

The Performance of Ritual Metaphors

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Finally a few examples may be given of cases in which the use of descriptive terms for certain concepts or the metaphorical use of terms has led to peculiar views or customs. . . . More convincing are examples taken from the use of metaphorical terms in poetry, which in rituals are taken literally, and are made the basis of certain rites. I am inclined to believe, for example, that the frequently occurring image of the *devouring of wealth* has a close relation to the detailed form of the winter ritual among the Indians of the North Pacific coast. . . .

FRANZ BOAS (1911)

This insight offered to anthropology by Franz Boas has largely lain fallow in the sixty years since. Kenneth Burke, however, in his wide-ranging and insatiable inquiry into man and all his works, has made that insight central in his task. And he would appear to have carried it far beyond the bounds of religious ceremony. He writes:

Indeed as the documents of science pile up, are we not coming to see that whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly

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more than the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile metaphor? Thus we have at different eras in history, considered man as the son of God, as an animal, as a political and economic brick, as a machine, each such metaphor, and a hundred others, serving as the cue for an unending line of data and generalizations. (1954:95)

Of course as Burke has worked out his theories of "dramatism"—for his any discussion of human affairs is dramatic criticism—the symbolic actions singled out again and again take the form of ancient collective ritual. In Burke's analysis ritual dramas emerge in the most contemporary and mundane literary materials. However widely he searches for central metaphors, therefore, the problem of their relation to ritual remains.

In anthropological theory we recognize a progression of central metaphors: the growth metaphor of evolutionism, Frazier's "struggle over succession," the Durkheimian mechanical-organic typology, the Kroeberian superorganic, the diffusionist "pebble in a pool." Histories of anthropological theory are usually silent on these central metaphors although literary anthropologists influenced by Burke (Hyman 1959) are quick to point them out. While we may resist seeing in them a whole system of thought (Pepper 1942) we can recognize their fertility. A new metaphor does plant before us a new frame of reference which is felt to be more apt and to make better sense of the materials than previous perspectives.

If an awareness of metaphor is important because of its presence as an organizing element in inquiry, one is equally moved to its study by the frequency of figures of speech in natural discourse. Unless we give some explanation of how metaphor—the essential figure of speech—operates, we risk making what Garfinkle calls "judgmental dopes" out of our informants. We risk ignoring in our intellections the comprehension they have of their situation as a result of more subtle "sign functions." He points out: "Available theories have many important things to say about such sign functions as marks and indicators but they are silent on such overwhelmingly more common features as glosses, synecdoche, documented representation, euphemism, irony and double entendre." (Garfinkle 1967:71)

If Garfinkle finds such devices of representation common in the natural discourse of the mass society in which he works, how much more common must they be in the societies studied by anthropologists which are proverbially reliant upon indirection and analogy rather than upon direct analysis. Although an interest in the relation of metaphor to ritual is nothing new a theory of that relationship is in need of elaboration. It is proposed here that metaphors provide organizing images which ritual action puts into effect. This ritualization of metaphor

enables the pronouns participating in ritual to undergo apt integrations and transformations in their experience. The study of ritual is the study of the structure of associations brought into play by metaphoric predications upon pronouns.

METAPHORIC PREDICATION AND METAPHORIC MOVEMENT

How can one give an account of metaphoric statements? They are slippery and appear to be something of a swindle. In what way is one to be critical of them. . . affirm or deny their use by reference to the distinctive features of the event or object to which they are applied? Metaphorical statements—our leader is a foxy grandpa—"cannot be corrected by reference to proper usage nor by the way things turn out" (McClosky 1964:216). In what way can one say of them that they are right or wrong? They can only be shown to be inappropriate or inept. Can inquiry satisfactorily probe anyone's sense of ineptness or propriety? It is difficult to specify the set of rules or principles of distribution by which the decision to associate our leader and a foxy grandpa can be anticipated. That decision rests upon a multitude of experiences with these words in contexts which overlap in some respects but contrast in others.

Rather than a grammatical definition of metaphor, I will propose, to guide us, a two-part semantic definition. A metaphor is (1) a device of representation by which a new meaning is learned (Von Steenburgh 1965:678) and (2) a strategic predication upon an inchoate pronoun (an I, a you, a we, a they) which makes a movement and leads to performance.

First, a metaphor is a predication to some subject that changes the meaning of that subject. Thus George is a muffin. Metaphoric usage is to be contrasted with literal usage in the sense that when we make a literal predication about some subject we do not really learn anything new about it. We merely identify it by applying a name to it according to its characteristics (the distinctive features it gives evidence of) at some level of the domain to which it belongs. Thus George is an animal, George is a man, George is an adult, George is a father etc.

Any subject or any set of subjects is literally assigned a name (a predicate) according to a set of characteristics which ordinarily characterize it in common parlance in relation to the domain in which it belongs. Any subject or any set of subjects is assigned a metaphoric predicate according to a set of characteristics which do not literally characterize it, except at a very high level of abstraction. This can be

illustrated with Venn diagrams (Figure 1). In that sense metaphor makes a false attribution and it is in that sense that we learn something new about the subject. And it is also in that sense that Aristotle defined metaphor as the extension of a name from that to which it usually belongs to some other object.

It is sometimes said that literal predication singles out the essential or important features of the subject while metaphoric predication singles out striking but not essential or important features (McClosky 1964:219). This may be the case by reference to logical rules of classification and denotation but it does not hold when we have connotation in mind. It is in the realm of connotation primarily that metaphoric predication teaches us something new. What we are taught there, I mean to point out, may be essential and very important. Although Locke, from the logical point of view (*Essay on Human Understanding*), criticizes such eloquent and artificial invention as metaphor obtains for "insinuating wrong ideas and moving the passions," it is precisely this insinuation and this movement which are behaviorally of greatest interest.

The fact that there is movement in our understanding, that we do learn something new in metaphor, is well recognized by Wheelwright who speaks of that imaginative process of outreaching (epiphor) and combining (diaphor) that characterizes the metaphoric process. Wheelwright (1962) makes a sharp distinction between epiphor—the extension of meaning by unusual comparison—(Life is a dream) and diaphor—the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition—"The Emperor of Ice-Cream"). This is not easily borne out by analysis, however, for metaphor generally combines both processes. Wheelwright's emphasis upon the etymology of the term—*meta* (change), *phora* (motion)—




FIGURE 1

hence change in motion, captures, however, the dynamic to be emphasized. Indeed the term "vehicle," emphasized in the humanities for the metaphorical predicate, expresses the dynamic as well.

It is necessary to distinguish varieties of metaphor. The distinction is to be made first according to the relationship of the metaphorical predicate to its subject. As Aristotle advises, "To adorn, borrow metaphor from things superior; to disparage, borrow from things inferior." Metaphor will thus vary as it adorns or disparages its subject, and this is fundamental. But metaphor as vehicle must also be distinguished according to the clarity with which the subject is held in mind. Thus, if the subject is held clearly in mind, metaphorical comment has a rather different effect than when the subject is vaguely conceived. Here metaphor accomplishes a notable illumination of the obscure and inchoate. This difference has been made in terms of perspective metaphor (my arm, clearly conceived, is a lever) and prescinding metaphor (hate, obscurely conceived, is a smoldering fire) (Van Steenburgh 1965). In general, the semantic movement accomplished by metaphor is from the abstract, and inchoate in the subject to the more concrete, ostensive and easily graspable in the metaphorical predicate. Thus "mercy droppeth as a gentle rain from heaven." The gentle rain gives to the abstract and vaguely conceived "mercy" a concreteness that literal definition is hopeless to achieve. Metaphor obtains in such cases what has been well called by T. S. Eliot an "objective correlative" of what is subjectively inchoate in perception and reflection.

Metaphors, like language generally, can serve a variety of functions: informative, expressive, declarative, directive, etc. They can be put forth in an attempt to bring additional information to bear on a subject where logical processes of superordination or subordination seem inadequate. They can serve merely to express the speaker's feelings vis-à-vis the subject or to declare his intentions vis-à-vis the subject, or, in an indirect way, to give directions to the subject. The metaphors to be discussed here, in varying degrees, all these uses but their particular use approximates the last in that they give directions. We will call them performative metaphors because, as we shall see, they bring about actions appropriate to their realization. They imply performance.

There are many distinctions to be made in figures of speech. We will remark on one only: the distinction between analogue or structural metaphors (Black 1962:222) and textual metaphors (Berggren 1962-63).¹ The difference hinges upon the principle of association, the rule

1. Both Black (1962) and Berggren (1963) make finer distinctions in the varieties of these metaphors than we feel it necessary to make here. For example, Black distinguishes among scale models, analogic models, mathematical models. He also prefers the term *archetype* to metaphor probably because of the association of metaphor exclusively with poetics.

by which there is assimilation of metaphorical predication to its subject. In the case of structural or analogic metaphor, a metaphor is assigned to its subject on the basis of some isomorphic similar structure or pattern of relationships. Thus we say the *branch* of the stream, we use *tree* diagrams in logic, and we speak of the *mechanical* relationship of self-sufficient parts in traditional societies and the *organic* relationship of mutually dependent cells in bureaucratic societies. Black warns with good reason that "identity of structure is compatible with the widest variety of content—hence the possibilities for construction of analogic models are endless. . . the risks of fallacious inference from inevitable irrelevancies and distortions in the model are present in aggravated measure" (1962:223).

By textual metaphor one means that metaphor in which the assimilation made is on the basis of similarity in feeling tone—glowering clouds, a brooding landscape, a dyspeptic bureaucracy. It is, of course, the intent of science to eradicate mere textual or emotional association and capitalize as much as possible on the analogic mode of metaphor attempting to develop more systematic precision in the structural analogy by experimental verification. [The textual/structural distinction is roughly similar to that made between internal and external metaphors in Part I. (eds.)]

In the analogic mode of metaphorical reasoning, however, there may often be emotional reasons behind the assimilation. Take the Durkheimian mechanical and organic metaphors. As has been frequently pointed out, they have a different emotional weight—the former an objectivity, an exteriority, a detachment, the other a subjectivity, an interiority, an attachment. These metaphors move by a kind of "principle of compensation." One can speculate that the assignment of the mechanical metaphor to traditional societies objectifies societies in which the emotional subjectivity of kinship is the characteristic feature. On the other hand, the assignment of the organic metaphor to the impersonal and rational bureaucratic societies subjectifies them and gives them an interiority they do not, in fact, possess. In our analysis of metaphorical usage we stress the importance of the emotional movement accomplished by the metaphor whether textual or analogic in emphasis.

We can now identify the kernel metaphorical statement with which we will be preoccupied: the inchoate subject and metaphorical predicate out of which, by a series of transformations, we see arise the thick and complex surface structure of cult ritual. One need not apologize for employing a modish transformational metaphor for it fits the phenomena very well. Kernel metaphorical statements involve pronouns as the inchoate subjects (tenors, continuous terms) and any of a virtually limitless range of nominal attributes as the metaphorical predicates (vehicles, discontinuous terms). The general movement of kernel meta-

phor is from the abstract and inchoate in the subject to the concrete and ostensive in the predicate. What is more abstract and inchoate and in need of predication than a pronoun? Personal experience and social life cry out that we predicate some identity upon the I, the you, the he, the she, the they, the it. These are the "generalized others" which social experience singles out for us but does not meaningfully identify in any particular way.

Hence:

I am a lion or a parrot.

He is a mouse or a muffin or the King of Kings!

We are friendly giants a bit clumsy in our paternalism.

They are calculating machines who know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

She is a common scold.

It is an organism which was born and will die.

From all these kernel metaphorical statements, we learn something new about the subject in the sense in which we have above discussed learning as movement.

When faced, in short, with the inchoate pronoun men have several options. Most reasonably they can appeal to the principal domain to which the subject belongs and offer a predicate definition by superordination within that domain. He is an investment officer. He is a banker. He is a businessman. He is a father. He is an adult. He is a homo sapiens. We see here immediately that men in social life belong to a number of domains and hence in qualifying the inchoate pronoun we must always choose one domain or another of his activity. Of course, we learn something by the very choice of domains and by ordination within it but not in the sense that we learn something by the metaphorical choice of a domain to which the subject does not legitimately belong and within which he does not legitimately act. The other alternative in the pursuit of a forceful and clear predication to the inchoate pronoun is the tautological one upon which great works of the imagination, in pursuit of ultimate definitions, often end, viz. *The Divine Comedy*. The subject, perhaps out of phenomenological despair that no predicate is not in some sense metaphorical, is simply reiterated, neither confirmed nor denied in the predicate: I am I, he is he, it is itness, etc. The subject like Dante finds himself, itself, themselves, looking into a mirror. In fact, this tautology of the mirror exists in the cult to be examined.² But this alternative, an aspect perhaps of the mythological

2. The initiates, sometimes in Bwiti and almost always in the sister cult of Mliri, eat the alkaloid *choga* (*Tuberenthes choga*) while looking into a mirror painted

motif of eternal return, is not so interesting as the metaphorical predicate which entails, as I now want to point out, ritual performance.

A RITUAL PROGRESS: BWITI

I would like to demonstrate the operation of kernel metaphorical statements in relationship to the Fang reformative cult of Bwiti (Fernandez 1964, 1965, 1966). This cult offers one of the most complex liturgical structures that we know of among African religious movements, which must be today numbered in the many thousands (Sundkler 1960; Barrett 1968).³ It is correspondingly richer in metaphor. But metaphor is an organizing element in all these cult movements and I have elsewhere attempted to give an account of these metaphors—the militant metaphor of Christian soldiering in the *Apostles Revelation Society* in Ghana, the pastoral metaphor of the bull that crashes in the kraal, in the *Church of God in Christ* in Natal, South Africa, the sylvan metaphor of the parrot's egg in *Bwiti* itself, and the atmospheric metaphor of the circumambient holy wind (or ghost) in Christianity Celeste in Dahomey (Fernandez 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970).

The cult of Bwiti in the Gabon Republic is polymorphous with more than six sub-branches. The data presented here are taken from the *Asumege Ening* (New Life) branch which appeared after the Second World War in the Region of the Estuaire and in the early sixties was principally located in Kango, Medounu, and Oyem districts. But Bwiti itself is much older. It appears about the time of the First World War as a result of the contact between the Fang and the southern Gabonese people in the lumber camps of the Gabon estuary and the lower Ogoowe. The Fang adapted their own ancestor cult Bieri (then failing) to Bwiti, the more aesthetically compelling ancestor cult of the southern Cabonese people, notably the Mitsogo and the Baloumbo. At its inception Bwiti represented the syncretism of two northwest Bantu ancestor cults. More recently there has been considerable syncretization of Christian elements.

In the *Asumege Ening* branch of Bwiti we can identify the following distribution of ceremonial scenes (Frake 1964) in the all night cere-

with abstract designs. After some time, under the influence of the narcotic and the ritual, they "see" their ancestor come out of the ground (actually their own face reflected). It is an essential first step of initiation. But it is a crucial step for, visually, the I is transformed into the other by a simple tautology.

3. This judgment is based on field work in ten religious movements in various parts of Africa in 1959-60 and 1965-66. See, for example, the ritual parsimony that characterizes the *Apostles Revelation Society* in Ghana (Fernandez 1970).

mony held once a week. The distinctions may be made according to the Bwiti's own ritual vocabulary.

Introduction

1. *Minkin*: ceremonies of entrance into the chapel and invitation to the ancestors. Intermittent, beginning at 3:00 p.m.
2. *Njimba*: ceremonies of personal prayer, preparation, and foregathering. Held en masse in a hut outside the chapel, 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Zen Ngombi Part I (Road of the Cult Harp)

3. *Zen Abiale*: the ceremonies of the birth of the spirit into the after life (syncretized to the birth of Christ). From early evening until midnight. Interspersed with *obango*—vertiginous dances in which the spirit is shaken free from the body.
4. *Nkobo Akymge*: "evangile," the ceremonies of final reunion with the ancestors. Final and most direct and powerful prayer to the supernatural. Direction of the "miraculous word" to the membership from the cult leader—*nima na kombo*. Includes a small *minkin* in which the membership exits to go out into the forest on narrow pre-cut trails in order to invite in any lingering ancestor spirits. Midnight.

Zen Ngombi Part II (Road of the Cross)

5. *Zen Atou*: the ceremonies of the death of the spirit from after life into this life (syncretized to the death of Christ). From midnight to first light, interspersed with *obango*.

Conclusion

6. *Minkin*: ceremonies of exit from the chapel and farewell to the ancestors. First light until sunrise.
7. *Njimba*: ceremonies of euphonic aftergathering of the membership for ritual food and relaxed conversation. 8:00 a.m.

The scenario is not absolutely fixed in any cult house, and scene development tends to vary with season and with the leaders responsible for the particular scene. Some leaders are more given to creative and unscheduled ceremonial elaboration than others. Now that a Christian calendar has been adopted, the particular ceremonies are even more susceptible to shift in spiritual and practical focus. But we may define four major categories of the scene:

1. *Minkin*: ceremonies (songs and dances) of entrance and exit.
2. *Njimba*: ceremonies (song and prayers) of group cohesion, intercommunication, and appeal to the powers.
3. *Zen Ngombi*: ceremonies (songs and dances) particularly celebrating the primordial experiences of the individual (at the level of

body tissue, events of satisfaction and depletion) and of his culture (at the level of the mythological events of creation and dispersion). Generally divided into two sub-scenes as life processes or death processes are being celebrated (*zen abiale, zen atou*), and according to whether the key instrument is the soft cult harp, *ngombi*, or the intense drums, *obango*.

4. *Evangile*: ceremonies of communication of the "word" from the powers, and confirmation of the bonds of the spiritual community.

Although there may be some variation in the distribution of these scenes and in the arrangement of the more than two hundred songs and a dozen dances that appear as part of them, the general distribution shows us *minkin* and *njimba* embracing the road of the cult harp which themselves embrace the evangile as the nested and nuclear event of the evening.

Although there is considerable variation in the distribution of scenes within the total scenario, and particularly as we descend in level to the inspection of smaller and smaller segments of scenes (Pike 1967), nevertheless the distribution is not probabilistic and dependent solely upon the outcome of the accumulating series of scenes. "In acting as well as in speaking persons have an image of the pattern to be completed and make plans according" (Frake 1964:125). It is just this series of images that must be scrutinized if one is to understand the cult and have some modest foreknowledge of its necessary development. My view is that these images are contained in metaphors, which organize scene development in a fundamental way.

Let me then examine four metaphors which arise in Bwiti as members comment upon the evening's progress. We find them referring to various constellations of the ceremony as: here we are such and such, there he is such and such—*vyong dzi bi ne, eyong te e ne*. Four of the most recurrent predicates are:

- bi ne esamba*—We are a trading team (in file through the forest).
bi ne ayong da—We are of one clan.
me ne (e ne) emuan mot—I am (he is) the son of man (man child).
bi ne nlem mvoore—We are one heart.

Although these metaphors emerge in liturgical commentary, one finds them running through cult life and providing a periodic familiarizing reinforcement, or leitmotif. Merely to identify them is not enough. We must (1) demonstrate their aptness and (2) show how, in performance, they accomplish those transformations of experience which is the prime function of religion.

First consider their aptness, for the fitness of ritual lies in the aptness

of metaphor, and it should be one main object of anthropological method to indicate the contexts by which metaphorical associations become appropriate or apt. It may be asked: is not aptness a function of purpose? Is not something apt or appropriate to a certain purpose? Bwiti participants articulate several purposes that bring them together for worship. Predominant among these are the desires to obtain surcease from the sorrows of village life, to obtain some sense of vitality in that life, and at the same time to obtain effective contact with the ancestral dead and the powers of the beyond. In fact, the purposes of the cult are not dogmatically, even clearly, formulated, and it is difficult to obtain consensus about them (Fernandez 1965). One may, abstracting from the evidence before us, say more accurately that the cult ceremonial is not explicitly regarded as a technique undertaken with a practical purpose in mind but is rather valued for certain kinds of affirmation it makes and inspirations it gives. And to understand these affirmations and inspirations—we may still wish to call them “purposes”—one must examine the metaphors themselves. For a very fundamental kind of purpose is declared in the very choice of these metaphors.

The metaphor of the *esamba* appears first in the transformations I want to consider. It is the metaphor that belongs typically to the *minikin*. The metaphor connects the cult members to a cohesive trading band marching with determination through the forest. Historically the main association of this term is that of the adventurous team of young men which collected rubber and ivory at the turn of the century and took it to the coast to exchange for trade goods. This group was characterized by high solidarity, the euphoria of hunting and gathering, and a rewarding trading relation with the colonial world. It was a group characterized by values and a sense of purpose which led to significant fulfillment. The aptness of this metaphor is readily understood when the goallessness, the lack of solidarity in village and kinship, and the high degree of ambivalence about the larger colonial world are grasped. For these conditions provide experience to which the metaphor was, and continues to be, a compensatory representation.

The second metaphor to emerge is that of *anyong da*, one clan. It is primarily the metaphor of the *nimba*. This may not seem like a metaphor but in fact it is, for the membership of Bwiti chapels is an association drawn from many clans and to a degree from several tribes. It is not properly described, by reference to the norms of Fang social structure, as one clan. During the *nimba* when the members sit together under the eye of the elders of the cult to hear individual prayers they say: We are one clan. Prayers are made at this time, incidentally, preceded by the reciting of genealogy, the “*pièce maîtresse*” of clan identification. We must keep in mind that clan relationships are much

degenerated in their claims on allegiance (this is reflected in the decline in knowledge of the genealogies). Since allegiance to the clan is virtually the same thing as allegiance to the ancestors, who are its guarantors, we understand the aptness of this metaphor. For the Bwiti cult is reacting to the kinds of individualism and opportunism which have undermined the clan and the ancestors, who symbolized its viability and the viability of all its members.

The third metaphor is *emwan mot*: child of man, or man child. In the process of the *zen ngombi* phase the members speak of themselves and particularly of their leaders as *emwan mot*. This metaphor has a complex of associations, not the least of which may be a Christian one—in particular the reference to the Savior not only as the son of God but also as the son of man. In this metaphor, it seems to me, the Bwiti expresses several notions. First of all, the satisfactory spiritual experience can only be achieved by escaping from the contaminated (*ngol abe*—bad body) condition of adulthood where, it is said, sexuality and strife with one's brothers and peers burden down the spirit and prevent it from rising over to the “other side.” Efforts are made in ritual costume and in spatial arrangements in dance patterns to avoid the expression of sexual dimorphism and the direct contact between the sexes. The cooperative attitude toward all cult activities is insisted upon. Thus is the innocence of the child achieved in preparation for the passing over to the “other side” where the spirits exist in asexual harmony. Other associations make this an apt metaphor—for example, the notion that the younger the child the closer he is to the ancestors. The metaphor also aptly expresses that state of helplessness and search for aid which the cult members desire to impress upon the ancestors and the great gods. Finally by insisting on identifying themselves with the child of man they emphasize their corporeality—the primordial facts of birth, the intermediate conditions of organismic life, and the inevitability of death—which in all its aspects they both celebrate in worship and seek to pass beyond.

This last intention of the child of man metaphor is even more aptly conveyed in the metaphor of “one heartedness”—*nlem mwore*. This metaphor is affirmed at several points in the ceremony, first at midnight when the members, candles in hand, exit from the chapel in single file and move out into the forest to make final appeals to any ancestors that may be lingering there. As the members file back into the chapel they begin to spiral more and more tightly together until they form a compact mass with candles raised above their heads in such a manner as to form one flame. Here is “one heartedness,” a general object of the cult, most characteristically obtained.

Organic metaphors, the extension of the body image into secondary

structures and institutions, are quite common in this cult. We see the cult house itself assimilated in its various parts to the human body (Fernandez 1970b). The various torches and pitch lamps are assimilated to the life of the body, for men, like torches, are all shells within which a vital substance burns its allotted time. Membership in a corporate religious body is variously celebrated, but this almost always seems to be done for complex reasons. First, the projection of corporeality into "objective correlatives" is part of the process of escaping the burden of that corporeality—and the Banzie (member of Bwiti), however they may wish to vitalize it, do regard it as a burden. Secondly, insofar as there is a preoccupation with corporeal well-being, ritual action, in structures and institutions that have a corporeal association, is efficacious (perhaps abreactive [Levi-Strauss 1963b]) in respect to the body's own problems.

In respect to the particular body metaphor here—the heart—its aptness consists in the fact that (1) it is the heart which is the most alive of the bloody organs, (2) it is traditionally conceived by the Fang to be the organ of thought, and (3) in its bloodiness it is associated with the female principle. The aliveness of the heart is apt because, as we have seen, one pole of the cult's intention aims at greater vitality in this life. The fact that the heart is the organ of thought (as opposed to the brain which is the organ of will and intention) is compatible with the other objective of cult life—to escape the corporeal and thus affirm unanimity at that level at which it is most significant—the level of thought. I have elsewhere discussed the focal importance in this cult of the female principle in the universe, *Nyngwan Mebege*, the sister of God. I pointed up then how this element is celebrated in the many different liturgical references to blood and the bloody organs. For blood and the bloody organs are the female portion of the corporeal; semen, bone, and sinew are the male portion. (Fernandez 1969b, 1970b) Many meanings then are at work in this metaphor, for that bloody organ, the heart, has a congeries of useful associations. The heart has so many associations that in many contexts it carries the weight of a symbol. But we are interested here in its specific predication upon "we," the cult members. Many more metaphors than these four appear in Bwiti liturgy—a liturgy that is also laden with symbols. These four metaphors, however, provide a sufficient base for the understanding of ritual as change in motion.

RIITUAL ACTTUALIZATION OF A METAPHORIC PLAN

We now ask the question as to what role these metaphors play in ritual behavior. Since there is more than one metaphor, in any ritual

the question is really how metaphors progressively interact and how they affect the participants who suspend belief in their favor. We might best represent this by elaborating the Test-Operate-Test-Exit model of planned behavior, the so-called TOTE model, put forth by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). It is an information processing model. This model suggests that a metaphor is not only an image, it is a plan for behavior.

I will take it as axiomatic in this model that:

1. People undertake experience in religious movements because they desire to change the way they feel about themselves and the world in which they live and they want to change the way they think about these things as well. They desire to achieve more definition and better definition of their inchoate selves.

2. A metaphor is an image which when acted upon by ritual moves these feelings and object relationships in the desired direction. It provides apt definition.

3. The process by which metaphorical plans operate is one of looping and feedback of information flow in which the venerable principles of contiguity (metonymy) on the one hand and association (metaphor proper) on the other account for the ritual elaboration of the image.

A TOTE account of the dynamics in ritual tenor brought about by the operation of our four metaphorical vehicles is given in Figure 2. In respect to the Fang Bwitist I regard him as coming into the ceremonial of this religious movement suffering from the anomie, the individualism, the comparative deprivation, the status denial, etc. that have long been identified as the psychosocial consequences of rapid change in the colonial situation. I see him, in other words, as coming into the cult with some constellation of feelings of isolation, disengagement, powerlessness, enervation, disphoria, debasement, contamination, and a sense of personal transgression. I load all these disgraceful states upon our unfortunate Bwitist only for purposes of demonstrating the model. It is to be supposed that religious movements have, at one time or another, to contend with all these states though rarely at one time and in the same individual. As a consequence of ritual action, that is a consequence of the operationalizing of metaphorical images which are put forth in contention with these states, we see the Bwitist and the cult group with which he performs as being able to exit from the ritual incorporated, empowered, activated, and euphoric!

The overall predication on our inchoate, and we suppose, troubled subject is "I am a Banzie," that is, I am a member of Bwiti. While in one sense this is not a metaphor but simply an identification of the individual's membership in a class, in another sense it is clearly a

and maintainers of revitalization movements who have the insight and force of character and talent for organization, to envision and "create" a new religious culture (Wallace 1956). It is their visions that rest most fundamentally upon metaphorical predications on inchoate subjects. Through force of character and talent for organization they were and are enabled to operationalize these metaphors in the manner in which we find this done in Bwiti. And as the leaders of the various cult chapters, according to their nature, constantly have new visions, new metaphors appear frequently to obtain their ritualization. Fission in this cult and in so many others like it, which often arises because of dispute over ritual (Fernandez 1965:920), may be seen, in the end, as a dispute over the aptness of metaphor.

It must also be recognized in respect to this distinction between social and cultural consensus that the participant in any highly organized activity may be paying quite variable attention to the particulars of his own activity or the activity of others while yet going through, in an acceptable way, its minimum requirements. There may be important differences in "focus." These are differences as regards the level of activity of which the participant is aware or upon which he is concentrating. In fact, the participant's attention at certain junctures may be so removed from the level of activity in the hierarchy of events which are just then qualifying a particular metaphor as to be "with" the ritual in body only. This hypostatization or removal of attention we may call daydreaming (or night dreaming, in the case of Bwiti) cannot be so complete as to prevent the participant from recognizing those cues (signals) by which scenes are changed and new metaphors put into operation. Interestingly enough, although this cult employs an alkaloid narcotic (*tabernaemthos eboka*) for purposes of initiation and in very modest amounts to free the participants from the fatigue of the all night ceremony, cult leaders guard against the abuse of the drug lest it cause attention to stray and degrade the precision of the ritual.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF METAPHOR

We may be skeptical that this account of the routines and sub-routines by which metaphorical predicates are realized in ritual brings us really close to the complexity of religious experience. While the nature of a phenomenological account of that complexity remains uncertain, our account may be made more apt (in relationship to the inchoate experience we ourselves have of religious behavior) by looking more closely at the problem of the transformation of metaphor. I have been assuming that in the ritual progress the transformation of

the participant's attention from one metaphorical domain to another is brought about by a testing of the consequences of ritual against the desired image. The exiting to the next metaphor occurs when the pronominal image—the I image, the we image, etc.—approximates to the metaphorical predication.

But our participants are not, after all, automata. The experience of putting actions into operation to fulfill images is much thickened by the network of associations that run throughout this elementary activity and provide for differing kinds of integration and differing kinds of experience for individual participants. Here we must introduce the two laws of association: (1) the law of contiguity or cause and effect, and (2) the law of assimilation by similarity. In respect to expressive phenomena this difference as we have implied is generally attached to the distinction between metonymy and metaphor, the former being figures of speech resting on relationships of contiguity in the same domain of experience and the latter resting on perceived or felt similarities in the structure or textural quality of experiences which are not necessarily contiguous. These are very basic notions in anthropology, linguistics, and psychology: Jacobson and Halle (1956), Lounsbury (1959: 123-28). They were recognized very early in anthropology by Tylor (metaphor and syntax) and by Frazer (sympathetic or similarity magic and contiguous or contiguity magic). They are otherwise discussed by Plato, Locke, Hobbes, Hume, etc.

It is generally recognized in associationist theory that the contiguity principle fails to explain much of the phenomena. "We must be willing to admit the possibility that obtained associations may never have occurred together in the experience of the person who yields them—they may instead be the result of schemata which serve the function of bringing together structurally related elements from diverse experience" (Deese 1965:20). The nature of these schema have become the object of intense research in psychology and linguistics, and we will not pursue them here except to suggest that the original metaphorical insights create a framework which dictates certain associations and denies others. As Deese elsewhere (1965:159) says, "Our cognitive structures are the outcome of the operation of hypothesis upon our experience." The pronominal metaphors we have identified are surely hypothesis (predications) which are brought to bear upon experience, in particular the inchoate experience of pronominal identity.⁴

In what manner are diverse experiences brought together under the aegis of our metaphors? The two laws of association often lead to the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations. In lan-

4. Metaphors are called by Peppier "World Hypotheses" (1942).

gnage study syntagmatic associations are those which occur by reason of grammatical contiguity—the association of good with boy, kindly with neighbor, or reasonable with doubt may rest on such an association. By paradigmatic association one means associations which rest upon equivalence of function—the capacity to occupy the same slot or frame in the grammar. Thus fragmentary and rudimentary or euphoric and despicable are associated on the grounds they all can occur in the frame “this was a ——— presentation.” The idea is that objects, actions, and events which occupy or can occupy the same slot in experience are associated by that fact of similarity. Slots are filled by what linguists call “form classes” (function classes) although for our purposes they constitute a very large and weak set of associations. Nevertheless, the extension of this grammatical notion to the understanding of behavior as being composed of sequences of frames each of which contains a class or set of appropriate actions or objects is fruitful. It pinpoints not only a fundamental principle of behavioral organization but also accounts for its variability (Pike 1967). For frames differ in the variety of events which will satisfactorily fill them. In most frames participants have a degree of choice. And although ritual is more compulsive in this respect, in discussing either the paradigm of metaphors which will fill the overall ritual frame or the sequence of scenes which will satisfy the metaphorical image, one must keep in mind that there are possible variations and this is always a source of creativity and complexity.

From this perspective what we have been discussing is the filling of frames and the role of metaphor in this fulfillment! In the largest sense men are framed between the remembered past and the imagined future with the need to fill the inchoate present with activity. We are, as the expression goes, “time binders” concerned to find the kind of activity that will fill this frame and bind the past and the future together. The need to bind past and future together in the present is even more pressing in rapidly transitional societies moving between tradition and modernity. In these societies, so painfully poised upon the uncertain interface of the past and the future, there are few well-proven frame-filling technical and ritual routines. Religious movements of the kind discussed here are a particularly apt way to fill ultimate frames. As we see these movements—and we see them most fundamentally as a particular paradigm of metaphors—they, in their microcosmogeny, give a futre-ness to the past and a pastness to the future that is fundamentally reassuring.⁵

5. I have elsewhere (Fernandez 1966) argued this “time binding” consequence of metaphor using Black’s view of the interactive nature of these figures of speech (Black 1962).

Microcosmogeny—this filling of inchoate frames including the space framed by our own bodies at various levels of our experience—can be seen then as the product of the interplay of paradigmatic and syntagmatic association—the relationship, in other words, between metaphors and metonyms.

This is a relationship which has preoccupied Lévi-Strauss, who with frequency in his work refers to the law of mythical thought: “the transformation of metaphor is achieved in metonymy.” But his thought on this matter is difficult of interpretation. The clearest exposition comes in a footnote to *The Savage Mind* (1966a:150). Here he points out the paradigmatic-syntagmatic bricolage involved in the life of Mr. Wemmick of *Great Expectations*. I interpret Lévi-Strauss’s meaning here in the following way. The framework of Mr. Wemmick’s life is a suburban house which may be treated metaphorically as either a villa or as a castle. What, as a bricoleur, Wemmick “undertook and realized was the establishment of paradigmatic relations between the elements of these two (syntagmatic chains) . . . he can choose between villa and castle to signify his abode, between pond and moat to signify the entrance, between salad and food reserves to signify his salad greens.” By metaphorical assertion Wemmick’s life as a bourgeois, a very inchoate existence we take it, is transformed into “a succession of ritual actions, the paradigmatic relations between two equally unreal syntagmatic chains. That of the castle which has never existed and that of the village which has been sacrificed.”

Lévi-Strauss’s difficulty comes when we are told that “the first aspect of bricolage is thus to construct a system of paradigms with the fragments of syntagmatic chains. But the reverse is equally true . . . a new syntagmatic chain results from the system of paradigmatic relations . . . metaphors take over the mission of metonyms and vice versa.” I should like to rephrase these important insights in the following way. The inchoateness of certain frames of experience cause metaphors to be put forth whose effect is to incorporate into such frames other domains of experience which are more clearly understood. These frames, as Pike has made clear (1967), are hierarchally arranged and may be considered at any level of generality, from the frame that in the case of Bwiti falls between Saturday night and Sunday morning, to the most general frame we have identified above, between the past and the future. Not only does the level of generality of the frame vary but the context differs. The main point is that within any frame there is a certain and finite class of appropriate (apt) fillers. This class of functional associates is the paradigm. Hence in that frame that falls for the Fang Bwitiist between tradition and modernity and between Saturday night and Sunday morning we have identified the following

paradigm of apt metaphors: *esamba*, *ayong da*, *emvan mot*, *nlem moore*.

The mission of metaphor is to fill inchoate frames by incorporating experience from a domain aptly included in the particular context of that frame.⁶ In another current vocabulary one might say that "metaphor" is a mediating device connecting the unconnected and bridging the gaps in causality. The frame in which metaphors appear are a part of a larger syntagmatic chain just as they themselves define or at least require, at a lower level, a sequence of frames (a syntax) to fulfill themselves (as we have demonstrated). In that sense it is true to say that metaphors take over the mission of metonyms and vice versa.

In extended discussion the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations becomes, we see, difficult to maintain. In respect to linguistic analysis Lounsbury finds the two notions of similarity relation and contiguity relation not independent: "Linguistic similarity is nothing more than shared contiguity associations" (1959:127). If we think of this in terms of a matrix, following Lounsbury, it is to be pointed out that the substitution distribution matrix A(ij) (where j is the paradigm of 1. to n frames and i is the class of 1. to n forms that may fill each of these frames) may be inverted to the substitution distribution matrix B(ji) (where i is the paradigm of 1. to n forms and j is the class of 1. to n frames in which these forms may appear). What is a distribution paradigm in one sense—the set of frames into which a class of different forms may be fitted—becomes a substitution class in another sense—the class of frames defined by their ability to entertain the same set of forms. For the fact is that the same form can appear in different frames. This is a basic kind of transformation and accounts for the difficulty of categorizing the elements of religious or any expressive experience without having these categories undergo inversions, and without having, in Lévi-Strauss's phrasing, "Metaphors take over the mission of metonyms and vice versa."

These difficulties can be illustrated in various ways. The materials we have presented, for example, suggest a cube of data (Figure 3) whose cells have the following dimensions: (1) the succeeding domains of experience framed by the metaphor (the horizontal axis, m); (2) the particular scenes performed and designed to fulfill the expectation of the metaphor (the vertical axis, s); and (3) the particular associations brought into play by each scene (the receding axis, a). This

6. The mission of metaphor, we may further add, is not only to fill inchoate frames but, by filling them with certain models, to accomplish a fundamental transformation in that subject which is being syntactically elaborated. As has been pointed out for language itself the selection of any word inevitably has a transformative effect on the entire sentence.




FIGURE 2

cube can be collapsed and inverted in various ways as we have suggested. In Figure 2 we collapsed the dimension of association so as to obtain the principal scenes of each metaphorical frame (m by s). In Figure 4 below we have collapsed the cube along the dimension of scenes so as to point up the matrix (m by a) of the principal associations for each metaphor. But insofar as there is reiteration of scenes (or associations) we can invert to obtain the principal domains or scenes characteristic of each association (a by m or a by s) as well as the principal metaphors characteristic of each scene (s by m). Although we collapse or invert this cube into various matrices to tell us about various kinds of classifications, it itself has a veridical quality in respect to the progressive transformations and reiterations characteristic of religious experience which originates somewhere and moves toward infinity.

Let me illustrate some of the particularities of our metaphorical progression by collapsing the sequence of scenes that, operating upon the metaphor, put it into effect. I would emphasize instead the chain of associations which are brought into existence by each metaphorical reprising of the cult situation—each metaphorical “acting out.” Just as Mr. Wernnick lives in a house among other houses which he metaphorically interprets to be either a villa or a castle, so the cult member lives in a body among other bodies which he (overall) metaphorically interprets to be that of an angel (a spiritual rather than a corporeal entity). To achieve this overall corporeal transformation the members are asked through ritual to operate upon four subordinate metaphors. Examine the following chains (Figure 4) then, each associated with one or another of the images in the Bwiti metaphor paradigm. We see that all of the items in all the chains arise out of that inchoate primary experience which is that of corporeal life with the self and with others. But particular chains of that primary experience are extended into cult life according to the particular image of the body or of society or of both which has been metaphorically selected.

The basic transformation in this scheme is from a suffering corporeality (state of *emuzan mot*) to an exalted spirituality (state of *banzie-angel*) and subordinately from a debilitated corporeality to a revitalized corporeality. The paradigm of metaphors aids in accomplishing this by calling into focus and scanning as it were different aspects of the primary corporeal experience. Thus the members find at various moments in their ritual celebrations the extension of various aspects of the primary experience of corporeality—that experience which is so problematic and inchoate. Each of these metaphorical images of the body and its constituents calls to mind different aspects of the body, placing it in focus in the frame so that if this aspect is not actually

Overall Basic Transformation

suffering debilitated individual	is incorporated into	worshipping body of Bwiti	which is incorporated into	spiritual body of Bwiti (angel)
Subordinate Transformations				
primary corporeal experience	chain of associations	chain of associations	chain of associations	chain of associations
relatedness to others	celebration of the achievement of solidarity through the cooperation of corporeal parts!	celebration of lineal relatedness	sorrowful and beseeching celebration of helplessness and depen- dence, desire for related- ness!	celebration of the achieve- ment of unity by liquefaction
color spectrum	white	white	black	red
body effluent	sweat	semen	cloacal exuviae	blood
sexuality	young manhood	mature manhood	childhood and latency	incorporation with the mother
body constituents	sinews tendons & muscles	skeleton & brain	flesh and skin	veins, arteries, and bloody organs
attitude or posture	energetic adventure- some, self- confidence, euphoria	pensive and serene reflection	inferiority and self- abnegation	self- transcendence

FIGURE 4

revitalized in the acting out of the metaphor (as occurs in the case with the *esamba* and *ayong da* metaphors) it is at least clearly brought to mind for functional purposes. The necessary paradigm for the overall transformation to spiritual status must include the *emuan mot* and the *nlem mvore* metaphors.

There is a looping process in ritual by which the member's attention undergoes small transformations in associations. Different aspects of his inchoate primary corporeal experience are called out by that metaphor active at the moment and extended to different social domains of experience. The sequence of metaphors thus not only shifts attention around within the primary domain but extends that experience into succeeding social domains—the domain of group adventure (*esamba*), the domain of the ancestral cult (*ayong da*), the domain of childhood experience (*emuan mot*).

A metaphor to be realized imposes certain actions upon those who would operate on it, as we have said. Our point here is that it also brings with it in association a syntax of elements (the chains in Figure 4) which are part of the experience of that metaphor.

The paradigm of metaphors which we have considered here accomplish the following movement. The first two metaphors take the individual and include him and his body within two compensatory social structures—the first an energetic and exuberant if ephemeral solidarity group; the second a powerful and awesome and enduring kin group, the patrilineage. The third metaphor counting on the revitalization accomplished by the first two metaphors appears to move our subjects to a contemplation of the essential helplessness (if not worthlessness) of their corporeality and moves them to the final liquifaction of spiritual unification in *one heartedness*—the metaphor which represents vitalization in the most spiritual sense. Each of these metaphors picks out a part of the inchoate wholeness of corporeal existence and explores the syntax of its contiguous associations. When this exploration is fulfilled another metaphor appears in a sense trying "to return us to the whole but only succeeds in calling out another domain of primary experience for exploration." Here we note another source of the transformation of metaphor—the constant search to return to the whole, out of dissatisfaction, perhaps, with the "partness" of any of our devices of representation.⁷

In sum we may note the following shift in attention in respect to the domain of denotation, accomplished by these metaphor predicates:

7. Lévi-Strauss makes such an observation about the function of metaphor in returning to the whole: "Various forms of metonymy," he points out, "and in particular synecdoche celebrate the parts of experience while the more eloquent metaphors of myth refer back to the whole for significance." (1969:342).

	Predication	Shifts in Domain
major metaphor	<i>bi ne banzie</i> we are angels	physiological to spiritual
subordinate metaphors	<i>bi ne esamba</i> we are an association <i>bi ne ayong da</i> we are one clan <i>bi ne emuan mot</i> we are manchild <i>bi ne nlem mvore</i> we are one heart	individuality to intense social solidarity ephemeral contemporaneity to enduring lineal allegiance maturity to immaturity substance to essence, structure to content

In respect to the physiological experience which has been extended into this ritual activity and whose transformation is involved in each metaphor, we see a shift from the first two subordinate metaphors which call up the structural organs of willful activity (sinews, tendons, bones, and brain) to the organs of flux and liquifaction, in particular the heart which is, for the Fang, the organ of reflection and thought.

Several observations remain if this account is to come as close as possible to this religious experience conceived of as the actualizing of metaphor. First, although we have shown these four metaphors as appearing one time only in the process of the ritual, during the entire ceremony they actually appear several times over in thematic repetition. They appear with a rather different sequence of actions associated with them but they aim at the same kinds of objectives both in respect to the extension of primordial experience and in respect to the selection of denotative domains to which that experience can be extended.

We may secondly point out that, although we presume the study of metaphor to be primary to the study of symbolism, nevertheless symbols of various kinds are constantly appearing and being manipulated in the ritual process. In Bwiti these are numerous indeed and range from the cult harp (Fernandez 1965) to the *akon abda*, the pillar of heaven and earth, within which so many meanings are condensed (Fernandez 1970b). Other symbols are the cult dress and the chapel house itself which condenses birth and death elements, male and female sides, a spirit realm and an earth realm, a structure and a content, tranquility and activity (Fernandez 1970). Symbols of any import in ritual condense many meanings as Turner has so clearly demon-

strated (Turner 1967:chap. 1). This gives them a multivocality or polysemy which makes them highly volatile in the metaphor scenario we are examining here. They are by virtue of their many meanings always likely to shift the member's attention from the metaphoric operations at hand either by hypostatizing it at another level or by shifting his attention to a meaning (say femaleness rather than maleness or bodily corruption rather than bodily exaltation) not appropriately voiced by the metaphor under which he is currently acting.

The metaphoric context in which a symbol appears tends to focus attention on a particular meaning of that symbol (by reason of its multivocality it can appear in many metaphoric contexts). Still the symbol is volatile in the sense that it is always likely to return the participants' "attention to the whole" to shift his attention away from the current metaphoric focus.⁸ Symbols thus add the possibility of the experience of other levels of meaning during the basic transformations we are discussing and they fill out this universe of religious experience giving it a resonance, a thick complexity and potency, which the discussion of the paradigm of metaphors—however basic—does not fully capture.

CONCLUSION: THE IDEA OF METAPHORIC EXPRESSION

Religious metaphors recast the inchoate (and ineffable) whole of primary experience into various manageable perspectives. They do this by taking experience from more manageable domains, into which some aspects of that primary experience can be extended, to represent it. Most metaphorical images potentially imply a set of actions by which they might be realized. The utterance of metaphor itself as well as the actions undertaken to realize it is attended by a set of associations which "belong" to it by reason of contiguities in previous experience. The assertion of metaphor thus provokes a metonymous chain of elements or experiences associated with it as part to whole, cause to effect, or other contiguity in time or space. Thus for the

8. In a different context I have tried to assess this quality of the symbol (1965: 922). "It appears, thus, that the tension between society and culture, between causal-functional systems and logico-meaningful systems, is not only a consequence of their inevitable incongruities, but can be summed up in the tension between the symbol and the signal—the one immediate, dependent, imbedded in the existential situation of coexistence and coordinatd interaction, the other autonomous with super-added meanings forever pulling the culture carrier's attention beyond his immediate situation to the larger implications of his actions—creating in him, in other words, self awareness."

metaphor *ayong da* which is the celebration of clanship and the male principle the syntax of metonyms are: the body infrastructure (skeletons and brains), for these are the sacred relics of the ancestor cult; semen, the vehicle of lineage continuity; sexual maturity, the requirement for entrance into the ancestor cult which preserves and protects the lineage.

When the frame which the metaphor is filling calls for an apposite predication upon an inchoate pronomial subject, certain kinds of associations among the great number possible to the image of the clan are selected. That is to say that the metaphor does not simply excite associations but imposes a schema upon them—a metaphor is a hypothesis which makes some things in the world relevant and all other things quite irrelevant. The associations, in short, are conceptually mediated by the metaphor. The associations thus mediated are apt to the subject's preoccupation with his (or their or our) corporeal existence and his or their social existence (status and role). In fact, the truly apt metaphors, in the religious context at least, are those that when acted upon combine in themselves some satisfactory representation of both social experience as well as primary experience. We see this combination in at least three of our four metaphors: *esamba*, *ayong da*, *emuan mol*. In these the value of primary experience is affirmed by extension into social experience, and social experience is revitalized by association with primary experience. A fundamental transformation is thus accomplished by metaphor: the socialization of primary experience on the one hand and the rendering of social experience primarily relevant on the other.

This capacity of the apt metaphor has been argued by Victor Turner to be the fundamental capacity of dominant religious symbols. In one of the most important insights of his work, he points out that the multivocality of religious symbols tends to polarize between physiological referents on the one hand and referents to the normative values of social life on the other. Ritual dramas in which these symbols are manipulated create an exchange between physiological and social experiences ennobling the former and investing the latter with emotional significance. Thus are social relationships revitalized. For the socially necessary is made desirable by having it shown that the requirements of social structure are as necessary as the primary processes themselves (Turner 1967:chap. 1). No doubt if what we are physiologically can be shown by religion to have a socially relevant manifestation, and vice versa, then religion accomplishes a fundamental transformation. Two of our metaphors aim at that goal. But religion often aims at more than that. It aims at showing that what we are physiologically and socially can be transcended. This is par-

ticularly a Christian intention, and two of the metaphors of our syncretist cult aim at that goal. In any case, this insight moves us far toward attaining that necessary level of analysis where "body, soul, society—everything merges" (Mauss quoted by Lévi-Strauss [1966b: 113]).

The merging of everything, the return to the whole, can only be, as far as the student of religion is concerned, the final analysis. What we have been trying to follow through here is the beginning analysis, that of metaphorical predications, and the intermediate analysis, that of the structure of associations which these bring into play in their actualization. The identification of the two basic types of association—those based on contiguity and those based on similarity—help us to understand the structure of ritual only to a degree. We should not pretend that we have solved all the problems of this analysis although we would hope to have focused our attention correctly. Although certain kinds of association can be well enough understood—how chains of association, for example, appear in relation to each metaphor—yet it is more difficult to understand how metaphors are associated within paradigms or how metaphors themselves appear!

If we look to the literature on association, we do not find much help. For this literature has tended to concentrate upon association by external contiguity or ordination within the same domain or the same tree structure. It has tended to concentrate upon superordinate (dog-animal), subordinate (animal-dog), and coordinate (dog-cat) associations. But many of the most interesting kinds of association for the student of religion are usually thrown into a wastebasket class. These are associations whose linkages seem very remote when compared to any principle of inner ordination or external contiguity.

The kinds of associations involved here would seem to be those obtained by contrast on the one hand and by mediation, synthesis, or grouping on the other.⁹ Association by contrast is better studied and better understood. We need hardly discuss it. We see it in our metaphorical paradigm as *esamba* (euphoric contemporary solidarity), which provokes in some sense its opposite, *ayong da* (somber historic solidarity). Further the thought of the exaltation of the body social (in *esamba* and *ayong da*) leads by opposites to the denigration of both the body personal and the body social in *emuan mo!*. This in turn

9. Deese defines two structural types (1965:160) in his discussion of the laws of association: "The manifest and particular associations we find in ordinary thought and language are derived from and can be described by fundamental structural types. These structural types are defined by contrasting relations and grouping relations." The concept of synthesis arises from the Kantian distinction between associations which are predicated on analysis and those predicated on synthesis. The distinction is similar to that between metonymy and metaphor.

leads to an exaltation and transubstantiation of the body personal and social in *nlem moore*.

Association by mediation or synthesis is much more personal or culture-bound and not at all evident empirically. While, for example, the association between moon and white and sun and red has some easily accessible empirical base the association between moon and female and sun and males does not. These latter are based on some inner sense of relationship, customary to some individual or culture, which makes them difficult to study.

Despite the obvious difficulties it is these culture-bound synthetic associations that pose the most important problems for the study of religion. Evans-Pritchard is one anthropologist who has taken a hard look at just such associations and has been particularly concerned with the latent underlying ideas by which such linkages—such groupings or synthesis—are mediated. He was led to his observations by a problem similar to that which lies behind our discussion here: the existence of various metaphorical predications on an inchoate religious subject, in his case spirit (*kuoth*). What indeed is spirit? The Nuer say, "Kuoth is a crocodile." "Kuoth is rain." But knowing how to correctly interpret the synthesis accomplished by the copula is another matter. "What meaning are we to attach to Nuer statements that such and such a thing is *kuoth*, spirit?" (1956:123)

In his search for the source of these associations Evans-Pritchard finds that some rest on explicit analogies but most rest on culture-bound analogies which it is the anthropologist's province to divulge. Often, he points out, there is this latent factor involved and we must understand that this consists of either (1) an indirect and usually gratuitous association or (2) a triadic relationship. In the first case snake is linked with well-being by virtue of its association with honey, which, beside its intrinsic attractiveness, is again associated with the season of fine weather. In the second case, the triadic relationship, birds are twins (Nuer) and twins are salmon (Nootka) by virtue of their common relation to a third higher order entity, spirit, of which they are both specific manifestations. If the context in which the association is to take place is a spiritual one then either birds or twins, twins or salmon may appear in that context to stand for spirit. The latent generic characteristic they have in common and which associates them is spirit.

The triadic relationship—association by a latent third principle—stands to reason but is helpful only to a point! The mind after all is one entity bound to realize the unity of its experiences at some level of abstraction. If we return to Figure 1 we realize that, although George and muffin are bizarre associations between two quite distinct

domains of everyday experience, nevertheless at a high level of abstraction—organic matter—they both belong to the same domain. To a sufficiently religious mentality practically everything in the world can be brought into association as a manifestation of spirit. Certain kinds of metaphysical endeavor search precisely for those general integrating principles by which the diversity of experience—the product of categorization—can be compiled.¹⁰ To put this caution in another way: we must be as specific about the latent factor as possible to avoid the true but not very helpful suggestion that the latent principle by which religious associations are brought into being is the inchoate itself.

Ethnography is obliged to trace as specifically as it can both the accidental chains of association that may be at work in any imaginative cultural product as well as the higher order concepts or controlling ideas that may be present in mediating between associates bringing about their synthesis. Beside progress by opposites what are the mediating concepts by which cultural performances are synthesized bringing together gods and men, heaven and earth, body and soul, man and woman, past and present, self and society? We have seen well enough how metaphors start up the syntactic machinery focusing our intentions by their predication, but whence the metaphor itself? What intention lies behind it? Does it not owe its own existence to a latent third principle or controlling idea? Are not the controlling ideas of these successive metaphors the following: corporeal solidarity should be affirmed, structural solidarity should be affirmed, social and corporeal inadequacy should be pleaded, and finally social and corporeal distinctions should be abolished.

From our experience with this cult can we suggest a set of controlling ideas or preoccupying themes which mediate between inchoate subjects and the metaphors predicated upon them? These themes or ideas have to do with transformations in either structural or primary experience. For social structural experience we have the elementary need to put forth metaphorically:

the idea of status well-being,
the idea of status insufficiency,
the idea of transcendence or exaltation with respect
to structure.

10. In an extended discussion with one of the Bwiti leaders, Ekang Engone of Koungoulen (Kango), on his use of "likenesses" (*efonan*) in his sermons, remarked that such analogies make clear that all the world was one thing. By using them he was trying to teach his members that fact, and thus defeat witchcraft. For witchcraft tries to break the world down and isolate men in order to eat them (Fernandez 1965:911).

For primary corporeal experience we have the need to put forth metaphorically:

the idea of corporeal well-being,
the idea of corporeal insufficiency,
the idea of exaltation or transubstantiation with respect
to structure.

Simply on the evidence of the cult we have before us we can say that there are three basic controlling ideas which mediate in religious celebration: ideas of adequacy, ideas of inadequacy, and ideas of exaltation. Of course, cults will differ as to the kinds of frames that the culture history of the people involved calls upon them to fill and the kinds of controlling ideas with which they are preoccupied and find socially useful to put into effect. Hence metaphorical statements which can function to fill these frames and express these ideas will differ. Thus the statement of any set of elementary and controlling ideas does not eliminate the need, in any case, for the study of the metaphorical structures by which the inchoate is given palpable form and by which these ideas, pale abstractions at best, are given substance.

Only if we do this with careful attention to detail are we entitled to state the controlling ideas. And since we have done this for Bwiti we may even state here the overall controlling idea which mediates for all metaphors. It is not anything given to us by our informants. But is it not the idea that the primordial self can first be incorporated into some body social and that these together can be surpassed to the quite insubstantial spiritual? Among the Banzie is not the progression of metaphors controlled by the idea that men grounded in blood, bowels, muscle, and sweat, in sinew bone and of peurile origin, can yet shrug all that off and fly?