was no more expected by Blyden.
than by most of his English connections. Blyden’s work also just preceded a
great religious transition—the passing of the middle-class Christian revival
that had produced (among many other things) the antislavery movement
and the increasing flood of foreign missions and that would soon expire in
its final guise as metropolitan Progressivism, a halfway station to secular so-
cial democracy. But as with imperialism, Blyden did not see this coming
change. The long revival had decisively shaped his life, and although his own
religious positions changed steadily, his book is quite unaware that secular-
ism is soon to dominate the metropolis itself.

Of the two other great movements that would soon dominate metropol-
itan affairs, Blyden addresses only one—the nationalism exemplified in the
Americans’ bloody Civil War, the unifications of Italy and Germany, and the
emergence of Zionism, all of which Blyden mentions. The second, unmen-
tioned movement was socialism, a metropolis-wide movement growing out
of the economic transformations that were also helping produce the scram-
ble for Africa. Blyden does mention international political economy: he is
quite explicit that the expansion of the metropolitan nations into Africa is
driven in part by “the depressed factories of Lancashire” (p. 110). He also
recognizes that export dependency is a danger for both Liberia and Sierra
Leone (pp. 119–29; Blyden hopes for a stable African society largely self-
sufficient in agriculture and traditional manufactures). But socialism itself
does not appear.

Blyden’s book is thus an odd combination of past and future, of roman-
ticism and realism. In this, it is profoundly Victorian. (I use “Victorian” to
stand for a set of attitudes common across the upper-middle classes of the
metropolis in the mid-19th century.) The combination of passion and re-
straint, of worldwide vision with a local and particular lifestyle, of unusual
commitment with everyday conventionality: these mark Blyden just as they
mark the British Liberals he knew so well. Indeed, the text itself abounds
in Victorian qualities. Blyden accepts sharp racial difference, the doctrines of
evolutionism and inexorable progress, European “Orientalist” studies, and
separate gender spheres. He speaks of “East” and “West,” of “manliness,” of
“fitness for life.” He uses dozens of canonical quotations in original languages,
drawing on the authors and allusions that all Victorian gentlemen would
have encountered. It is no surprise that the frontispiece shows a confident
Blyden at ease in full frock coat nor that the children of his good friend
R. Bosworth Smith (schoolmaster at the elite Harrow School) found him
“awe-inspiring.” At Smith’s table, Blyden would have dined with eminent
Britons like Thomas Hardy, Matthew Arnold, James Bryce, and George
Trevelyan. Students at Harrow in the period of Blyden’s friendship with
Smith included future prime ministers Winston Churchill and Stanley Bald-
win. Blyden moved in very exalted Victorian circles, and his Victorian qual-
ities come as no surprise.
Blyden’s romanticism and optimism could also be called Victorian, although other times and moralities might choose to call these qualities by other names—vision and leadership, for example, or illusion and bravado. He says pointblank, “The fate of the Negro is the romance of our age” (p. 150). (In keeping with long-standing practice in this series, I shall use the author’s terminology—in this case “Negro”—through this review.) He tells us “his [the Negro’s] hands are free of the blood of other men” (p. 161). In splendid language, he hymns the Negro’s return to Africa as a great homecoming (pp. 149–47, 171–173). His sermon (pp. 174–98) on the story of Philip and the eunuch (Acts 8:26–39) weaves together a theory of evangelization, a concept of Africans as uniquely open to experience, and a rich sweep of history from domination to freedom. These and many other passages have a warmth and vision that is extraordinary. Yet Blyden must have known well that the recent Zulu expansion in the south had brought death and disaster to millions; that the Sudanic empires south of the Sahara were slave societies; that Africans had sold millions of their brothers into slavery both east and west. But he chose to see the positive and the possible—a mix of romanticism and performative vision.

Blyden romanticizes not only Africa, but also Islam. Much of the book concerns the obviously greater success of Islamic rather than Christian mission. (Ironically enough, the latter was Blyden’s main source of funding in his early years.) Yet Blyden never addresses the most obvious reason for this differential success—that the Muslims had been in the field for a thousand years by comparison with the Christians’ hundred. Rather he founds his argument on two mechanisms of influence: Islam’s prohibition against images and its spread through trading. The first of these arguments is as simple as it is brilliant. Because Christians are allowed to portray the holy family and even God himself, they gave God a (biological) race, with obvious alienating consequences for black folk both in Africa and the Americas. By contrast, Islam cannot alienate proselytes in this way, simply because it forbids images of the All-Merciful.

It is rather the second, trading argument that is romantic. Blyden holds that Islam spread across Sudanic Africa by peaceful means, through trade and through cooptation of elites, who then helped spread the religion. In this he was relying heavily on sources like Bosworth Smith’s 1874 book on Islam, a popular work by the highly educated schoolmaster who thought (in good Victorian manner) that the Muslims needed “fair play” in the British public sphere and so wrote a careful but strongly positive work. Yet while trade and elite cooptation had played important roles in the spread of Islam in Africa, so also did conquest and forced conversion, often of the masses by elites who saw in Islam a way to stabilize the social order. More important, much of the trade across Sudanic Africa was trade in slaves, and the insatiable demand of the Islamic empires of the Middle East for
slaves took millions of Africans from their homelands over the nearly thousand years that this trade endured. That these slaves were generally employed in services rather than agriculture—a fact Blyden notes alongside his rare acknowledgements of the eastward-flowing slave trade—does not obscure the fact of slavery (pp.137, 324).

Similarly, Blyden is effective in portraying the ignorance of many of the Christian missionaries (e.g., pp. 65–72) of languages, customs, and religion in Africa. But the same tools are not applied to the equivalent Islamic missions, for Blyden’s extensive firsthand knowledge of Islamic kingdoms and empires in inland West Africa was knowledge of societies that had been Islamic for centuries, often under extensive and stable empires. Blyden is certainly right that “the Negro of the ordinary traveler or missionary—and perhaps two-thirds of the Christian world—is a purely fictitious being, constructed out of the traditions of slave-traders and slave-holders” (p. 68). But it is not clear that slaveholders in Arabia held ideas any less fictitious, and if local Islamic images of the Negro were more realistic it is because the religion had come to dominate the West African interior long before Blyden’s arrival there. Similarly questionable is Blyden’s notion that Arabic contains no ethnic slurs (p. 267; that was perhaps true of the classical literary Arabic he knew, but not of everyday dialects) and that the Islamic missionary wars in the Maghreb were justified because they were proselytizing wars (p. 284).

But despite his occasional romanticism, Blyden made two major intellectual advances. First, he developed a comprehensive vision of cultural difference. Second, he produced a truly revolutionary analysis of the impact of domination on the psychology of the dominated.

Blyden’s theory of cultural difference unfolds through his use of the word “race.” Writing before the systematization of biological racism, he uses the word race to refer sometimes to biological groupings (in practice, groupings in terms of appearance) but more often to refer to cultural units (e.g., Italians, Germans, and “Slavonic tribes” are races, as also are “Africans,” whom he views both as a cultural and biological unit). Indeed, this dual concept accords with Blyden’s extensive use of the new language of “nationalism,” which clearly melded culture and biology. To be sure, Blyden’s concept of African-ness sometimes leans toward biology, in keeping with his polemic about mulattoes. But his use of “Ethiopian” to mean any African is clearly more cultural than biological. For example, in much of the book, he includes Egyptians and Egyptian culture in Africa (pp. 143, 174, 227; at other times he specifically omits the Egyptians, e.g., pp. 125, 179, and 320). In addition, he treats Moses as African, praises Egypt as the savior of the Jews, and notes—as Senghor would emphasize almost a century later—that Africa is the “cradle of humanity,” the geographical source of the human organism.
That Blyden derives his concept of African racial identity in part from the rising conception of nationalism in the metropolis is evident throughout. “This seems to be the period of race organization and race consolidation. The races in Europe are striving to group themselves together according to their natural affinities” (p. 141). “Among the conclusions to which study and research are conducting philosophers, none is clearer than this—that each of the races of mankind has a specific character and a specific work. The science of Sociology is the science of Race” (p. 108). Like everyone of his time, Blyden has no idea that this rising nationalism would soon lead to colossal wars, hecatombs of tens of millions of young men, and the bankrupting of Europe. “The law of God for each race is written on the tablets of their hearts and no theories will ever obliterate the deep impression or neutralize its influence on their action” (p. 115). This concept of nationalism as a form of cultural/biological essentialism seems to Blyden both obvious and good.

But having seized the dominant discourse, Blyden must use it to produce not only an argument against domination but also a vision for the future. In the chapter “Liberal Education for Africans” he attempts this vision. He posits an Africa free of foreign influences. He expects African civilization to “organize itself according to the nature of the people and the country” (p. 82). He does not envision Africans as liberal “citizens of the world,” but rather a (united) Africa as one citizen of a world of nations. This new nation is to be author of itself: an argument that comes not only from the contractarians’ notion of the people’s sovereignty but also from the nationalism that Christianity—and particularly the protestant Christianity in which Blyden had been trained—derives from the Jewish scriptures, which essentially identify religion with nationalism. (Note also the masculinist framework: for Blyden, Africans must achieve “manhood.”) There is a strain of internationalism, to be sure. Africans must achieve “self-respect, a proper appreciation of our own powers and of the powers of other people” (p. 85). But most important, Africans must make it independently; they must reject European influences. And for that purpose, Blyden is willing to omit from Negro education all of European literature since the slave trade began in the West, to reject the canon of which he was so great a master—Shakespeare and Milton, Gibbon and Macaulay. Everything European from the early modern period onward must be rejected. African education must rely only on the works of ancient civilization. It must also turn toward the interior of Africa, away from the societies of the coast, which Blyden thought hopelessly degenerate. Race memory (Blyden is not clear on the mechanisms of this) is more solid in the purely black societies of the interior.

The turn to the interior echoes Blyden’s increasing dislike of mulattoes. Indeed, he ultimately employs a “one drop rule” in reverse; only full-blooded Africans can participate in the making of Africa’s future. Blyden’s biographer
attributes part of the virulence of this dislike—which is much stronger in his letters than in the book read here—to his profoundly unhappy marriage to an elite but uneducated mulatto woman, Sarah Yates, in 1856. (Blyden eventually developed another relationship, with an educated Liberian woman, Anna Erskine, with whom he later lived and had five children in Sierra Leone). But Blyden’s dislike no doubt also derived from his own failures as an organizer or politician. Although the mulatto elites of Liberia gave him many chances at practical leadership, none seemed to succeed. Blyden’s letters show a man often out of place in organizational life and verging at times on paranoia. His position on race purity probably derived its vehemence from these unhappy life experiences.

As a result, Blyden did not become an apostle of mixture, as did so many others on the border between the metropolis and its other. He urges instead that the “races” be separate and equal, quoting James Johnson that “the Negro or African should be raised upon his own idiosyncracies” (p. 75). Although we never get a clear statement of those idiosyncracies, Blyden here and there suggests a position like the one Senghor would later articulate: the superiority of Africans in unmediated, direct experience of the world. Such a position presupposes a racial version of division of labor, thus employing another of the late-19th-century’s favorite concepts. Indeed, Blyden was in some ways following a George Eliot essay (quoted on p. 125) that argues that one’s own nationalism should not come at the expense of that of others, but that all must nonetheless recognize the importance of particular culture and indeed of nationalism itself.

But if Blyden’s analysis of race and nation seems sometimes awkward, his analysis of the impact of subordinate status on subordinate peoples is timeless and brilliant. Much of it is concentrated in the essay “Echoes from Africa,” but Blyden’s penetrating anatomy of the subordinate consciousness pervades the book. Thus, education is a problem “because [the Negro] is taught from the beginning to the end of his book-training—from the illustrated primer to the illustrated scientific treatise—not to be himself, but somebody else” (p. 43). Or again, “We have no poetry or philosophy but that of our taskmasters” (p. 105). He recognizes the shallowness of religion received under slave conditions, which made it almost impossible to grow and become independent individuals through religion. “Imitation is not discipleship. The Mohammedan Negro is a much better Mohammedan than the Christian Negro is a Christian, because the Muslim Negro, as a learner, is a disciple, not an imitator. . . . With the disciple, progress is from within; the imitator grows by accretion from without” (p. 44).

Blyden also understands the subordinate’s paranoid insistence on doing everything oneself, the need that makes subordinate groups unable to accept any dominant invitation, however well-meant, that might bypass the winning of equality on the subordinate’s own terms. “We must show
that we are able to go alone, to carve out our own way. We must not be satisfied that, in this nation, European influence shapes our polity, makes our laws, rules in our tribunals, and impregnates our social atmosphere” (p. 90). “We must study our brethren of the interior, who know better than we do the laws of growth for the race” (p. 90).

But he notes certain species of false consciousness as well: for example, that Negroes are more numerous in the orthodox denominations even though these denominations are the weakest in support of racial equality. He notes the seemingly perverse hypersensitivity of the dominated: “Next to ridicule one of the most repulsive things to a sensitive mind is a sympathy unduly extended, especially when the sympathizer has no means of correctly estimating the situation which he imagines calls forth his sympathy” (p. 164). He feels no compunction in rejecting white help: “We beg most respectfully... to assure our white friends that [conquering the race prejudice of whites and assimilating] are matters for which the Negro... will care very little. He will feel that in his own race-groove and on his own continent he has a work to accomplish equal to that of the European, and that caste and race prejudices are as natural to him as to the next man” (p. 168). (The contrast with the late-20th-century metropolitan idea of multiculturalism is striking.) And he also sees the self-hatred that can arise from the situation of domination. “Hence some of us are found repeating things against ourselves, which are thoroughly false and injurious to us, and only because we read them in books or have heard them from foreign teachers” (p. 252). Or again, he speaks of “influences which warp [the Negro] in the direction of self-depreciation” (p. 400).

Nor is Blyden’s searching eye on his own race alone. He notes almost clinically the drift of Christianity into justifying slavery, remarking the new euphemisms with which “Christian divines” tried to avoid their guilt (p. 36). And he sees danger even among friends: “The white man under a keen sense of the wrongs done to the Negro, will work for him, will suffer for him will fight for him, will even die for him, but he cannot get rid of a secret contempt for him” (p. 153). This is a subtle insight, recognizing that in every gift relationship domination is inherent in the (potentially dominating) presupposition that one has something to give. It is this inevitable suspicion that leads Blyden to the strong claim that he detests “the class who are professionally philanthropic [who] at the sight of the Negro, go into ecstasies over this ‘man and brother,’ and put themselves to all sorts of inconvenience to prove to this unfortunate member of the human race that they believe God made of one blood all nations, etc. ... The race has scarcely suffered more from the violent antagonism of its foes than from the false and undue admiration of its friends” (p. 305).

Oddly, this unsettling exposition is somewhat undercut when Blyden tells us on the same page that he prefers “those who treat who treat [the Negro]
as they would a white man of the same degree of culture and behavior, basing their demeanours altogether on the intellectual or moral qualities of the man." For this measure is simply the test of a Victorian gentleman, not the radical African test that has seemed his goal theretofore. And one is surprised to find this trenchant essay followed by a review of Bosworth Smith’s most recent opus, his biography of the “good imperialist,” Lord Lawrence. Blyden admires Smith and Smith’s hero Lawrence because he “would make room, not for one race only, nor for one element of human nature only, but for all the races and all the various elements of the whole world. Not that he would bring them all to a dead uniformity. He would respect the religious and social institutions of alien and non-Christian races, and he would not interfere with their harmless customs” (p. 341). But who is to define harmless customs? Lord Lawrence was famous in some circles for his attempts to stop female infanticide and sati. These were the “customs of alien races.” But were they harmless?

The consistent moralism of Blyden and his sources was repeated a century later, at least in the metropolis. That period too had the confident moralism of the Victorians. Its strong sense of self-righteousness was founded—like Victorianism—on a firm and enduring foundation of enlightenment liberalism and on the “multiculturalism” that seemed so easily to follow from it. And like the Victorians the multiculturalists could not see their desire to impose a particular kind of equality, a particular kind of group politics, and a particular vision of human rights as in any way particular. Like all dominant groups, they thought themselves universal. Blyden speaks for those who resisted this and all similar forms of metropolitan hegemony. His opposition to the Europeanization of Africa prefigures the resistance of many places to the hegemony of the Western metropolis, not only resistance to its material and economic power and to its religion of personal well-being through consumption, but also in some cases to its social ideals of antistratification and maximization of social diversity.

In summary, a brilliant but difficult African man who was a Christian missionary in 19th-century Liberia and also a Victorian gentleman with friends among the great figures of Liberal England was the forerunner of later radical theorists of domination like Antonio Gramsci and Frantz Fanon: Edward Blyden is one of the great figures of 19th-century social thought.