TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF MIND

OVERVIEW

• TANYA MARIE LUHRMANN •

The short position papers assembled here arose out of an interdisciplinary conference held to explore the implications of broadening and developing what is called 'theory of mind'. The conference was held at Stanford University in September, 2011. Our goal was to discuss the known and possible consequences of cultural variations in models of mind inferred by social actors in different social settings. These questions are new, or at least controversial, in anthropology and in psychology, because what psychologists call "theory of mind" is often construed as a universal developmental achievement. Without denying this developmental milestone, we believed that there are differences in the models of mind which people in different cultural settings were encouraged in infer, and we believed that there might be significant consequences which followed from these differences. We hoped to develop a shared interdisciplinary conversation out of which good comparative work could emerge. To this end, we invited both anthropologists and psychologists to participate. We asked all participants to prepare short position papers: statements which set out the author's evidential base, and which made a broad claim, based on that evidence, about the consequence of culturally different theories of mind, broadly construed. These position papers are quite interesting. We present them here in the hopes that they lead to a broader conversation about these questions. We hope that this comparative analysis will lead us towards an anthropological theory of mind.

Theory of mind is a well-established construct in developmental psychology (Wellman, Cross and Watson 2001). Psychologists have demonstrated that the basic presumption that the mind is separate from the world is one of the most definitive achievements of childhood development. By the age of three, more or less—there is a good deal of controversy—toddlers understand that mental states can explain behavior. The classic experiment is the 'False Belief' task. A child and the child's mother watch an experimenter hide a toy. Then the mother leaves the room, and the experimenter moves the toy to a new hiding place. When the mother returns, the experimenter asks the child where the mother thinks the toy will be. Very young children point to the second hiding place, because that is where the toy actually is. Older children understand that the mother does not know that the toy has been moved, and so they point to the pillow. They have developed what psychologists call a 'theory of mind'. They understand that what people think may be different from what has happened in the world. They understand that people hold different ideas, and that the different ideas they hold may explain what they do. And they know that their own thoughts cannot be known by other people unless they

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tell them. They no longer act, as very young children do, as if other people cannot see them when they shut their own eyes.

The motivation behind the conference was an anthropological suspicion that the inferred theory of mind is both universal and culturally particular. There is no doubt that humans in all known cultures learn to infer intention and knowledge from the behavior of other humans; yet at the same time, ethnographers observe that the inferences they draw are probably shaped not only by developmental capacity but by cultural specificity. For example, Eve Danzinger (2006) has found that Mopan Mayans explicitly disregard mental states. They de-emphasize fantasy and pretend play (as Susanne Gaskin [in press] also demonstrates for Yucatec Mayans). This has consequences for how people operate in the world. For example, in relation to language, what counts is the direct word-to-world fit, the relationship of speech and fact—not whether the speaker, at the time of uttering, believed that the spoken claim was accurate. Danzinger uses this example to demonstrate that the standard psychological theory of theory of mind is culturally Euro-American. The Mayan child is not behaving in the way that many theorists have suggested, explicitly formulating models of mental states. The child does draw the correct inferences, but in a way different from the Euro-American expectations of the mind. What are the implications of this observation?

Our conference established that we had rich ethnographic evidence to support the presence of cultural variations in ideas about mind that were sufficiently powerful to justify the use of the word 'theory'. That is (to use the helpful account of Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997), these ideas identify evidence; they are at least somewhat abstract; they specify relations between theory and evidence; they are causal; and they make ontological commitments. We found evidence for complex causal models of mind that could be described as theories within specific communities.

Different theories of mind

We identified at least six such theories.

The Euro-American modern secular theory of mind: in this theory of mind, people treat the mind as if there is in effect a clear boundary between what is in the mind, and what is in the world. Entities in the world, supernatural or otherwise, do not enter the mind, and thoughts do not leave the mind to act upon the world. The assertion that they do is seen as a symptom of mental illness (thought insertion and thought withdrawal). What is in the mind is not real in the way that tables and chairs are real; one can speak of 'mere' imagination. At the same time, what is held in the interior of the mind is causally important. Intentions and emotions are powerful and can even make someone ill.

The Euro-American modern supernaturalist theory of mind: this theory can be found undergirding charismatic Christianity, contemporary Chinese healing, alternative bereavement practices, paganism, and other practices that are sometimes identified as 'new age'. Here people treat the mind as if it conformed to the modern secular theory, except in specific respects. The mind-world boundary becomes permeable for God, or for the dead person, or for specific 'energies' that are treated as having causal power and, usually, their own agency. The individual learns to identify these supernatural presences,

often through implicit or even explicit training. Other features of the secular theory apply. The training becomes important because the secular model of mind is the default model with which these individuals work.

The opacity of mind theory: this theory is found in varying forms throughout the South Pacific and Melanesia. Its most striking feature is the insistent refusal to infer what other people are thinking unless they verbalize their intentions. In these societies, asserted intention is taken to be causally powerful in a way that felt intention is not. That is, whatever one's actual intention may be, the intention one asserts (or is taken to have asserted) is taken to be causally powerful. The impropriety of inferring privately held intention is so great that it can be impolite to look directly into another's eyes. At the same time, the boundary between the mind and the world is often porous, so that spirits (or the Holy Spirit) pass back and forth across it.

The transparency of language theory: in these societies, for which our best examples come from Central America, language is understood to align with the world rather than to express interior states. Fiction may be frowned upon; play by children may be tolerated but not encouraged. The vocabulary to describe mental states may be thin or near-non-existent. Most notably (to ethnographers) beliefs that happen to be false but are not understood to be false by the speaker may be identified as 'lying'. When an utterance is assessed, what matters is its truth-relationship to the world rather than its relationship to the intention of the speaker.

The mind control theory: our best example of this theory locates it in Thailand, but it can be found in different versions throughout Asia. In Thailand, the most important concern around the mind is how well it is controlled. One can have a well-controlled mind, or one that is less well-controlled. When the mind is poorly controlled, emotions and intentions become powerful and can enter other poorly controlled minds as ghosts or spirits. Thoughts thus are real in a way that is quite different from the Euro-American model. One's mind(s) can be unbunched, and can wander. Thoughts can act in the world and on other minds in ways that are only partially related to those that first thought them.

Perspectivism: this theory suggests that the world is dependent on the perspective one takes on it. Many Amazonian peoples are held to conceptualize theoretically the world as if it is seen from a particular perspective: a human's or a jaguar's, for example. Here there is a great deal of interest in the idea that what appears to be blood to a human may seem to be beer to a jaguar (for instance). There is an expectation that a human can become a jaguar and vice versa. The most important feature of a mind seems to be that it can migrate from body to body. People sometimes fear ending up in a non-human form permanently. People can make claims that they have seen other people becoming non-human, or been with humans who become non-human.

Dimensions of mind

These theories differ systematically along several dimensions (and no doubt more):

The degree to which the mind is 'bounded' or 'porous': are other minds (God, spirits) understood to be able to be present inside the mind? Can thoughts themselves cross

back and forth across this barrier? The porous/bounded dichotomy was proposed by Charles Taylor (2007) as a way to distinguish judgments about the supernatural made by Westerners and some non-Westerners. Taylor was writing about selves, but he was actually describing differences in the experience of mind. While his distinction provoked controversy, it captures real differences between theories of mind in different social settings.

The degree to which interiority matters: are emotions and thoughts understood to be causally powerful and significant? Are emotions allowable explanations for behavior or for illness experience? One of the early scholarly discussions of this question has been whether Christianity invented the individual—not whether individuals exist outside of Christian contexts, but whether Christianity increased the social value placed on individual intention and emotion in a way which strikingly altered the way people understood intention and emotion (Morris 1972; Jaynes 1976 makes a related point). One of the shocking consequences for Melanesians who become Christian is that their interior thoughts are given a meaning that was previously absent, and as a result, their attempts to be scrupulously devout always fail, to their dismay (Robbins 2004).

The epistemic stance: the degree to which thoughts and the imagination are represented as 'real'. The imagination has had different statuses with respect to the real across Western history. In the medieval European era, the imagination was presumed to be the route to the true reality (Karnes 2011), as it was also for Plato. The ephemeral, merely personal importance of what the mind imagines is emphasized in the post-enlightenment period (Abrams 1953). These different stances also occur within non-Western contexts. Thai Buddhists, for example, go to considerable effort to experience attachment as non-real (Cassaniti 2009).

The sensorial weighting: the social importance given to specific senses. While all humans share the same sensory apparatus, different social settings draw attention to the senses in different ways. European-American culture tends to pay little attention to, or even debases, the sense of smell (Classen 1993); the sense of sight is culturally dominant, or at least argued to be so (the classic statement is Ong 1982). Stephen Levinson's group at the Max Planck Institute has been able to demonstrate that presented with the same stimuli for the five traditional senses (Munsell color chips, distinct geometric shapes, scratch and sniff cards, specific sounds, etc.) there is considerable variation between societies in whether individuals were able to name the stimuli in the same way, suggesting a real range in cultural attention to different senses (Majid and Levinson 2010).

Relational access and relational responsibility: whether it is socially allowable to display knowledge of inferences about other minds and whether inferred knowledge (as opposed to socially shared knowledge) confers responsibility to act. Asian cultures appear to place more importance on the observer's capacity to infer the wants and needs of others, while western cultures emphasize the importance of individual choice (Markus and Kitayama 1991). These differences presume a different capacity to know other minds. The westerner who presumes that a guest should choose implicitly asserts that the guest's mind is not knowable without verbal interaction; in a Japanese setting, the host is presumed to be able to know the other's inner desires.

How these different theories matter

How do these differences in theories of mind matter? If they are truly theories held by people who use the models to interpret and respond to their worlds, then there should be consequences for behavior, ways of responding to distress and infirmity, child development and social relationships. Our discussion came to the conclusion that different theories of mind do matter, but that we had better evidence for some consequences than for others.

Do different theories of mind matter developmentally?

The group (most of whom were not developmentalists) found evidence that there might be important developmental consequences to theories of mind. Luke Butler and Ellen Markman presented evidence that US children pay attention to new knowledge that adults indicate is important, suggesting that it is not the knowledge itself but the social invitation that directs learning. Barbara Rogoff contrasted a model of learning among the Maya, in which the child is seen as a participating community member, to one in which the child is seen as not-fully-participating and learning must be adult-directed. Among the Maya, there was an emphasis on learning through collaborative interaction and among the Americans, on learning through explicit transmission of knowledge by experts. These pedagogical styles seemed to rest on different theories about how one learns from other minds, a difference which entailed calm, evenly distributed attention in the one case, and self-focused, expert-directed attention in the other. Those differences were vividly on display in video illustrations of children from the different communities.

Suzanne Gaskins developed this theme about different understandings of mind developed in the Mayan world, where children organize their own learning through observation and participation, and the American world, where children are socialized to attend to experts and authorities. Mayan infants point less. Their attention is wide-angled and abiding, rather than narrow and sustained in bursts. There are differences in play across US and Mayan Yucatec children also. Mayan children's play is limited to what they observe in their everyday world, while US children play at imagining worlds that do not exist—worlds of fairies and dragons and make-believe. In fact, US parents encourage their children to 'develop their imaginations' by creating fanciful worlds during play-time, whereas Mayan parents tolerate, but do not encourage, any form of play.

Neither Graham Jones nor Michelle Karnes worked with children, but their studies of adult play and imagination suggest that there are significant differences in theories of mind even within the history of Europe which might have consequences for childhood development. Karnes described the medieval European focus on the imagination as the source of true knowledge; Jones explained that the European stage magician knows that in order to be successful, he must cultivate false beliefs in his audience. For the former, imagination is reliable and important to cultivate; for the latter, imagination is for dupes. These different theories of play, fantasy and make-believe—different epistemic stances on what the mind imagines, one Platonic, the other rationalistic—might well have consequences for the way children learn to ascribe truth-status to assertions.

Do different theories of mind make a difference to the experience of mind?

The group had a good deal of evidence that different theories of mind could indeed make a difference to mental experience. Kathyrn Geurts' analysis of the Ghanaian Anlo-Ewe demonstrated that the Anlo-Ewe understood mind as in part somatic, because of their different sensory hierarchy, and not as contained privately in an opaque container. That different emphasis on a more kinesthetic awareness could be shown to have significant consequences for the way they identified emotion (according to standard measures, they paid less attention to it) and attended to their bodies (to which they paid far more attention than Americans). Danilyn Rutherford found that her developmentally disabled daughter's different sensory capacities seemed to alter the way she attended to her environment and body.

Alexa Hagerty demonstrated that those who learn to pay attention to signs that the dead are present do in fact learn to experience the dead as present: to feel the dead, to know the dead and indeed to interact with the dead. In my own work, I also found that American evangelicals learn to adopt a theory of mind in which the supernatural is found within the mind, and that seeking the supernatural, in the form of God, often leads to encounters with it. Indeed, I found that the way people pay attention to mental experience changes mental experience—not just in culturally expected ways (if you seek God's presence you will feel it) but in unexpected ones (prayer practices that demand attention to internal experience seem to make mental imagery more vivid and increase the likelihood of unusual sensory experience).

A number of presenters argued that different theories of mind change emotional experience. Allen Tran gave an example of the modern Vietnamese, who have only recently adopted a theory of mind that valorizes emotions and their vicissitudes. He finds that this new theory seems to make their emotions more intense—and that they have become newly and acutely attentive to anxiety. Julia Cassaniti is persuaded that the Thai among whom she did her fieldwork are not simply repressing their strong emotions; their theory of mind, in which people should not be attached to people and events in the world, seems to genuinely alter their emotional reactivity.

Do different theories of mind make a difference to illness experience and health?

Again, the group seemed to have good evidence that they do. Rob Barrett (2004) found, in a well known study, that the Iban who could be diagnosed with schizophrenia did not report thought insertion and thought withdrawal (when people feel that thoughts have been placed in and taken out of the mind) because they did not hold a model of the mind as a container. Dedre Gentner drew our attention to the fact that different eras in European history used different models of the mind that drew from the technology of their times, and suggested that consequences similar to Barrett's could follow. Metaphors matter, as Lera Boroditsky pointed out. Sonya Pritzker described the way that Americans learning Chinese medicine encountered a new theory of mind in which emotional distress could be diagnosed and treated through the manipulation of the body. She described the way people came to feel their sadness in their wrists and other body parts, and how they came

to feel bodily manipulation change it. Giulia Mazza compared the experience of psychosis in India and the United States, and argued that one of the major differences arose from the awareness of diagnostic labels in the United States and the ability to interpret distressing voices as a symptom of illness. This available model of a 'broken brain' permeated the experience of Americans with schizophrenia, but was virtually absent in her Indian field subjects.

Meanwhile, Jocelyn Marrow found that the hierarchical structure of South Asian families meant that empathy was asymmetrical. Elders were understood to know what was best for juniors by drawing on a broad array of knowledge; juniors were acutely aware of the desires, emotions and expectations of the specific elders who cared for them. She argues this asymmetry arises out of a distinctive theory of mind in which minds are continuously reconstituted through interaction with others. When the interaction is not understood to be positive or possible, people fall ill. Both Jason Throop and Douglas Hollan also make an argument that empathy is local; that different ways of understanding the mind lead to different ways of empathizing; and that different kinds of empathy had consequences for the way people experience compassion and suffering.

Do different theories of mind interfere with knowledge of the other's intentions?

This was the question more specific to theory of mind research as it now stands—and it was the question to which the group did not feel that we yet had much of an answer. The question was raised initially in a well known article by Angela Lillard (1998), who noted that although different social groups might assert an inability to know other's minds, it did not follow that they did not speculate about other's intentions. The question is most acute in understanding the impact of the opacity of mind theory. Joel Robbins and others who worked in the South Pacific and Melanesia felt that we needed experimental evidence to complement ethnographic description. This was a point Rita Astuti made early on in the discussions, and which she has made in her work: that what people assert culturally is often an assertion of how the world should be, rather than a description of what they find in the world. This is provocative because it argues that what ethnographers sometimes take to be a society's worldview on the basis of what they say (for example, that there is no difference between biological inheritance and social learning) may be inaccurate. In her work, she found that the statements people made explicitly were contradicted by the implicit understandings they revealed in an experimental probe.

The question of how far the cultural model of the opacity of mind could go in shaping people's ability to infer intention became one of the most interesting debates of the gathering. Jason Throop suggested that the behavior of his field subjects might in fact indicate that those with an opacity of mind theory were actually more attentive to other's intentions as a result. Rupert Stasch seemed to agree; he thought that the Melanesians with whom he worked used the opacity theory to maintain autonomy in a small society, and raised the question of whether autonomy and opacity of mind might be associated. John Lucy, while not working in Melanesia but among the Maya, made a strong argument for the dependency of theory of mind on language and on the representation of mental states. Bambi Schieffelin was clear about the hard work her Melanesian subjects did socializing

school children not to speculate on inner states; she thought such schooling might well have consequences. Eve Danzinger echoed Rita Astuti's observation that culture shapes fundamental psychological processes like theory of mind, but does not transform them beyond recognition.

We agreed that this was a question that would best be answered by experimental work that could tease apart what people actually did in drawing inferences about each other, and what they said that they did.

Our discussions showed that the standard psychological theory of mind carries with it a series of assumptions that may be culturally particular to a Euro-American context. It implies that the other's mind is separate from the self, that it contains a set of interior intentions and perspectives, and that vision and speech provide the way to ascertain these beliefs. Each of these assumptions was critiqued during the conference, and found wanting. We also found that a broader attention to the ways in which theories of mind matter showed that these theories affected the experience of mind, the experience of health and illness, and childhood socialization. We concluded that our different theoretical, methodological, and area expertise together offer tantalizing evidence for culturally variable theories of mind, and that more ethnographic and experimental work is needed.

How would we take this further?

We still know too little about the comparative theory of mind. In an ideal research world, we might want to collect the following data:

How are mental events experienced? How are inner dialogues reported and experienced; what kinds of inner sensory experience—images, sensations, inner voices—do people attend to; what is the significance of dreams; are there objects outside the body that are treated as if they hold mental events? What senses count?

What are the metaphors of mind? Is the mind a container or a crossroads? Is it like a computer or a hydraulic system? What mental states are identified, and are those words used in daily conversation?

How is information about other minds collected? Do people look directly at each other? How do they pay attention? Does body contact substitute for eye contact?

Who is responsible for teaching? For learning? How is a learner's mind imagined? How do learners learn to learn?

What is the epistemic stance of imagination, play, fiction, creativity and the supernatural? What counts as real? When?

And then: do the differences, such as they are, explain differences in the way adults draw inferences about other minds; experience emotion; report distress; the way they create, interact with and understand the real?

One could imagine a terrific comparative project.

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THE POSITION PAPERS

In the following papers, each participant was asked to sketch the background knowledge from which they spoke, and then to lay out a claim about an anthropological theory of mind. We grouped our discussion in the following order, which developed internal conversations around specific theoretical and empirical domains:

How do we think about researching an anthropological theory of mind?

The constitution of mind: what's in a mind? Interiority and boundedness

The constitution of mind: what's in a mind? Selves

The constitution of mind: what's in a mind? Senses and experience

The constitution of mind: what's in a mind? Perspectivism

The learning of mind: how do you figure out what a mind is? Teaching and learning

The learning of mind: how do you figure out what a mind is? Play, creativity, fiction and fantasy

The learning of mind: how do you figure out what a mind is? Metaphors for mind

The learning of mind: how do you figure out what a mind is? Issues of language

Broken and despairing minds

HOW DO WE THINK ABOUT RESEARCHING
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF MIND?

• RITA ASTUTI •

I am an anthropologist with an ethnographic interest in Madagascar and a theoretical interest in the relationship between 'culture and cognition'. In recent years I have collaborated with developmental psychologists (Susan Carey and Paul Harris) to explore two broad issues, both of which are relevant to an anthropological approach to theory of mind.

The first issue is the relationship between:

1) the knowledge that ethnographers infer from what people say in answer to open-ended why/how questions, or from what they say when they sit around the fire, speak at a village meeting, attend a ritual and so on

2) the knowledge which people might never, or very occasionally, put into words but which they use, more or less consciously and automatically, when they have to solve a new problem or draw a novel inference

In my work on Vezo understandings of biological inheritance and of the mechanisms responsible for family resemblance, I have shown that what people say about how their babies come to have their looks is radically different from the way they reason in a simple experimental task that asks them to solve a de-contextualized riddle based on an adoption scenario. In the first instance, they insist that babies do not resemble their birth parents but that they take their looks from people who gave them food or spent time with them (either when they were still in uterus or after birth); in the second instance, they predict, as matter of fact, that an adopted baby will take its physical features from its birth parents and its beliefs and skills from the adoptive ones. While the statements that are readily available to an ethnographer might tempt her to infer a non-dualistic ontology, according to which Vezo draw no distinction between facts of biology and facts of sociality (e.g., Carsten 1995; Ingold 1991, and others for similar claims), people's answers to the adoption riddle suggest that the ontological distinction is made, but that people have normative and moral reasons to emphatically state otherwise. I am aware that in some quarters such findings may be interpreted as proof that anthropologists deal with inessential 'cultural fluff' (e.g., Pinker 1997: 583 who refers to what anthropologists have to say about kinship as 'nonsense'). However, my point is that anthropologists—and all other cognitive scientists—need to take what people say very seriously (if nothing else because people often care very much about it), but that in order to correctly interpret their statements we need to know what they are: in this case, not a description of how the world is and is known to be, but a commentary on how the world should be (a world in which birth parents don't have exclusive and divisive rights over their children).

The second issue is linked to the first one, as I have explored how Vezo children actively construct Vezo 'culture'—how they construct their ideas about kinship, group identity,

the ancestors and the afterlife. As part of this endeavor, I have shown the interaction between the untutored intuitions that children bring to the task of learning their 'culture' and the environment that enables, guides and structures their cognitive development. For example, I have shown that the fact that Vezo children grow up in an environment in which 'resemblance talk' is discouraged, has measurable effects on the timing and the modality with which their understanding of biological inheritance develops.

The lessons I've learnt from my work, which I would hope to be relevant to a cross-cultural program of research on theory of mind are that 1) we need to be careful in distinguishing between what people say in their explicit, normative discourse and the knowledge they use to understand and act in and on the world; 2) we need to be careful not to dismiss people's explicit, normative discourse, as this is likely to have significant effects on cognitive development and to leave a distinctive signature on adult knowledge.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF MIND: WHAT'S IN A MIND? INTERIORITY AND BOUNDEDNESS

• JOEL ROBBINS •

I have carried out twenty six months of fieldwork among the Urapmin, a community of approximately four hundred members who live in the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. I have also been involved in a developing comparative conversation among scholars of the Pacific concerning culturally defined theories of mind in the region, particularly those that highlight the difficulty or impossibility of knowing what goes on in the minds of others—an idea sometimes referred to as a cultural assertion of the 'opacity' of other minds.

In Urapmin, the heart is the seat of all thought, feeling, and intention. Like people living in many Pacific societies, Urapmin assert strongly that one cannot know what goes on in the heart of another person. Mental processes go on 'inside' the heart, which is itself 'inside' the body, and thus they are well hidden from the view of others. Furthermore, a person's speech does nothing to make his/her mind present to others. 'Too much can happen between the heart and the mouth,' the Urapmin say, 'for speech to be trustworthy.' Speech can be beautiful, moving, and persuasive, but it remains 'just talk'. Urapmin never claim to know anything about what people think or feel on the basis of what they say. In keeping with this, they do not source the meaning of speech to the intentions of the person who produces it. There are in Urapmin none of the speech acts common in cultures that assume that mindreading is part of language comprehension: no promising, thanking, apologizing, or lying, for example. Moreover, when you ask

someone in Urapmin what he/she meant by something he/she said, he/she will claim not to know. The meaning of what is said, people point out, is determined by what listeners make of it. Not surprisingly, Urapmin never speculate about the thoughts or feelings of others, and they regard attempts to do so not only as doomed to failure, but as serious moral breaches of what we might call each person's 'psychic privacy'.

In relation to broader debates about theory of mind, I should point out that the Urapmin lack of confidence and interest in mindreading is not correlated with the presence of a model of human action that gives intention little role to play. Urapmin regularly state that people do what they want to do, and they have a rich vocabulary for kinds of emotions and thoughts. People's hearts, rather than any systems of social rules, drive their behavior. For this reason, Urapmin find behavior to be in essence unpredictable.

A final point to make about the evidential basis of my thinking about theories of mind is that in the late 1970s all adults in Urapmin converted to charismatic Christianity and since then they have seen themselves as a completely Christian community. They recognize that the kind of Christianity they have taken up carries different ideas about, and normative expectations related to, mind and language. In particular, they understand Christianity to demand sincerity in speech and honesty in confession of one's sins to God. Their struggles to live up to these demands in some ritual domains, even as traditional ideas hold sway in everyday contexts, pushed issues related to mind and language to the forefront during my fieldwork, and made them more available to ethnographic study than they might otherwise have been.

When I first returned from Urapmin quite a few years ago, I found that many of the anthropologists and other scholars to whom I presented this material assumed that Urapmin ideas about the impossibility of knowing other people's minds and their related claim to interpret speech without regard to the intentions of its speakers must misrepresent their actual practice. Urapmin must be reading intentions, colleagues argued, or their social life together would be impossible. They must have some kind of political motivation for claiming not to know the minds of others, and this might be interesting to study, but their claims along these lines are unlikely to shape their own mental experience, which must be much like ours in this crucial area. Based on my strong sense from my fieldwork that these responses were missing something important, I have been interested in exploring how we might work more productively with cross-cultural differences in theory of mind. I will draw two basic claims from this project for our consideration.

Basic Claim 1:

My first claim, admittedly at this point only a hypothesis, goes straight to the heart of scholarly skepticism about the mental effects of theories of mind like those one finds in Urapmin and asserts that such theories of mind do shape the mental experience of those who hold them. In her widely cited article, Lillard (1998: 12) writes that 'Although (…) in many cultures people refuse to talk about others' minds, this does not necessarily mean that people in those cultures never think about others' minds. Evidence on that issue is not available.' It is difficult to determine whether Lillard is suggesting here that evidence is not yet available or that it never will be, since it is hard to prove the absence of a mental state in another. It would be interesting to think together about how we might test the

possibility that people are in fact not reading the minds of others in interpreting what they say or how they act.

Basic Claim 2:

Regardless of where we come down on Basic Claim 1, we should explore the ways in which cultural theories of mind are connected in important ways to cultural ideas in other domains. The study of what have come to be known as language ideologies has been one of the most important developments in anthropology over the last several decades. One reason work in this area has been so important is because anthropologists have found that cultural ideas about language connect to many other areas of cultural concern, including to ideas about the person, sociality, political process, morality, and a wide range of other matters, including theories of mind. My claim is that cultural theories of mind, like language ideologies, ramify widely throughout other cultural domains in ways that warrant our attention. To illustrate this point, I close with some observations about how Urapmin and wider Melanesian theories of mind can be seen to link to other key cultural ideas and practices in the region.

First, one of the primary reasons for skepticism about the veracity of folk models of the opacity of mind is the assumption that without mindreading, one cannot coordinate action. Given this, one important area of study is how people living in cultures that stress opacity think about the coordination of action. Among the Urapmin, people understand constant practices of gift giving to do much of the work of speech and its mindreading interpretation elsewhere. It is also true that the Urapmin expect and tolerate a much greater lack of coordination in social life than Euro-Americans are willing to accept, suggesting that we may overestimate what is necessary along these lines. These points could be elaborated, but I hope I have said enough here to indicate that cultural models about the nature of social action and its coordination are likely everywhere to be tied to theories of mind in interesting ways.

Second, in Euro-American culture, shared thoughts and feelings are one of the primary 'substances' out of which relationships are made. How are relationships between people culturally defined in places where mindreading is not expected to lead to shared outlooks or feelings between people? In Melanesia, one answer to this question is that relationships are often assumed to be a given in each person's life, defined by ancestry and shared residence and food consumption and not dependent on any shared mental states or understandings between people. Relations that are given in such ways are then realized or deepened through the exchange of material items mentioned above. The efflorescence of cultural models of what is sometimes called 'innate' relatedness, along with the emphasis on exchange, thus go hand in hand with opacity doctrines in this region. It would be interesting to discuss how theories of mind shape notions of relationship in other locales as well.

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For the past ten years I have been conducting a research project on Buddhism and the mind in a small community in Northern Thailand. My research revolves around a central question: how are shared Buddhist ideas lived in everyday life? More broadly, to quote Rick Shweder (1991), how do culture and psyche 'make each other up'? I have interviewed hundreds of people over the years and have followed a few families in depth, learning how people feel about changes in their lives and processes of cause and effect. Beginning with the Buddhist concept of pervasive impermanence (*anicca*), I have found that a seemingly simple concept of change has implications for such disparate realms of life as emotion, morality, and agency. While people living in a nearby Christian (Karen Baptist) community emphasize the development of discrete emotions and discursive relationships with each other and their God, people in the Buddhist community work to create calm affect that lets go of emotional attachments, crafting emotional orientations based on Buddhist teachings that create a kind of personal control over the environment. I wrote up the findings from this project in my dissertation, 'Control in a world of change', and am now in the middle of writing a book based on it, tentatively titled, 'With Buddhism in Mind: the psychology of everyday life in Buddhist Thailand'.

More recently I have begun a second project on the supernatural in Thailand that likewise connects mental processes to ontological and cosmological constructs. Based on 150 surveys and 45 in-depth interviews, I have found that the supernatural in Thailand is directly related to mental focus. I'll elaborate on this here.

In Thailand people say that one of the main characteristics of Buddhism is the focus of the mind. Concentration meditation (*Samadhi*) is the most common form of meditation practiced in Thailand. Awareness (*Vipassana*) is also a key part of Buddhist practice. Through techniques like concentration and awareness meditation, when one is mindful (when one has *sati*, mindfulness), one is in control of the self and the environment. The concentration and focus of the mind is thus both a goal and a representation of healthy minds and bodies. When one is not mindful, that is, when the mind is scattered around, all sorts of problems occur. 'Soul calling' ceremonies bring in monks and other respected elders to 'call' the distracted souls (*khwan*) of mentally or physically out-of-sorts persons; these 'souls' (or 'spirits') then regroup in the individual, as symbolized in white string bracelets (*sai sin*) worn at the wrist. *Sai sin*, meant as protection and help in keeping one's *khwan* together, are often given before one goes on a trip or engages in other potentially dangerous or uncertain activity.

These 'souls' are difficult to characterize. They have been described as a kind of personified wits, as when we say in English that someone has 'lost their wits'. The mind, in a sense, consists of these wits, and keeping one's mind focused keeps these wits together. When someone does not have their wits about them, when their mind is not focused, a kind of energy results. This is the energy of intentionality. When one wants, or desires something, one is told the energy resulting means that the mind has lost focus. This is not the focus of the 'one-track mind', as we say in English; a one-track mind is likewise considered a mind that has lost focus or balance; it is attached to an idea, a wish or a goal, and thus creates the energy associated with intentional thought and behavior. It is this intentionality that drives karma. The energy of karma, while not free-floating, can wander

from bodies and minds. After death the karmic energy of attachments and desires that people had in life can linger, be felt, and create effects. Encounters with the supernatural in Thailand are a complex play of the interactions of these intentional feelings of self and other. The degree of one's own mental focus (that is, one's own scattered or unscattered intentions), and the intentions of others become intermingled. If we believe supernatural beings exist, their qualities of desire create energy that can more easily be felt by people who themselves are lacking in mental focus. If we do not believe supernatural beings exist, the qualities given to them and the ways that people experience them represent projections of the mind, projections that mimic the intentionality and focus of the human beings that interact with them.

The findings from Thailand are quite telling of anthropological variation in theories of mind. When Tanya Luhrmann and I asked undergraduates in the United States about supernatural encounters, the US students almost always discussed discrete entities that were external to the self—or, when internal, the entities were seen as still single and separate from the self. Rather than single, bounded minds with clear boundaries, in Thailand minds are conceived as much less isolated and bounded. Ideas like the *khwan* and the Buddhist teaching of non-self together mean that people infer others' minds as being somewhat separate from their own but not isolated and autonomous. There are fewer boundaries between the inside and outside of the mind; one's 'mind(s)' can come and go, and intermingle with those they know (and with those they don't know, but presumably did know in some past life). It is this intermingling and feltness of others' intentions that creates connections between people.

In Buddhist Thailand minds are inferred to be permeable and susceptible to the influence of others. To be aware of intentionality thus means to have a strong mind.

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• TANYA MARIE LUHRMANN •

I have been working for years on two different projects.

One of them is about God (and the supernatural more generally). This involved initial fieldwork in San Diego looking at four different religious groups: a Black Catholic Church, an Anglo-Cuban Santeria church, a *baal teschuva shul* (a Jewish service for the newly Orthodox), and an evangelical church. I continued the work on the evangelical church when I moved to Chicago and then to California. What obsessed me was this: how does God become real to people? How do people take seriously that an invisible agent has an important role in their lives, and that this role is good? You could answer that it happens naturally and we are hard-wired that way (the crude, evolutionary psychology answer) but that is not enough—not least because there are many smart people who do not believe. Evolutionary psychology explains why invisible agents seem plausible. It does not explain how belief in them is sustained and experienced over time.

I noticed also that prayer seemed to have consequences. People said that you had to learn to pray, that the learning was hard, that some people were better than others, and that people who were good at prayer would change in various ways—among them, that their mental imagery would get sharper. That seemed to be an odd thing to say from a theological perspective, and I concluded that there was a psychological story as well as an interpretation story. That suggested that there was learning involved, and the learning reached deep into the mind and body.

To explore this learning, I did classic ethnographic fieldwork, and I looked at what congregants were being taught in church and in housegroup meetings, through reading, etc. I ended up concluding that they were being taught a new theory of mind—for want of a better term. They were being taught to treat some thoughts and mental images as not being their own, but as generated by this outside being, God. They had to learn how to identify them (thoughts/images that were 'stronger', unexpected, spontaneous, in God's character, and generative of peace); they also learned to 'test' their inferences. This was really hard for people, but they did learn, although they also sort of kept forgetting that God was interacting with them, and the result was that they were constantly scanning their inner experience. They were also taught to 'play': to imagine, through daydream like encounters, that God was interacting with them like a person. And they learned to follow a set of emotional practices that in effect trained them to experience themselves as loved for themselves by God.

I also ran an experiment, in which I randomized people into different prayer practices (the control was lectures on the Gospels from the Teaching Company) which they followed for thirty minutes each day for a month. Our before-and-after measures demonstrate that the imaginative prayer practice did improve their mental imagery vividness and salience, did improve their ability to use mental imagery, and increased the likeliness of unusual sensory experience.

In sum, it seems that what the Christians are doing is to use practices which make inner sensory experience more significant, and that this has real consequences for their mental experience. I call this an 'attentional learning' theory of religion. Part of this story is psychological: inner sense training enhances inner senses. Inner sense training, and mental imagery training in particular, is at the heart of much spiritual practice around the world because it has consequences. But it also seems to me that culture makes a big difference. The details of the way the mind is imagined should shape the way people pay attention. For instance, which senses count? Or is the ordinary inner voice understood to be significant?

The second project has to do with the experience of psychosis. For years I spent time with homeless psychotic women on the streets of Chicago. I was answering a most pragmatic question—why don't these women want help?—but also getting increasingly interested in their experience of voices. A new, controversial movement argues that if people who hear distressing voices develop a respectful relationship with those voices, the torment of the voices can diminish. Again, this suggests that the way the mind is imagined has real consequences for the way the mental events are experienced. I am now doing comparative interviews between people in the San Francisco peninsula and in Chennai and (shortly I hope) in Ghana, talking to people who meet criteria for schizophrenia in detail about their voice-hearing experience. (This time they are housed and high-functioning, for the

most part.) What we know so far is that there are sensory variations. In India, people report more visual hallucinations on average than in the US (this is now supported by epidemiological work). It also seems to be true that the Americans have a remarkably harsh experience of voices. They seem to imagine themselves to have a wall between the mind and the world, and they do not feel comfortable when the wall is breached.

My hypothesis is that we will have three different findings:

1. local cultural emphases on sensory importance will shape the sensory mode of hallucinations
2. local emphasis on mind-boundaries will shape the ease with which people form relationships with voices (this is more speculative, but the initial interviews suggest it)
3. there will be different phenomenological patterns

My basic claim:

The way we imagine our minds shapes our mental experience: the way a social group implicitly models/theorizes mental process (imagination, perception, thought) will affect the way people draw inferences about their own minds and the minds of others.

This theory of mind will involve different dimensions, among them:

1. the senses
2. how bounded the mind is
3. whether interiority matters: whether inner thoughts/voice/dreams etc are given significance
4. epistemic stance: what counts as real?

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THE CONSTITUTION OF MIND: WHAT'S IN A MIND? SELVES

• JOCELYN MARROW •

My research explores how the contemporary socio-economic context of North India, characterized by globalization, economic liberalization, and reactionary cultural nationalism, impacts non-elite North Indian women's health and the quality of their relationships. I undertook research in family, clinical, and religious settings of Varanasi, India in 2001–2004. I found that women's expressions of emotional distress in North

Indian commonly take a somatic form: 'fits' of unresponsiveness locally referred to as 'clenched teeth illness'. I am currently working on a book-length project demonstrating that cultural tropes of loss, longing and 'love in separation' (*viraha*) are activated and refigured in the contemporary moment among young women suffering emotional and interpersonal distress. In domestic spaces (where most clenched teeth illness episodes occur) the meaning of any given illness event is multi-layered, allowing afflicted young women to receive attention and care while avoiding the direct airing of complaints against members of their conjugal (and sometimes natal) families.

Other work emerging from this ethnographic research include: (1) a paper examining how communicative styles predicated on class differences between North Indian doctors and patients impede the success of psychosocial interventions in public Indian psychiatric clinics; (2) an exploration of how hyperbolic and contradictory representations of 'Indian womanhood' in circulation at the national level negatively impact non-elite Indian girls' and young women's struggles to achieve educational and work aspirations; and (3) (with Tanya Luhrmann) a comparison of the consequences of different cultural expectations and available social spaces for the abandonment of persons with severe mental illness across India and the United States.

While exploring circumstances that contribute to ill-health and diminished well being, I undertook to investigate the interpersonal—especially familial—contexts that North Indians believe contribute to the successful resolution of day-to-day dysphoria and distress. Some questions motivating my research with North Indian families are: What is the range of expected communicative responses to expressions of emotional distress? How might sensitivity, sympathy, empathy, and succor be expressed and experienced among adults in intimate North Indian settings, and how do these expressions and experiences expand scholarly understanding of interpersonal communication, emotion, and psychological functioning in general?

I discovered that persons spoke about managing the feelings, self-expression, and behaviors of others in distinctive ways. According to the cultural theory, persons 'cause' others 'to understand' (*samjhaana*)—that is, they provide explicit instruction and exhortation regarding the most effective or morally correct behaviors and attitudes pertaining to specific contexts. Overt attempts at emotion work tend to flow down intimate hierarchies of generation, age, and gender. The cultural theory of 'causing understanding' holds that hierarchical seniors expect that their subordinates, once exhorted, will conform to their prescriptions in return for emotional rewards, particularly the expressions of seniors' love towards them. The 'loving' emotional rewards that juniors receive in return for 'understanding' include the experience of being assimilated to the wisdom and moral qualities of the elder—an experience of positive merger with the elder.

This cultural theory of causing understanding suggests an asymmetrical model of empathy across hierarchically-structured intimacies in North India. Subordinates are acutely sensitive to the desires, wishes, and expectations of hierarchical seniors, believing that (ideally) seniors embody what is good and true, and that attention to their commands, suggestions, and individual desires will be beneficial for the self and the collectivity. Subordinates' empathy towards elders follows closely elders' utterances and behaviors in the here-and-now; juniors restrict themselves to extrapolating from the specific actions of seniors when trying to understand them. Elders, on the other hand, do

not empathize with their juniors by attending to juniors' expressed desires and wishes in the present moment; they make use of a broader temporal dimension which draws upon their knowledge and past experiences. That is, elders reflect upon the events and feelings of their own lifetime when trying to grasp the perspectives of their junior; their empathy towards juniors is somewhat projective.

My basic claim is that this asymmetrical model of empathy among North Indians arises from a distinctive North Indian theory of mind in which minds/bodies possess essential differences that are highly susceptible to contamination, contagion, and impression through contact with others. According to this model, minds are continuously constituted and reconstituted through interaction with others. Other persons may contribute to a refinement and improvement of an individual's mind if their speech and interactions with the individual are true and moral. On the other hand, inferior and immoral others cause the qualities of the individual to decline.

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In my research I focus on the relation between language and thought. My expertise encompasses the fields of psychology (cognitive, developmental, social), anthropology (linguistic, cultural, psychological), and linguistics (semantics, syntax, typology). I have done long-term comparative fieldwork on the Yucatec Maya language and culture using ethnographic, linguistic, and psychological methods. I have strong secondary interests in social theory and the relation between language, culture, and self in the modern period.

Most work on language and thought assumes that thought influences language. Since thought is presumed to be essentially the same for all humans, this view typically leads to the conclusion that all languages must be essentially the same as well, a view that shapes the course of research by downplaying or even ignoring diversity. Such an approach also essentially construes a social phenomenon (language) as a mere byproduct of psychological functioning (thought).

I have been interested in the reverse effects: how language might influence thought. More broadly, I am interested in how social phenomena influence psychological functioning. Influences of language on thought can be characterized into three logical types: (1) the symbolic quality of language might be essential for certain kinds of characteristically human thought; (2) the structures of specific languages might influence the thought of those who speak them (i.e., 'linguistic relativity'); or (3) particular social institutional uses of language might shape thought.

In my empirical work, I first tackled the second question regarding the possible impact of language differences on thought. I designed a comparative method for exploring whether language differences in the form of grammatical categories influenced thought

in the form of attention, classification, and memory. Using this method, I was able to show that certain language patterns (number marking) could predict certain cognitive behaviors (attentiveness to number, preference for shape versus material, etc.). I next tackled the first question regarding the enabling role of language in thought, this work in collaboration with Suzanne Gaskins. We designed a developmental method for exploring the age at which the language differences began to appear in thought, that is, how and when thought began to depend on language specific categories. Using this method, we were able to show that language patterns were in place before the associated cognitive patterns, further confirming the shaping role of language, and that the influences on thought began in middle childhood, around age eight. The two projects unite the main elements of the Whorfian and Vygotskian approaches to language and thought.

Most recently, I have been trying to understand the verbal and intellectual developments occurring during this middle childhood transition. On the linguistic side, what seems to be central is the child's increased ability to coordinate speech into larger narrative units and to adopt hierarchical or reflexive stances on speech. The focus of this research is on how children come to exploit deictic forms that they have developed for external reference (e.g. person and tense) to the internal purposes of text and discourse-internal cross-referencing. Doing so effectively binds elements of the world into the language structure in new way, creating both a sense of social reality and social self that are qualitatively different from what has come before.

I was led to connect this work to research on theory of mind (ToM) by the work of Jill and Peter de Villiers. They showed that deaf children not exposed to normal language input showed delayed or deficient performance in standard false belief tasks. Through a variety of studies, they are able to rule out that the problem is with deafness itself or the sheer amount of language known by the child. Rather, the key element they lack is the ability to use grammatical structures that require them to embed into their own utterance the speech or mental state of another. This ability to report speech and mental states is precisely the skill set that is being heavily advanced at age eight when the linguistic relativity effects are appearing: the deictic displacement of person and tense, the expression of stance and mental states, etc. In a broader sense, this work also provides empirical substance to some of G.H. Mead's (1965) claims that the use of symbols is essential to making a mind and that the self is then a construct of such a mind.

Research arguing for language and/or verbal interaction being essential to the development of ToM is now quite extensive. It cannot all be summarized here, but falls into four large types: (1) language facilitates general cognition (e.g. memory) making ToM possible; (2) language provides the empirical evidence of other minds that the child needs to develop ToM; (3) language specifically enables meta-representation making ToM possible; and (4) language provides specific forms (vocabulary, grammatical constructions) enabling ToM. I am especially interested in this last as it intersects nicely with my comparative project. Many languages lack a large mental state vocabulary and/or do not use them with complement constructions. We should be able to exploit this natural variation to learn more about ToM. And the particular florescence of mental state forms in Western Europe, not only in everyday speech, but in the scholarly literature, suggests our linguistic and cultural sensitivity to 'minds' needs some calibration.

This line of research on language in relation to false belief stands in contrast to several other lines of empirical research. Some other work shows that something like an implicit theory of mind exists in very young children long before they can use the terms or constructions in question. And other work shows that children do not really have a full concept of the perspective of the 'other' until late in middle childhood. To some extent, this represents a simple problem of terminology: what ToM means at these different ages is simply qualitatively different. And there have been some efforts to come up with new terms to capture these differences.

But there are two deeper issues at stake beyond mere differences about what are the empirical 'facts'. The first has to do with the ready projection by scientists of intentional mental states onto some animals, children, and the deaf. This approach tacitly seeks to vindicate the view that language and similar social phenomena are irrelevant—that ToM is really some sort of psychological 'module' that we have. This fits with the prevailing psychological ideology that minds are really psychological phenomena, not social ones. In a sense, the appeal to ToM represents but the latest effort to erase (or absorb) the social by psychologizing it. At the same time, when we look to the everyday public, we find a reluctance to attribute mental states, or at least good ones, to those from other cultures, who speak other languages, or who suffer from some communicative incapacity. If we cannot read their mental states properly, then they are assumed not to exist. The de-humanizing tropes used for social 'others' are striking. But notice, again, how essentially social differences are construed psychologically, as deficiencies of self. I am interested then in tracing out whether our language supports these two sorts of projections.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF MIND: WHAT'S IN A MIND? SENSES AND EXPERIENCE

• KATHYRN GEURTS •

In relation to an 'anthropological theory of mind', my research has focused on sensory experience and sensory perception among Anlo-Ewe speaking people in West Africa. For more than three hundred years, Ewe-speaking people have inhabited the land that is now southeastern Ghana, as well as southern Togo, and Ewes are close in ethno-linguistic terms to Fon-speaking people in Benin. Anlo-Ewe refers to a group of primarily Ghanaian Ewes whose homeland is considered the coastal area of the Volta Region and the terrain immediately around the Keta Lagoon. In the twenty-first century, however, many Anlo-

Ewe people live in diaspora—in Accra, other parts of Ghana and the African continent, as well as in Europe and North America.

During the early and mid-1990s, I carried out ethnographic research with Anlo-Ewe people to learn how we might better understand Anlo-Ewe ways of being-in-the-world through a study of their sensory order. In our discussions and research, Anlo-Ewe individuals and I found that a taxonomy restricted to five external senses—hearing, touch, taste, smell and sight—was not particularly meaningful to many Anlo-Ewe people. Instead, they recognized an array of sensory fields including: *nusese*: hearing and aural perception; *agbagbadodo*: a sense of equilibrium and balance; *azolizozo* or *azolinu*: walking, kinesthesia, and a sense of movement; *nulele*: a complex of tactility, contact, touch; *nukpokpo*: seeing and visuality; *nudodo* and *nudodokpo*: tasting and 'tasting to see'; *nuvevese*: smelling and olfaction; *nufofo*: 'talking' or a vocal-oral sense. Not only was their cultural category for sensation broader than our classic five-senses model, but links were often drawn among sensations, emotions, and dispositions. This contrasted with Western philosophical traditions built on the distinctiveness of four domains: the external senses of hearing, touch, taste, smell, and sight; internal senses such as balance, kinesthesia, and proprioception; a set of emotional states including anger, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise; and moral responses differentiating between conscience and consciousness. But in Anlo-Ewe traditions, people have tended to posit a domain of immediate bodily experience encompassing perception, emotion, disposition, and moral knowing referred to in their language as *seselelame*.

Translating *seselelame* into English has proved difficult, and my Anlo-Ewe colleagues and I have resisted the gloss of 'sensation, opting instead for 'feeling in the body, flesh, or skin'. Indeed, Ewe linguist Felix Ameka has confirmed that the phrase *se-se-le-la-me* could be used for both emotion and sensing: 'lower level terms for various experiences in Ewe, like the superordinate label seselelame, do not distinguish between emotion, sensation, perception, cognition, etc. Instead, there are components that link to a bundle of these things at one and the same time' (Ameka 2002: 44–45). One of the implications of all of this is that the five exteroceptive registers of hearing, touch, taste, smell, and sight did not constitute a closed category in Anlo-Ewe thought, and were not the basis for their theory of knowing. Instead, Anlo epistemology and ontology depended upon an indigenous schema of *seselelame*—a sensibility in which bodily feeling was foregrounded as a source of vital information about environment and self. Later analysis (carried out with my colleague E.G. Adikah) led us to postulate that *seselelame* may be a foundational schema, and as such it may serve as a source domain for an array of cultural models—including narrative, verbal formulas, and other language arts.

The terms 'model' and 'schema' are sometimes used interchangeably, but here I rely on Bradd Shore's notion that foundational schemas have an encompassing quality, they are general and abstract, while cultural models are more particular and concrete. 'A foundational schema functions', Shore suggests, 'as a kind of template, a common underlying form that links superficially diverse cultural models' while simultaneously contributing to the 'sometimes ineffable sense of "style" or "ethos"' that is characteristic of a particular social group (1998: 117). In technical terms, Shore explains, a foundational schema provides what is referred to as a 'source domain' for the 'creation of a family of related cultural models'. These cultural models 'have evolved by means of a usually

unconscious "schematizing process," a kind of analogical transfer that underlies the creative life of cultural models' (1998: 118). In Anlo-Ewe contexts, balance would be an example of a model that is derived from a universal somatic experience that is nonetheless culturally instantiated in daily practice and thought. *Seselelame*, on the other hand, is more abstract and it usually remains out of awareness—similar to the way that 'Cartesian dualism' or 'mind-body split' probably remains out of awareness in the routine thoughts of most Euro-Americans.

After I published these findings, a Ghanaian psychologist named Vivian Dzokoto carried out a study to see if *seselelame* could be not only qualitatively demonstrated through ethnographic description, but also tested using quantitative measures. Dzokoto recruited seventy undergraduate students from two different social science departments at a Ghanaian university, and she recruited one hundred Euro-American students from 'the psychology subject pool of a large Midwestern university' (2010: 71). Her research drew on two different tests: the Body Awareness Questionnaire and the TMMS (Trait Meta-Mood Scale) Attention to Emotion subscale. Her results show that 'Ghanaians were significantly lower on the attention to emotion subscale' and her hypothesis was confirmed that 'Ghanaian subjects would score significantly higher on a measure of somatic-focused awareness' (2010: 72). She then explains that, '[a]ccording to these results, the concept of "feel-feel-at-flesh-inside" was successfully demonstrated numerically through the concept of somatic-focused awareness as measured by the Body Awareness Questionnaire.' Interestingly, Dzokoto points out that the Ghanaian participants in the study were English-speaking university students, which brings in two factors we might expect to cause them to exhibit more 'Western influence' in their mode of thinking and being. But even though they were from the more, relatively speaking, 'Westernized sector' of their own African society, they still exhibited the difference that Dzokoto hypothesized.

My claims:

The way in which Ghanaians in general (and Anlo-Ewe Ghanaians more specifically) exhibit higher somatic-focused awareness (compared to Euro-Americans) has consequences for theory of mind.

For one thing, in this context mind and organism are one, not separate. That is, mental activity (such as thought) is understood to involve (or to be inextricably bound up with) somatic processes.

Furthermore, the notion of thoughts being contained within a mind, or even within a buffered self (possessive individualism), is not meaningful or convincing to Anlo-Ewe people. Instead, in this cultural context your thoughts are perceivable (to others) through your bodily comportment; your tone of voice can betray your thoughts; your eyes can betray your thoughts. Intention is readily known. If we think of a continuum of ontologies from buffered selves to porous selves, this group is on the far end of porosity.

Understanding an Anlo-Ewe sensorium is significant because sight is not the primary modality by which people know things. 'Seeing is believing' does not really ring true. Instead, hearing, moving, and balancing are very important to mental processes, and 'invisible' forces are referenced.

Finally, my hypothesis is that while *seselelame* (feeling in the body, flesh, or skin) is a term that denotes a foundational schema among Anlo-Ewes, it probably points toward a pattern that is pan-African. Among Africans, and probably even among people of African descent, I hypothesize that when it comes to mental processes such as imagination, perception, and thought, we will find a privileging of movement-adaptability-flexibility, along with improvisation or 'repetition with revision'.

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• JASON THROOP •

My work centers on the problem of empathy, which developed out of nineteen months of ethnographic research on pain, suffering, and moral sensibilities in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia. Of particular significance for theory of mind research is the fact that there are numerous moral, epistemological, and communicative assumptions associated with ideals of mental opacity that inform experiences of suffering in Yap. In this context, the moral person is thought to be a person who is able to actively maintain a non-transparent relationship between his or her subjective life and his or her various forms of expression. Hiding your feelings from the scrutiny of others and remaining secretive about your intentions, motives, plans and goals, are expected and valued aspects of everyday social interactions.

When it comes specifically to experiences of pain, the ideal virtuous response for an individual sufferer is to conceal his or her suffering from others. There is a paradoxical problem associated with ideals of mental opacity in relationship to pain, however. On the one hand, for those suffering with pain, ideals associated with mental opacity are implicated in efforts at moral self-fashioning. The moral person is ideally to cultivate forms of self-governance that enable them to control the overt expression of their emotions, feelings, and hurt. And yet, these self-same orientations become problematic in efforts to seek out a diagnosis, treatment, and remedy for suffering. If individuals are actively working to conceal their suffering from others, how do they go about obtaining an accurate diagnosis for their condition? How do they seek treatment for it?

It was in the context of trying to understand individuals' struggles to navigate ideals of mental opacity and realities of personal suffering that I was repeatedly confronted with questions of empathy. What does empathy mean, how is it enacted, and how is it recognized in contexts where ideals of mental opacity are deemed necessarily linked to virtuous modes of being? How do individuals, their friends, family members, and healers cope with a sufferer's reluctance to express his or her suffering directly to others? What role does empathy play in such encounters?

These questions eventually led to my collaboration with Douglas Hollan who was also interested in examining the problem of empathy in anthropological research, theorizing, and practice. This collaboration led to our co-organizing a series of panels at

the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania meetings (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), as well as an invited panel at the SPA biennial meeting in 2004. These panels resulted in the publication of a special issue of the journal *Ethos*, entitled, 'Whatever Happened to Empathy?' in 2008, and an edited volume, *The Anthropology of Empathy: Experiencing the Lives of Others in Pacific Societies*, in 2011.

In both volumes, we examine the apparent lack of explicit attention to empathy in anthropology despite a renewed interest in the topic in psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We also point to the many definitional problems associated with the concept and the difficulties researchers faced in determining how empathy is related to other concepts that seem to bear a family resemblance to it, such as intersubjectivity, intentionality, and theory of mind. To help gain some conceptual clarity on the matter we suggested, with Jodi Halpern (2001), that empathy and empathy-like processes consist of at least three distinct aspects. These include: (1) a de-centering of self from its own historically situated self-experience; (2) imagining the perspective of another from a quasi-first person perspective; and (3) approximating the feelings, motives, and concerns of another, through cognitive, emotional, imaginal, and/or dialogical processes.

In the introduction to our most recent volume we extended this definition by means of the philosopher Karsten Stueber's (2006) distinction between 'basic' and 'reenactive' empathy—a distinction that is based on ongoing debates in theory of mind research over so-called 'theory-theory' and 'simulation-theory' approaches. In line with 'simulation-theory', Stueber takes 'basic empathy' to refer to all of those pre-theoretical and immediate emotional, sensory, and perceptual mechanisms (including the recently discovered mirror-neuron system) that underlie our abilities to understand another's moods, emotions, feelings, perspectives, etc. In contrast, 'reenactive' empathy consists of all other cognitive, imaginal, and emotional processes that are implicated in approximating the first-person perspective of others by means of so-called folk-psychological models. 'Reenactive' empathy aligns most closely with 'theory-theory' approaches in psychology and philosophy. It is our contention that both 'basic' and 'reenactive' varieties empathy are variously at play in moments where understanding others' motives, thoughts, cares, and concerns are at stake in social interaction.

My claim, then, is that empathy is shaped by different forms of intersubjectivity. In my contributions to these volumes I set out to detail Yapese understandings and practices of empathy, in particular examining how the ideal of mental opacity is, and is not, reconciled with dynamic exchanges of suffering and compassion that significantly pattern everyday social interactions (Throop 2008, 2011). In two more recent publications I explore in greater detail the personal, interpersonal, cultural, and temporal dynamics of empathy in the context of experiences of mourning and loss (Throop 2011), as well as the multiple sensory registers that may be implicated in efforts at empathy in the context of a local healer's massage practice (under review). In each case, building upon insights from the phenomenological tradition, I take empathy to be a particular mode of intersubjectivity that arises at moments in which interpersonal understanding breaks down in some way. From this perspective, there are necessarily more basic forms of intersubjectivity that potentiate possibilities for empathy (see Duranti 2010; Jackson 1998; Zahavi 2001, 2003).

In my work, I have avoided using the concept of 'theory of mind', relying instead upon this more phenomenologically grounded notion of 'basic intersubjectivity'. My reluctance to use 'theory of mind' is rooted in two related concerns that also have relevance, I think, for our workshop. The first concern is definitional/theoretical. What do we mean by theory of mind? Are anthropological formulations in any way different from psychological or philosophical ones? What are the advantages or disadvantages in relying upon the concept from an anthropological perspective? How does theory of mind relate to empathy or intersubjectivity? To what extent is theory of mind an ability based upon inferential processes (e.g. explicit or implicit theories) as opposed to experientially based embodied processes? Does the term 'theory' implicate an all too rational, cognitive, and conscious process? Does the emphasis upon 'theory' take our attention away from embodied, sensory, and practical modes of knowing others? Does the term 'mind', and all of the conceptual baggage associated with it, limit the range and varieties of experiences implicated in our assessments of other modes of being-in-the-world? My second concern is methodological. What methods should we use to understand the development, experience, and use of theory of mind in cultural context? Should anthropologists simply import existing experimental methods (e.g. false-belief tests) in psychology to differing field settings? Whether or not this is the case, should researchers rely on methods that focus primarily upon non-verbal cues, such as instances of joint-attention and gaze monitoring? Or do we need access to more explicit verbalized instances of recognizing complex emotional and internal states? How can traditional ethnographic methods contribute to the study of theory of mind?

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THE CONSTITUTION OF MIND: WHAT'S IN A MIND? PERSPECTIVISM

• APARECIDA VILAÇA •

My background: twenty five years of non-continuous fieldwork among the Wari' (Amazonia). Main research themes: cannibalism (they practiced two types: warfare and funerary); kinship, shamanism, and more recently conversion to Christianity. Wari' data can be readily interpreted using perspectivism as a conceptual tool; indeed this material was one of the ethnographic sources used to elaborate the theory.

I wish to present a brief sketch of what we could call a theory of mind among Amazonian peoples, based on an ethnography of the Wari', an Amerindian group of three thousand people living in a forest region of Brazil near the border with Bolivia. Any reflection on 'how to know each other's minds' in different cultures must begin, I think, by establishing who is considered to be an other for the cultures in question—something which is far from obvious.

Among the Wari' and other Amazonian peoples the concept of humanity is much more comprehensive than our own. An enormous variety of beings are conceived as human, including the Indians themselves, jaguars, tapirs and numerous other mammals, birds, all kinds of fish, bees and snakes. As human beings, they live in houses, drink beer, hunt and roast their prey, perform rituals and care for their children. The difference between them lies in the empirical world they project. For the Wari', beer is a fermented maize drink, for the jaguar, beer is blood, while for the tapir, beer is the mud found along river shores. As Viveiros de Castro (1998) observed, we are faced by something very different from our multicultural relativism, which presumes a single empirical universe or natural world onto which diverse culturally-determined perspectives are projected. Perspectivism implies a single culture common to all and distinct multiple natures. Instead of multiculturalism we have a multinaturalism. We are also faced with something different from so-called animism since although all these beings are human, they do not see one another as human beings. The jaguar sees himself as human, and the Wari' as animal prey. From the Wari' point of view, the situation is reversed. The relationship between predator-prey is the key idiom for establishing the difference between human/non-human, meaning that humanity is a position related to the predator role in any encounter with an other.

The great spectre haunting this world is not solipsism, as in ours, but metamorphosis, which implies the risk of being captured by the other's perspective and—by having his/her perspective altered—ceasing to be human to one's own kin. Consequently people are always attentive to the different signals emanating from other people's actions since their eyes can be deceived, perceiving an other as a similar.

Returning to the problem of metamorphosis, numerous situations—mythic or quotidian—are recounted in which a Wari' encounters a person or a group of people and begins to interact with them, perceiving them as equals, until at some point they suddenly become suspicious not of their actions, but of their world. The Wari' person may notice, for example, that although these others act in a completely normal way, they offer a pot of drink that they call beer but which to the Wari' person's eyes looks like blood. Faced with this evidence, he or she finally realizes that those who looked like humans are in fact jaguars and, coming to their senses at last, leaves quickly. If the person accepts the beer and drinks it, he or she turns into a jaguar too, meaning that they continue to perceive themselves as human, but are not seen as such by their Wari' kin. Metamorphosis does not affect one's own self-perception, therefore, but the view that others have of oneself. Consequently identity is not something carried by the self, whether in the form of adornments, body painting or a secret thought, but is determined from the outside, indissociable from the relational context: 'I am what other people see'. As a result, sameness and otherness are perspectives, linked to the body, that cannot be defined *a priori* but only in the context of the relation.

What does this mean in terms of everyday relations, in particular the relations between people who consider each other equals, or kin? Firstly kinship, founded on the similarity of bodies, is something fabricated day-to-day, setting out from the potential alterity that forms the raw material of all beings: those described as human, who have soul, are precisely those who can be transformed. Among many Amazonian groups, babies are said to be born other than human and raising a child among the Trio, for instance, is expressed as 'undoing the spider monkey' (Grotti 2009). This means nurturing,

feeding and constituting a memory ideally expressed through the use of the correct kin terms. This assimilation of bodies amounts to the fabrication of a shared humanity, signifying a single perspective, or the same empirical world, thus minimizing the perils of metamorphosis. However this danger always remains present because of the predatory activity of other beings. The Wari' say, for example, that jaguars are always anxious to capture Wari' children to make them into their kin. To this end they may prey on them directly or attract children by looking after them so that they start to see the jaguars as kin. Tales abound of children who followed a jaguar thought to be their mother or father, only to be rescued later by their Wari' kin who had kept their human perspective: that is, they continued to see the jaguar as a jaguar, telling the child what was happening and recovering him or her.

For this reason, people always pay considerable attention to others' actions since it is through them that they can make an inference about their identity. Given the particular susceptibility of children, their actions are keenly observed, especially their appetite: children who reject food given by their Wari' parents are very likely to be in a process of alteration, sharing food with other types of beings, incapable of recognizing Wari' food. Hence this does not involve an inference concerning the mind per se, since the latter is in a way common to all insofar as all beings have similar intentions, ultimately desiring to make kin. Attention is focused on the nature objectified by the process of interaction. What varies, then, are not minds but worlds.

Finally I note that even non-human beings—those without a soul, which applies to some animals like the spider monkey, and to plants and objects in general—though incapable of transforming or producing transformations in others, may possess intentionality, acting intelligently to capture food, make shelters or defend themselves. Such intentionality is an attribute of the heart, part of the body. So, for example, on a visit to Rio de Janeiro my Wari' father attributed a heart to the garage door, opened by a remote control used by myself but unseen to him. Among the Wari', the heart is the seat of moral action. Someone with heart acts correctly, generously, is a good wife and so on. This involves another level of apprehending what we could call a theory of mind, a level subsumed by the first, which concerns humanity. A Wari' person is ideally someone with heart and a series of morally condemnable acts always raises the suspicion that a metamorphic process is under way.

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• RUPERT STASCH •

My knowledge base for thinking about cultural variation in theories of mind has been fieldwork with Korowai of West Papua, Indonesia. Many features of how Korowai talk and act about minds, consciousness, emotions, and thought echo patterns previously reported

in ethnographic literature on New Guinea and the Pacific. This includes a pattern of stressing the opacity of other people's minds, as in the common Korowai verbal formula, 'Herself her own guts/thoughts,' or more idiomatically, 'She thinks/decides for herself.' People routinely use this formula in conversation to disavow their ability to predict or explain another person's actions.

My main addition to discussions of this pattern has been a short article (Stasch 2008) suggesting that this emphasis in Melanesian theorization of mind is a matter of politics as well as epistemology. What Korowai are affirming in these statements is the special authority that persons have to know or determine their own thoughts, as much as special access they have to their own thoughts. In making this suggestion, I drew partly on philosopher Richard Moran's discussion of first-person versus third-person knowledge in his book *Authority and Estrangement* (2001). But my main evidence for the suggestion was patterns of wider linguistic and ethnographic context surrounding the 'She has her own thoughts' statements.

One level of relevant context is the prominence with which Korowai use language of 'thought' to analyze circumstances of political conflict. Discord in action is routinely described as stemming at base from involved parties' thoughts being mutually 'different' or 'other'. A wider level of relevant context is the great emphasis Korowai put on personal autonomy, and on refusal of hierarchy or being ordered around, as a cross-cutting political value. (Their emphasis on autonomy and egalitarianism may be sharper even than in the similar political ethos of many other New Guinea societies.) Seeing opacity statements as in part statements about the political terms of people's coexistence flowed from my sense that people's use of the 'He has his own thoughts' formula was usually a context-specific crystallization of these wider political values.

In sum, my claims with respect to the narrow theme above are:

– We should think about the knowledge aspect and authority aspect of knowing minds in tandem. (As best I have discerned from Korowai case materials, this would not involve doubting the experiential reality of the opacity of other minds, as something people feel. It just involves adding that often a sense of political opacity is a prominent aspect of the experience.)

– We should examine whether emphasis on opacity goes with, or is a form of, emphasis on autonomy. This could be true of variation across societies, or across contexts within societies.

My broader ethnographic and comparative interest would be to then situate the opacity theme within a wider field of mind talk and mind theorization. My work on this wider field is at a stage more of putting forward 'themes' than 'claims'. Some Korowai emphases in modeling of mind that might be good to think with comparatively include:

– Often it seems that mind theory is social theory, or theory of action. Talk about 'thought' is very prominent as a daily or moment-to-moment register in which people parse social affairs.

– The emphasis on opacity of others' minds is vivid, but coexists with other statements. People do express claims of positive knowledge of others' thoughts (even if hedged by irrealis and/or interrogative suffixes: '…perhaps they could be thinking'). They also frequently affirm that someone else is 'of the same mind' or 'has the same thoughts' as themselves (e.g. as a general expression of social unity and agreement). Speakers also frequently celebrate specific persons as not acting according to their 'own thoughts' but instead having 'good thoughts' evidenced in material generosity toward others. Many of these patterns of talk still seem to involve a strong recognition of a baseline possibility of people's radical mental-political separateness from each other, while posing bridges across separateness as a valued accomplishment.

– Perspectivism might be seen as standing in an interesting tension with the opacity emphasis. 'Perspectivist' representations posit parallel, inverted, or otherwise transposed subjectivities experienced by social beings other than living humans (e.g. they see our night as their day, they see our houses as their trees and vice versa). Korowai perspectivist representations are most elaborated around divinities, the dead, or other occult populations thought to coexist invisibly with humans. On the one hand, these representations might be taken as reaffirming at a species level what opacity statements affirm at a personal one: different beings have fundamentally different subjectivity. (Korowai sometimes use the vocabulary of 'guts/thought/consciousness' to talk about perspectivism, saying that humans and some other population 'don't have the same thoughts/subjectivity', and these differences are linked to imperatives of segregation). Yet against the grain of the opacity idea, the perspectivist representations do involve claiming to know the shape of the feelings and perceptual experiences of non-humans, and thinking about possibilities of moving between the different subjectivities in processes of mediumship, reincarnation, and the like.

– The moral emphasis on respecting others' mental autonomy coexists also with a diverse array of ideas about persons not knowing or controlling their own mental lives: their thoughts are startled or stressed by other people, they are possessed in their thoughts/guts by divinities, they are the reincarnation of a secret predecessor, they are attacked or injured without being conscious of it, and so on. Great interactional deference to others' personal authority over their own mental lives, as a mode of respecting autonomy, seems correlative also with a highly developed sense of the tenuousness of that authority. Routinely, too, people are distant or deliberative toward their own thought: their thoughts are opaque (plural, ambiguous) to themselves; they expect their thoughts to change or clarify over time, etc.

– Finally, 'thought' and emotional experience is often transparently modeled as being materially fungible: persons' feelings are known in and as their acts of material giving or appropriation, and people enter into material transactions deliberately expecting that articles will change their own or others' psychological states (e.g. remove grief or anger, akin to 'retail therapy'). This overall pattern again might be seen as in an interestingly two-sided relation to the opacity theme. On the one hand, the focus on visible, tangible, knowable material articles is a recognition of the basic unknowability

of people's interior subjectivity per se, and a compensatory shift to something more knowable. On the other hand, the transactional processes involve not only a sense that others' subjectivity is reachable but also a project of the deliberate, knowing reengineering of each other's subjectivity, seemingly contrary to the emphasis on unknowability and 'hands-off!' autonomy in the domain of verbal description and command.

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THE LEARNING OF MIND: HOW DO YOU FIGURE OUT WHAT A MIND IS? TEACHING AND LEARNING

• BARBARA ROGOFF •

The basis of my understanding of learning by observing and pitching in:

I first began working in a Tz'utujiil Mayan town in the highlands of Guatemala, thirty seven years ago, interested in understanding how children learned the complex activities of their community. I inquired about learning to weave, among other activities. When I asked mothers 'How do you teach your daughters to weave?' they replied, 'I don't teach them to weave, they just learn.' This was a puzzle for me, as I assumed that children don't learn unless they are taught. (My assumption may have been supported by having spent nineteen years in school at that point.) My career since then has circled around trying to answer this question.

My research since that eighteen-month period living in San Pedro has involved several subsequent investigations in San Pedro and approximately yearly trips back. In addition, I have engaged in research in collaboration with my students and postdoctoral students, in Mexico and among Mexican-heritage families in the US (varying in involvement in Western schooling), as well as Anglo families. Our methods include participant observation, ethnography (at various scales), interviews, and observing how people act in situations that we design to simulate everyday learning situations so that we can make cultural comparisons of multiple cases.

We are interested in understanding a way of learning that seems to be widespread among people with experience with Indigenous-heritage practices of Guatemala and Mexico, which we call 'learning through intent community participation' (see Intent Community Participation website). Basically, this is learning by observing and pitching in.

Our understanding is amplified by ethnographies of similar practices elsewhere in these regions as well as through North and South America. We have also learned a great deal from the international consortium that I founded to look at this question. The consortium has met for eight years, and involves about thirty-five researchers (anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, linguists, education folks, historians). All of

us have personal experience in Indigenous-heritage communities of the Americas, and many of us are from such communities.

My current understanding of learning by observing and pitching in can be contrasted with the characteristics of assembly-line instruction. The facets of the following prisms define the approaches:

LEARNING through INTENT COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

3. Learning by means of:
Keen attention and **contribution** (current or anticipated) to events. **Guidance** from communitywide **expectations** and sometimes people.

2. Motive: Learner is eager to **contribute, belong, & fulfill role.** Others' motive is to **accomplish** endeavor (and maybe to guide).

4. Social organization of endeavors: **Collaborative.** Learner trusted to contribute with **initiative**. **Flexible** leadership; all may guide. Calm mutual pace.

1. Learner is incorporated and contributing to family/community endeavors.

7. Assessment: of progress as well as **support**. To **aid** contributions **during** the endeavor. Thru **direct** feedback from outcome & acceptance or correction of efforts.

5. Communication: **Coordination** of **shared endeavors** with **nonverbal** (+verbal) conversation. Dramatization, narratives.

6. Goal of education: **Transform participation,** to contribute, belong. Learn **consideration, responsibility,** information, skills.

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ASSEMBLY-LINE INSTRUCTION

3. Learning by means of: **Receiving lessons, exercises out of context** of productive activity.

2. Motive: Learner seeks **extrinsic** rewards, avoids threats. Others' motive is to **instruct and sort** learners.

4. Social organization of endeavors: **Unilateral control, fixed roles.** '**Expert' controls** pace, attention, learner behavior. 'Transmits' info, divides labor, **not collaborating** in endeavor. Learner **receives** info.

1. Controlled instruction in segregated setting.

7. Assessment: to **sort + test** learners. **Separate** from learning. **Indirect feedback** from praise, critique, ranking.

5. Communication: **Limited formats**— Explanations out of context; quiz questions.

6. Goal of education: **Transmission** of **isolated** information, skills for **certification**, prerequisite for inclusion in society.

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With my research group, I have carried out extensive research on most of the facets of the prism. We have found that children (and in some studies, adults) from Indigenous and Indigenous-heritage families with little Western schooling are more likely to be:

– incorporated in a broad range of community activities
– expected and eager to contribute with initiative
– supported in their efforts by others nearby who are engaging in related activities, who allow them initiative and trust their ability to contribute
– attending keenly to events surrounding them, including events that do not directly involve them
– collaborating by blending agendas with others, with initiative, and attentively even when not directly involved
– coordinating shared endeavors with articulate nonverbal conversation (in addition to talk)
– guided by nonverbal conversation (in addition to talk) in the context of shared endeavors, as well as by counsel in narrative or dramatic form
– showing consideration (*respeto*) for the direction of the group endeavor
– helping without being asked (being *acomedid@*)

My claims:

Underlying these cultural differences there seem to be distinct views of childhood and learning. For example:

– Children are treated as community members from the start, rather than pre-persons or pre-contributors relegated to a 'child world'.
– They are assumed to be competent, trusted to make sense of the world and take part with growing skill and initiative.
– Their involvement is valued not only for the contributions in the moment but also for their learning of cultural ways, to be able to continue valued activities of the community.
– Their learning is treated as being a product of being present, observing, and contributing to the range of ongoing endeavors of the community.
– Calm mindful attention to surrounding events is key to learning, which is not rushed.
– Talk is used in support of (rather than in place of) shared endeavors.
– Learning to collaborate with others in support of shared endeavors requires learning to be alert to the direction of the group and considerate of the efforts of others, in addition to valued technical skills and information.

This way of organizing learning is not 'just natural'; it is a highly evolved human practice that requires specific forms of community organization and individual skill to support such learning practices. The ambient environment has to be organized for learners' presence, integration, and contributions.

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• LUKE BUTLER AND ELLEN MARKMAN •

Acquiring generic knowledge about kinds and categories is an essential building block in cognitive development, allowing children to make generalizations from small amounts of data and more efficiently construct a conceptual understanding of the world (see Gelman 2003; Keil 1989; Markman 1989). Moreover, in acquiring generic knowledge, children often rely on adults to impart information that might otherwise be difficult or even impossible to learn (Gelman 2009; Harris 2002). But acquiring generic knowledge poses a challenging inductive problem, as one can never observe a kind or category as a whole, but must infer for each newly encountered piece of information whether it is merely relevant or important to an individual or in a particular context, or whether it is truly a piece of generic information about the world. One way that children can solve this problem is by attending to linguistic cues. When children hear novel information conveyed in a way that makes it clear that an adult is referring to a kind rather than an individual, they treat it as more generalizable and more conceptually relevant to a kind than if they hear identical information conveyed otherwise (e.g. Cimpian and Markman 2008, 2009; Gelman and Coley 1990; Gelman and Markman 1986).

However, children must also be able to gauge whether information is generic in situations that don't provide such clear linguistic cues. One possibility is that children might attend to cues that an adult is explicitly sharing information with them for the child's own benefit (Csibra and Gergely 2009). On a rational, Gricean analysis (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986), children may infer that when adults communicate information to them, it is likely because it is information that is important and relevant. Children may thus infer that information being explicitly communicated is likely generic information, and will make inductive inferences similar to those they make when information is shared using clear linguistic cues.

In our research, we have found compelling evidence that children as young as four do make use of communicative cues to guide inferences about whether information is generic. In one set of experiments (Butler and Markman, in press), we found that in assessing the importance of new information children are highly sensitive as to whether an action is performed with the pedagogical intent of sharing information with the child for their benefit, or is merely performed with the intent to carry out an instrumental action. Children only formed a strong inductive generalization about a novel property when evidence for that property was explicitly demonstrated for their benefit. When children were given identical objects to play with, and discovered that they in fact failed to share the original demonstrated property, these strong inductive generalizations led them to persist in exploring and trying to get the objects to work. In contrast, even when children observed identical evidence that an object had this novel property, but it was produced in an intentional but not explicitly pedagogical manner, children made a weaker, more tentative generalization. This suggests that children are quite conservative about what information supports strong generalizations, and reserve such inferences for information that someone has deliberately manifested for their benefit.

Further, this sensitivity leads children not only to stronger generalizations but to fundamentally different conceptions of a novel object kind (Butler and Markman, under review). Only when children were explicitly shown that a novel object possessed a property,

and not when they observed identical evidence produced in an intentional but non-pedagogical manner, they made a radically different inference about the nature of that novel kind of object—as defined by possession of this deeper, functional property rather than by perceptual similarity. Taken together, these experiments suggest that children make judicious use of communicative cues to guide nuanced inductive inferences about whether information is generic.

Our claim is that these studies and those currently under way shed light on the important role that children's ability to reason about the minds of those around them plays in early cognitive development. Children are aware that others, especially adults, know more about the world than they do. Moreover, they know, or at least assume, that those adults act with a cooperative motive to manifest and share important information with them, for their own direct benefit. This type of cooperative exchange of information may form the bedrock of human culture and cultural transmission, enabling children to learn from adults, and allowing each generation to capitalize on the wealth of knowledge accumulated by earlier generations. This capacity begins to emerge early in life (see Tomasello 2008), and we have found that by preschool age children appear to use cues that an adult is communicating with them to help solve the crucial inductive problem of identifying important information about the world.

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THE LEARNING OF MIND: HOW DO YOU FIGURE OUT WHAT A MIND IS? PLAY, CREATIVITY, FICTION AND FANTASY

• DANILYN RUTHERFORD •

I feel both singularly unqualified and singularly qualified to contribute to the fashioning of an anthropological theory of mind. In my research in Biak, an island group in the Indonesian-occupied part of Melanesia, West Papua, I struck out when it came to collecting explicit accounts of how minds and bodies work. I'm not so sure that the term 'theory' captures what is going on when people make inferences about what others are thinking, feeling, or doing. I'm not sure we're going to make the most of what anthropology has to offer to thinking on this topic if we limit our task to the comparison of theories of mind.

But in another sense, I am qualified for this conversation. For reasons having less to do with my research on Biak than with my unusual domestic situation, I've given a good deal of thought to the question of how children develop the ability to stand in another's shoes. I'm not quite an auto-ethnographer, but I come close. I feel qualified to share some ideas about theories of mind—and what I see as shortcomings in the theory—because I am a participant observer who is tightly enmeshed in a tiny social world I feel compelled to describe.

This tiny social world revolves around my eleven-year old daughter, Millie. Millie does not walk without support. She does not talk. She rarely makes eye contact. She is what the doctors and bureaucrats call 'severely to profoundly retarded'. They say she has a mental age of between nine and eleven months. It is hard to imagine Millie entertaining a theory. Some might even see her as belonging to the ranks of Clifford Geertz famously described as 'unworkable monstrosities', 'men without culture', given her apparent lack of language or much in the way of signs. I have a personal and professional interest in seeing Millie otherwise. For me, Millie is one of the most instructive social beings I have ever met.

This is because Millie challenges our presumptions on the nature of sociality—our deep-seated prejudices on the way in which intersubjectivity happens amongst humans (and perhaps other animals). She brings to light the embodied connective tissue on which rests the relationship between self and others and all the multifarious modes of human action, from gossiping to doing math. I've just begun investigating the practices of belief that come to light in the therapeutic settings set up to serve children like Millie, who seem stalled on the cusp of communication. Based on what some have called 'the doctrine of the least dangerous assumption', speech therapy rests on faith: the faith that one can create a speaking subject by responding to seemingly random gestures—a burp, a twitch—as though they were intentional signs. But I'm also after something more elusive than these practices, which one can study by talking to experts. This has led me to start taking field notes like the following in which I try to understand Millie on her own terms:

> [Millie] is more determined than anyone I know. She tries hard to get herself moved into a position in which she can reach one of those toys in her room that she loves the best—things with strings, things with straps, things with zippers—toys only in the loosest sense, the sense that accommodates fleece vests, shoe laces, Keene sandals, and long hair. Most recent example: It's Easter. Non-conventional parent that I am, I do not awaken in the same house as both of my Bunny-worthy children. Ralph [my fourteen year old] wakes up in LA with his cousins, with whom he had just spent a week skiing. Millie wakes up in Santa Cruz, but by then I'm long gone, up at Lexington Reservoir with the other pagan scullers out for a morning row. On the way to San Jose Airport afterwards, I stop at a coffee house in Los Gatos. Why are all these people so dressed up? Why is everyone talking about church? Is Los Gatos not only whiter and richer than Santa Cruz—is it also more Christian, too? Easter. Fortunately, I did have my act together enough the night before to buy baskets, grass, crème eggs, jelly beans, and lots of Peeps—and the nicest Easter themed toys I could find for Millie at CVS. (Real toys: a bunny that bends. A sheep that bleats. A funny ball with feathers.)

> It's 3 p.m. Time for the egg hunt! Ralph makes pretty short work of it—he came home with a suitcase full of Best-Rogowski chocolate but he's still motivated enough to find eight cream eggs. Meanwhile, Millie has turned her attention to her basket. Izzi walks her out of her bathroom holding her shoulders to help her balance, knee poised to prompt Millie to step by applying gentle pressure to the opposite buttock. No need. Millie is lifting her knees, Gestapo style. Marching forward. She sees the grass.

She's smiling. She's squealing. She's taking huge steps. When she gets within two feet, she stops walking and leans forward, holding out her arms, reaching with her fingers, giggling hysterically. We laugh with her—she laughs even harder when she hears us laugh. One more step. She's forgotten about stepping, so determined is she to grab this stuff—she'd rather fly or dive into the little pile of shredded green paper. But then she is there. She grabs a fistful. It's not coming out quickly enough. She grabs the basket by the handle and shakes it upside down. Jelly beans spray onto the couch and carpet. (Look out for the dog!) She squeals. The bendy bunny catches her eye; she catches him by the leg—but she's not ready to give up the grass, looking over her shoulder to see where it went. Izzi turns her to sit on the couch—she can do this now, unsupported—I gather up the grass and jelly beans, unbending her fingers to release the final piece, and carrying her basket, along with Ralph's, to the kitchen. She keeps looking for them, not giving the bleating sheep the attention it deserves. I put the baskets back into their original hiding place—in the kitchen cupboard. She still gazes in their direction wistfully. Determination.

Millie experiences the world around her through channels quite unlike those used by typical people. Millie has trouble organizing her visual field; she prefers to rely on sound and touch. It's not surprising that strangers find it hard to interact with her. Millie doesn't share attention by following the gaze of another; instead she vocalizes, laughing merrily when someone imitates her sounds. She doesn't lock eyes; instead she strokes flesh, gently fondling people and their clothing, reaching for their jewelry, laces, and belts. Although Millie has not been labeled autistic, scholarship on this topic has provided me with useful leads for thinking about her experience. Critics of the theory of mind theory of autism have raised the possibility that what researchers have described as a 'deficit' in autistic children could in fact stem from their atypical ways of organizing their sensory field. Some have even suggested that intersubjectivity begins with proprioception: our reflexive experience of our bodies in time and space. We need not define autism as a lack of sympathy, to use an eighteenth century term for the ability to identify with others. We could view it as sympathy in another key.

Anthropologists often get cast in the role of naysayer. For the purposes of this project, I'm wondering whether we can use our comparative method in more sophisticated ways. Linguistic anthropologists have described how people's 'language ideologies' foreground certain functions of language, while leaving others unremarked. I wonder whether we could coin a new term—'sensory ideologies'—to describe how people navigate the multiple avenues that are available for entering the give and take that makes humans what they are. My daughter's ways may seem strange. But they may well bring to light capacities that all of us share.

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• SUZANNE GASKINS •

I have done fieldwork for many years in a small Maya village in Yucatan, Mexico. I have done a wide range of projects looking at children's development and their everyday lives from infancy through middle childhood.

My basic claim:

The cultural organization of children's worlds provides different demands and opportunities to children who are learning to understand their social partners. When caregivers initiate and organize children's social experiences and intentionally structure the world to support their learning, children must master their caregivers' expectations and also come to learn how to manipulate their attention. When caregivers give the responsibility to the children to organize their own learning through observation and participation, children focus not only on others' understandings about the interactional space but also on their understandings about the larger world and how to operate in it. Thus, there are many ways in which Yucatec Mayan children's understanding of others' minds is very different from that of a middle class, European-American child, and so is their use of their understanding in conducting their daily lives.

Infancy

One area that I have worked in is Mayan infants' rules of engagement with the physical and social world—which both structure and provide evidence for how they understand others' minds and motivations. Beginning in infancy, Yucatec Maya children's caregivers do not usually actively stimulate them nor construct experiences for them designed to maximize their learning experiences. Maya caregivers are highly responsive to their infants' signals about desires and distresses, but they do not work nearly as diligently as European-Americans to engage their infants in extended, face-to-face social interactions nor direct their attention to objects and events in the world around them. Thus, Mayan infants have much more control over directing their attention to the social and physical world around them—they must take the initiative to pay attention, and they must decide what is worth paying attention to, including making sense of others' thoughts and feelings.

Researchers are currently investigating whether Yucatec Mayan infants' pre-verbal communicative gestures (e.g. pointing) are similar to those studied in the US and Europe, and whether they develop at the same time. It appears that while the emergence of the capacity to point and to follow points happens in many cultures around the infants' first birthdays, the amount of time spent in practicing this new skill differs based on the social input the infant receives. Yucatec Mayan babies appear to be able to point around their first birthdays, but they point less (and have fewer points directed to them), and their points are frequently ignored by their social partners. In addition, it appears that one key component to shared pointing is not consistently present in early pointing—checking to see if the intended audience's attention has been successfully directed by the point—'is the other person paying attention to what I'm pointing at?' This social referencing is used in

the US and Europe as a necessary component for crediting the infant with an intentional pointing gesture, but among Yucatec Maya infants, many of their points go 'unchecked'. One would expect that other early theories of mind skills, like gaze following, might in fact be practiced earlier or more extensively by Yucatecan infants. (Again, we do not yet know the answer to this question, but it is being worked on.)

Pointing, as an early system for commenting on the shared world of infant and caregiver, is also influenced by what counts as an interesting topic for interaction—what the infant finds interesting and what they predict their social partners will find interesting. For US and European babies, much caregiver interaction is mediated through objects: showing, pointing, labeling, demonstrating, giving, etc. For Yucatec Maya babies, almost all social interaction is about interpersonal interaction, unmediated by objects: physical movement, greetings, facial expressions, etc. The infants' engagement with the physical world is much more independent, with almost no social referencing to caregivers or playmates. Because of this, Maya infants also spend less time in trying to sustain the attention of caregivers unless they actively need care. They are not seeking nor expecting mediation of the physical environment. Moreover, I have argued, as have Pablo Chavajay and Barbara Rogoff, that Maya adults are able to sustain attention to more than one thing at once, and so caregivers' attention is distributed simultaneously across activities and events, including whatever the infant is doing; in turn, Yucatec infants explore their environment as if they assume someone is always watching (a good assumption in their world). This helps explain why they do not check for partners' attention when they point. European-American adults, on the other hand, distribute their attention sequentially, and their babies factor in to their behavior the need to direct caregivers' attention toward them and to confirm that they have it.

Children three-to-eight years of age

At somewhat older ages, I have studied two kinds of behavior that are relevant to theory of mind: observational learning and pretend play. With Ruth Paradise, I have argued that growing out of an environment where children are invited to be present at virtually all activities and events, are expected to watch in order to learn, and are allowed to participate only when they have developed some level of competency, they learn through observation by exercising a kind of attention we have called open attention. We define it as attention that is wide–angled and abiding, that is, attention that is distributed across all that is occurring in the environment and is sustainable across time. This kind of attention contrasts strongly with the kind of attention expected in a Western school setting, which is narrowly focused and sustained in bursts. It comes closer to the kind of attention that someone who is 'street-wise' might use while walking in a dangerous neighborhood. Concrete skills can obviously be learned through observing behaviors, but when open attention is habitually practiced, much more subtle information can be inferred. Since there is little intentional teaching occurring, with an organized curriculum and explanations, the children are responsible for directing their attention and for making sense of what they observe in their everyday lives. It falls on the learner to identify and integrate relevant information, much of which involves making inferences about

unobservable characteristics of other people, such as their knowledge, ideas, motivations, and emotions.

One of the ways that children integrate their observations of the world around them into organized understanding is through pretend play. I have argued that in most cultures, pretend play is primarily limited to interpreting what they have observed in their everyday lives: assuming roles and enacting scripts drawn from events that the children participate in and/or observe. Vygotsky argues that children, though playing at roles they have in everyday life, come to understand the roles better through the process of extracting the more general characteristics of those roles in order to play them. To play at roles that they have observed others hold, children also must come to understand better the thoughts, motivations, and understandings of others—especially if the goal is to give accurate enough interpretations of someone in those roles that they will be accepted as sensible and adequate by fellow-players. In this sense, interpretive pretense, based on experience, requires children to apply their theories about others to their own actions within the pretend field. To play at being a mother, in a convincing and satisfying way, one cannot just create behaviors and talk, but rather, one must invoke one's understandings about the motivations behind a real mother's actions and talk. It is in this sense that this kind of pretend play goes beyond imitation and into interpretation. The other kind of pretend, inventive pretend, does not make this same demand on children. When children pretend at things that are not real, or they have not observed, as European-American children often do, they may construct roles and scripts that are not bound by the understandings of others—a new, personal reality is constructed. In this case, the theory-of-mind demands on a player come not from producing adequate content for the play, but from negotiating the play space with other players. The social demands of interaction are higher because the play is less constrained by shared knowledge, and children must take into consideration the minds of others to sustain the play space itself.

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• GRAHAM JONES •

Connections between play and games and the theorization of mind run deep. Scholars have linked play and the development of a theory of mind in children, and games involving strategic interaction in which players must dissimulate their own mental contents and make conjectures about opponents' thoughts are particularly rich in this regard. For instance, Sacks (1980: 320) describes a game in which children try to guess which one among them has received a button from another player as a setting where 'you learn that others can see what you're thinking and you learn to see what others are thinking' by inferring mental states from visible behaviors or expressions.

Anthropologists have studied similar forms of strategic interaction among adults. In an ethnographic study of Cretan card gamblers, Malaby (1999: 153–154) explains,

> The distinctive skill in poker is the ability to read the other players' intentions (…) with a corresponding control over what oneself reveals (…) Thus the game behind the game in poker is one of strategic concealment and disclosure, as one attempts to give others an inscrutable posture while simultaneously making one's own guesses about other players' situations.

Similarly, in a recent ethnographic study of international arena of competitive chess, Desjarlais (2011: 68–69) writes:

> Chess psychology holds that other minds are largely opaque—it's often difficult to know what an opponent is truly thinking or feeling—and this mental opacity sets limits on interpersonal empathy (…) Many chess players strive to drum up acts of agonic empathy: they try to know their opponents better, through a variety of means, in order to triumph over them (…) These days, players often adopt 'counterempathy' measures (…) so that their prospective rivals cannot pin down their inclinations. Some players are concerned about their opponents 'reading their minds' while playing, and they try not to let on too much about what they're thinking.

Entertainment magic, which involves someone fooling and someone being fooled, is another arena in which strategic interaction becomes a form of play, and which necessitates a high capacity for representing the mental states of others. Recent studies in brain sciences have focused on the patterns of thought and perception that magicians expertly manipulate. A representative review in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* argues that 'any serious magician has a theory about how to deceive his or her audience. If this theory is wrong, the magic trick will fail and the audience will spot the secret' (Kuhn et al. 2008: 350). It follows that 'each performance can be viewed as an experiment that tests the magician's theory (…) Years of such testing enables a magician to learn much about human cognition. Moreover much of this knowledge is shared with fellow magicians and is passed on from one generation to the next.'

In an ethnographic study of the social world of entertainment magicians in contemporary France, I describe the production and transmission of this kind of situated expertise as part of what I call a 'working theory of mind' (Jones 2011: 58). Magicians must remain constantly aware of how the spectators they encounter, often in face-to-face interactions, perceive their words and actions (it is important to note that their theories are developmentally calibrated to spectators of differing ages). One common strategy for imagining spectators' viewpoints in the context of magic lessons is to verbalize their thoughts as hypothetical reported speech. For instance, in a magic class I attended as a participant observer, the instructor made the following remarks about the need to perform a particular concealed maneuver without making any noise: '*If you allow the- the slightest suspicion about the fact that you* might have tossed it*, you're dead. People will say, 'OK, he tossed it, we didn't see it go.' It's too easy to say.* (…) *If there's a "*clack*" at the last moment, people say to themselves, "OK he tossed it."'*

This example suggests a number of directions for anthropological research on theories of mind. In imagining what spectators might think or say to themselves under certain conditions, expert magicians enact a working theory of mind that construes mentation as a continuous inner monolog that is also potentially speakable. This construal is calibrated both to the specific dynamics of magic performance as a situated activity system and to the exigencies of magic pedagogy, rendering the contents of spectators' thoughts available

for scrutiny. It may also reflect an ideology of mind specific to a cultural setting where others' thoughts are considered both knowable and speakable (cf. Schieffelin 2008). This analysis leads me to ask: How do participants in other forms of play involving strategic interaction—and other communities of practice more broadly—draw upon cultural and linguistic resources such as reported speech or constructed dialogue to discursively elaborate and interactionally transmit working theories of mind as a form of expertise?

Incidentally, magic may also be relevant to the consideration of other minds as an epistemological problem in social scientific research. Within anthropology, the topic of instrumental, occult, and ritual magic has played a pivotal role in research on cross-cultural psychology. Once taken as a primitive worldview, 'magical thinking' is no longer theorized as a form of cognitive alterity (e.g. Luhrmann 1989). Elsewhere, I have argued that entertainment magic was a significant cultural backdrop for the historical elaboration of a theoretical dichotomy between magical and rational thinking, with the ability to interpret magic tricks naturalistically functioning as a metonym for modernity (Jones 2010). This example raises a broader question about consequences of researchers' own conceptual models for cross-cultural research on mental phenomena.

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• MICHELLE KARNES •

My field is medieval literature and my work thus far has focused on imagination. I have just published a book that focuses on imagination in medieval meditations and theories of cognition. The Middle Ages abounded in meditations that instructed their readers or hearers to imagine the events of Christ's life systematically and to participate imaginatively in them. The imaginative exercises counseled by these authors—that you should imagine picking up the baby Jesus, calming him when he cries, handing him over to Mary if he starts squirming too much, and so forth—have tended to appear unsophisticated. I resist that characterization in part by reading the meditations in tandem with medieval philosophy. In the period's theories of cognition, imagination was integral to every act of understanding. Only through it could you proceed from perceiving a particular, upright, square, and tiled structure, from a particular house, to understanding what a house is more generally, that is, a form that can shelter people and goods. That journey from the particular to the universal is, in the Aristotelian theory of knowledge then dominant, simply the way that understanding occurs. It only happens, according to medieval Christian philosophers, with the aid of Christ. He shines his illuminative light on the images within imagination so that they can properly represent their objects. The point of all this is that Christ is nowhere more present to the individual than in his or her imagination. One who imagines Christ's life participates spiritually, not just figuratively, in it.

What especially interests me about this philosophy is imagination's relationship to the real and true: one discovers truth by using imagination, and one discovers Christ as

he exists within the mind by imagining him. How people theorize imagination surely affects how they experience it. Today, we value imagination above all as a creative faculty, one that forecasts and foresees things that might one day be but at present are not. In its negative aspect, it is simply illusory—he only imagined it, we say. In either case, what you imagine is something that doesn't exist, even if it should. So what does it mean to say that imagination gives you access to what's real? How does that change one's perspective on imagination or on reality?

I am continuing to work on these questions now. I'm in the midst of a chunky article that again looks at imagination, but this time as it relates to marvels, not meditation. Marvels or mirabilia include many sorts of wonderful things in medieval writings: they are the products of magic-like illusions and transmutations, they are the special properties of natural things like curative herbs and unusual stones when put to use, and they are crafted machines, called automata, that run themselves. These last include such things as clockworks and mechanical birds, and all evidence indicates that there was a real passion for them in the Middle Ages. There is also the darker side of magic, typically called necromancy and referring to any magic performed with the aid of demons. Imagination is integral to all of them. It is how demons possess you, although also how God delivers prophecy to you. It is how you are led to see, or believe you see, what the magician wants you to. It is even how you affect or move external objects. To take some common medieval examples: you can use your imagination to make a camel fall down, bewitch someone, make them sick or well, alter the elements, and change weather conditions. Imagination is also why, when a menstruating woman looks into a new mirror, that mirror becomes foggy, as though stained with blood (the phenomenon of the red mirror is described by Aristotle, and medieval philosophers were eager to explain it). Much of medieval philosophers' discussion of the subject focused on the realness or not of imagination's creations. Are you really having sex with a demon when you think you are? Is the illusion that a demon or magician creates really in the world or does it exist only in the mind?

This takes me, finally, to the topic of play, because the imaginative marvels I've been describing are staples in medieval romance. For instance, in a text popular in several languages throughout medieval Europe, Floris and Blancheflour, we find a well that tests a woman's virginity. When a non-virgin touches it, it screams and turns red. In the work of a thirteenth-century philosopher, William of Auvergne, we similarly find a stone that tests virginity. A non-virgin will vomit it up, which is why, William tells us, brides were often asked to swallow it. The connection between medieval philosophy and medieval romance on the topic of marvels is hard to make sense of. Philosophy, of course, seeks to discover truth, but medieval romance is wholly unconcerned with truth. It concerns itself with fairyland, werewolves, and magical women who have really nice clothes. Imagination is entertaining, but not because it deals with things fictive. Rather, the wonder it elicits matters more than the truth or illusoriness of its productions.

My final interest is in the much-written-about medieval belief in things like monsters and werewolves. As Caroline Walker Bynum (1999) rightly notes, these are the aspects of medieval culture that most capture the modern imagination. It was not always so: the Middle Ages used to feature in scholarship as a monumental point of origin, the era when cities and universities and so forth were born. Now it intrigues because it is unlike our world. You will note, and you are right, that many people alive today believe in monsters

in some form or another. Nonetheless, the Middle Ages is, in Max Weber's famous formulation, the enchanted world, now viewed above all as the un- or pre-modern. By the time we meet, I hope I can say how I think the simultaneous real and fictiveness of imagination's creations might lead us to a more satisfying perspective on medieval enchantment.

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THE LEARNING OF MIND: HOW DO YOU FIGURE OUT WHAT A MIND IS? METAPHORS FOR MIND

• DEDRE GENTNER •

My work is on human cognition and its development, mostly using the techniques of cognitive psychology, but also drawing on linguistics and other areas of cognitive science. My chief foci are analogical thinking and interactions between thought and language. I see both of these as fundamental in human thinking.

People use analogy and metaphor to understand things that are hard to understand. This often means using a concrete or familiar domain to explain an abstract or unfamiliar domain. For example, Freud often used a metaphor from hydraulics to explain his psychodynamic theory of the mind. To explain how taboo thoughts may surface in unexpected ways, he used the intuition that if water is dammed in one place, it will show up somewhere else. Bowlby's influential theory of attachment explicitly makes use of an analogy with control systems theory (cybernetics). In Bowlby's case the source domains include a simple home heating thermostat, the power steering system in a car, and the sophisticated control systems that allow an anti-aircraft gun to track and hit a moving target. In a sense, the most striking thing about these efforts is that both these highly influential theories implicitly assume that our own minds are harder to understand than these external systems. Often, the source domains involve new technology, as suggested in Gigeranzer's work, and in the following quote from Searle (1986: 44):

> Because we do not understand the brain very well we are constantly tempted to use the latest technology as a model for trying to understand it. In my childhood we were always assured that the brain was a telephone switchboard. ('What else could it be?') I was amused to see that Sherrington, the great British neuroscientist, thought that the brain worked like a telegraph system. Freud often compared the brain to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz compared it to a mill, and I am told some of the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions like a catapult. At present, obviously, the metaphor is the digital computer.

Although the examples just cited are explicit academic theories, there is much evidence that people spontaneously use analogies (for better or worse) to explain things they want to understand. To the extent that people use analogical processes to understand the mind,

research on how these processes take place may be relevant to the themes of this workshop. We know a fair amount about how carrying out an analogy can change one's understanding of a topic, by suggesting inferences, inviting new abstractions and new perspectives, and even by making specific differences salient. Less is known about what exactly leads someone to think of a new analogy. But for our perception of other minds, I suspect what's important is the conventional cultural analogies that pervade cultural institutions.

A crucial aspect of analogical processing is its interactions with language. Our analogical capacity is magnified by language in several ways. For example, when a novel analogy is carried out, naming the resulting abstraction may make it more likely to persist and be used again. Language can also serve to invite analogical processing: if a child hears the same term used for two different situations, she is likely to compare them analogically and derive a new (for her) abstraction. In the other direction, analogical processes enter into language learning. For example, children are better able to understand a new abstract term if they are encouraged to analogically compare two instances of the term. The role of this analogy/language interaction becomes larger the less 'cut and dried' the domain of inquiry. Analogy and language form a mutual bootstrapping system by which humans can build up large-scale metaphoric systems.

I make two claims that bear on the broad question of how we think about minds. First, we know that disciplinary ideas about the mind change over time. I have been working on an historical study (with Jonathan Grudin) of the evolution of metaphors for the mind in psychology over the ninety years from 1890 to 1975. In this evolution, we can see an early reliance on animate beings as the source domain, as well as on spatial metaphors; these give way over time to a preference for complex systems—especially computers—as sources.

Second, we know that conceptions of the mind are influenced by current technology. I have also been working on an historical study of the use of metaphors in alchemy (with Michael Jeziorski). For this workshop, the most relevant are metaphorical correspondences between the components of a human being (e.g. body, mind and soul) and the components of metals (e.g. mercury, salt and sulfur). These correspondences entered into the quest to turn base metals into gold, in pursuit of the Philosophers' Stone. As the work was perfected, the alchemists' spirit would also be perfected; for example, an early stage in the alchemical process was calcination—heating the base metal until it turns to ash. This corresponded to the alchemist's purging his soul through the fire of aspiration and self-discipline.

Of course the first question is what relation (if any) these essentially academic theories bear to people's informal day-to-day perceptions of other people's minds. Do such theories penetrate ordinary language and thought? We can find conventional metaphorical language that might suggest Freudian views as in: 'His resentment built up to where he couldn't contain it any longer.' If there is such a relation, the next question will be whether the influence is in the reverse direction: whether the academic theories are based on existing cultural views.

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• ALLEN TRAN •

My research focuses on the emerging sources, forms, and subjects of anxiety in post-reform Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and is based on ethnographic research on the transformation of people's emotional lives across various settings, including psychiatric clinics and counseling centers as well as people's homes and work places. Since Vietnam's neoliberal reforms were initiated in 1986, many Ho Chi Minh City residents have benefited from a vastly increased standard of living yet reported worrying more now than ever before. This stands in marked contrast to a past when, according to many people I talked to, extreme suffering stunted people's souls as much as their bodies. Recent scholarship on neoliberal modes of modernity has called attention to affective practices and relationships of sentiment as a medium linking structural transformations and subject formation. However, such studies rarely examine how the experience of practices and relationships come to be understood as specifically emotional themselves, a process that I argue is crucial to subject formation in Vietnam's transition to a market-oriented economy.

What stands out to me about the theory of mind at work in Vietnam comes from two observations: (1) people infrequently discuss or articulate their own interior states, especially their emotions; and (2) people are very observant of other people's behavior and actions. For example, people described the psyche (*tâm lý*, lit. heart and reason) as if it were a 'black box' of mental activity, but often could not elaborate psychological processes. On the other hand, they could infer the details of such processes from discrete and specific events; mental activity is understood and talked about through the medium of people's actions. Thus, theory of mind in Vietnam is embedded in theories of social action and relatedness. As the ethnopsychological basis of intersubjectivity, theory of mind identifies basic parameters of the mind-world relation. However, to what extent does a theory of mind overlap with a theory of behavior, action, or practice? And what is the relationship between theory of mind as a mental representation and as externalized in practice?

My claims is that the case of Vietnam has much to contribute to our thinking of theory of mind, focusing mostly on recent changes in the landscape of Vietnamese theories of emotion and sentiment, through the lens of metaphors for the heart. The shift implied in notions such as the 'angry gut', which is rooted in Traditional Chinese Medicine, to the 'force in our hearts', which is rooted in both Taoism and Western psychological disciplines, to express emotional experiences reflects new models of personhood. New ideas of emotionality construct individuals in terms of vivid interior lives, which have a tantalizing link to the powers of the self taken up by neoliberalism with aims towards modern goals of individual achievement through rationalization. However, this process of rationalization via individuation brings with it an attendant emotionalization of the self. In terms of people's everyday lives, an emphasis on how an individual feels about something is a shifting away from both Confucian and socialist forms of social organization that valorize communality and hierarchy. Changing concepts of emotion also alter people's relationships to the objects of those emotions. In re-casting social experience within

a rubric of emotion, individuals are not only paying greater attention to the emotions but changing the concept of emotion itself.

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THE LEARNING OF MIND: HOW DO YOU FIGURE OUT WHAT A MIND IS? ISSUES OF LANGUAGE

• EVE DANZINGER •

All of my thinking about theory of mind is inspired by twenty five years of acquaintance with speakers of a Yucatecan Mayan language called Mopan Maya. There are about five thousand Mopan speakers, most of whom live as subsistence agriculturalists in southeastern Central America. I have been making extended visits to Mopan country since 1986, doing ethnographic, linguistic-anthropological, and psycholinguistic observation. Over the years I've learned to speak Mopan, and I have published on Mopan grammar as well as on Mopan culture. My most recent visit was this past summer, July 2011. Mopan people in the area where I visit (Southern Belize) speak English, not Spanish, as their second language. Where I provide English translations for Mopan expressions below, they are endorsed by Mopan speakers who are bilingual in English.

I started thinking about theory of mind after I realized that Mopan Maya culture does not include an institutionalized genre of fiction. There is lots of storytelling, but stories are either believed (sometimes even stories with fantastical elements), or they are condemned as 'lying' (*tus*). This is theory of mind-relevant because successful interpretation of fiction depends on assessment of whether or not there is intention to deceive (we both know that we both know that what I say is not really true. But you will not condemn me as a liar since under this state of mutual knowledge, I clearly cannot be attempting to deceive you). I used a formal elicitation task to confirm that intention to deceive didn't have much to do with classifying even everyday utterances as *tus* in Mopan. Mistakes as well as deliberate attempts to deceive are classified this way by Mopan, even though it means moral condemnation of the speaker. In general, assessment of mental state is not an important part of interpreting or of morally evaluating others' utterances and actions in Mopan.

Don't get me wrong. Mopan people know that mental states exist. They even believe that they play an important role in motivating people's actions. There are vocabulary words for philosophically classic mental states like 'to want something' (*k'ati*), and 'to know something' (*eel*). Apart from the absence of fiction, and a few other little quirks (Mopan interactional style is often marked by reticence and linguistic caution), Mopan conversational interaction proceeds in ways that feel fully familiar when it comes to things

like real-time audience design (taking into account as you speak what you believe that your interlocutor does and does not already know). And I've performed some standard False Belief tasks with Mopan children, which document the expected development of an understanding that others could believe something which I know to be false.

But not all theory of mind tasks can be replicated with Mopan (ask me about 'interpretive theory of mind'). And I've also repeated the 'no-mental-state-calculation' effect with Mopan vocabulary items beyond *tus*. For example, the philosophically important 'believe' (*tz'ok-es*) is only fully appropriate in Mopan usage if the 'believer' also 'obeys' what s/he is told. And one can say in Mopan that someone has 'tried' doing something (*u yaal-tah*) only if they have actually accomplished it ('tried it out'). There is no lexical way to recognize mental effort alone in Mopan. From this and also from more diffuse ethnographic evidence, including evidence from religious practice, from attitudes to children's play, and from occasions when traditional and 'theatrical' costumed dances were performed in Mopan villages, I have concluded that what Mopan know perfectly well about the existence of others' mental states is not elaborately consulted when they bring their interpretations of other people's actions—including linguistic actions—into awareness. In fact, when awareness of such matters is demanded (as in elicitation tasks, but also when explicit moral or legal judgments are required), Mopan downplay the importance of actors' mental states.

To make sense of all this, it helps to know that Mopan believe that truthful speech and correct action are part of what keeps the universe running. Violations 'automatically' cause cosmological difficulties, so the question of interpersonal bad faith becomes only one—and not always the most severe—negative consequence of false speech and other transgressions. There are other ethnographic cases (many among other Native American groups), where a similar kind of philosophy seems to be in operation. This is different from the non-Western 'opacity' theory of mind doctrine (we can't know what's in another's mind) which is documented in many parts of the Pacific.

My basic claim(s)

In general, there are cultural particularities in theory of mind, and they have some effect on everyday behavior, and perhaps on people's own mental experience. But the effect of cultural theory of mind philosophies on the actual conduct of interaction is also not limitless. Much of everyday interactional exchange is organized universally, at a level to which cultural philosophy does not penetrate. This is a radical conclusion, because it means not only that non-intentionalists like the Mopan actually do unconsciously monitor and adjust to what they know of their interlocutors' mental states as interaction proceeds, but also that intentionalists like Euro-American moderns may do less accessible-to-awareness mutual knowledge calculation during online interaction than they think they do.

'Theory of mind' is not one thing, but has multiple components. Some of these components are found universally in our species and some are elaborated only under certain conditions of cultural philosophy. It is an important project to work out where the boundaries among these components lie, and what sorts of components they are. Which components can and cannot come under the influence of cultural belief-systems? Among other things, this involves study of differences among non-Euro-Americans, not

just differences of one or another group from Euro-Americans. We can aim for a multi-dimensional typology of cultural theory of mind possibilities.

Preferred forms of figurative speech across cultures follow from cultural beliefs about language, including beliefs related to the importance of mental states. Particular figurative speech types such as the production of novel metaphor are therefore not 'natural' to all humans. Exploration of poetic speech across cultures is an avenue into the investigation of cross-cultural theory of mind.

Another area where local belief-systems influence the presence of mutual knowledge calculation is in working out what to do when things go wrong (including misunderstandings in conversation). When things are going without a hitch, even high mutual-knowledge calculators like modern Euro-Americans may not actually conduct such calculation. Central places to look for variation in theory of mind across cultures are therefore in moral philosophies, legal codes, and household regimes of blame and reward.

The modern Euro-American belief that accessible-to-awareness mutual-knowledge calculation is constantly taking place perhaps arises erroneously from experiences with in-awareness assessment of blame for wrongdoing, under a culturally relative moral code in which mental state is the primary determinant of blameworthiness.

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My work centers on language use in context, its forms, functions, and meanings and the relationships that obtain across those domains. To this end I integrate ethnographic, ethnomethodological, linguistic and sociolinguistic methods and theories to understand what participants in a community do with language (speech practices) in conjunction with how they think about and talk about language (language ideologies). Audiorecorded, naturalistic interaction is my starting point for exploring these relationships, and I take cultural, linguistic and situational variation to be significant, requiring systematic investigation.

My long-term research program in Bosavi, Papua New Guinea, (1975–1998), a small-scale, relatively egalitarian society of hunters and horticulturalists, provided me with opportunity to document linguistic and cultural change over developmental as well as socio-historical time. In terms of theories of mind, research on children's language socialization practices revealed implicit theories or tacitly held cultural beliefs that were critically tied to Bosavi notions of personhood and sociality. During everyday interactions with caregivers, very young children acquire appropriate communicative conventions for participating as speakers, which in this community means talking only about things for which one has particular types of knowledge and evidence. Talking about one's own and others' internal states and intentions is one domain that highlights this cultural orientation.

While children (and others) talk about their own cognitive and affective states, when young children verbally report others' unexpressed internal states, they are corrected with a description of what the person is doing, that is, what is visually evident (e.g. crying, as opposed to being sad). If a child verbally interprets inarticulate vocalization as meaningful, (e.g. babbling), an adult will repeat the babbled vocalization retaining the phonological shape as a quotation of what was said. In both cases, these restated utterances are marked with appropriate evidentials, linguistic markers of the epistemological basis of assertions (heard, seen or inferred from specific types of evidence). Thus, as part of the discursive structures of talk in interaction, children simultaneously acquire the linguistic means for marking their source of knowledge when making assertions. The obligatory use of evidentials suggests that attention to epistemic stance is central to communicative competence.

Complementing these socialization practices, caregivers never expand or guess at the meaning of a child's referentially or pragmatically unclear utterances. To do so would provide verbal evidence that they might have independent knowledge of someone's inarticulate or incomprehensible thoughts. Small children are encouraged to observe what others do, and to repeat what others say as reported speech.

Bosavi people do not explicitly discuss these ideas, but other verbal activities substantiate a cultural and linguistic preference for maintaining a verbal boundary between unexpressed thoughts or internal states and those that are uttered and free to circulate, with citation. Bosavi people respond to others' actions (intentions) nonverbally (e.g. reaching to get something); they do not produce utterances that might be construed as verbal speculation about another's thoughts, feelings or desires. People ask, 'what are you doing?' not, 'are you doing X?'; or 'what are you saying?' not, 'are you saying Y?' Speakers do not repair others' utterances but rather ask for repetition, giving responsibility to the original speaker for his or her own utterances. People do not ask each other what they 'mean'. At the genre level, gossip (saying what is not yours to say) is viewed negatively and is actionable; confession in the context of Christian missionization is avoided.

These cultural and linguistic orientations challenged newly missionized Bosavi pastors, who, for over twenty years, struggled to translate New Testament passages that describe Jesus as knowing, and quoting the thoughts of others from Tok Pisin into their Bosavi vernacular. This type of cultural/linguistic contact situation raises the question of habitual and potential practices—in this case, presenting both a linguistic and cultural challenge: how to translate the text that reports a practice that makes little cultural sense. The spontaneous solutions offered by pastors offer insights into local problem-solving strategies for dealing with this with local linguistic parameters. This situation more generally raises questions about unexamined assumptions of one language/one culture models in broader thinking about theories of mind. In situations of cultural and linguistic contact, such theories also enter the contact zone.

Questions:

What can linguistic and cultural analyses of naturalistic and spontaneous discursive practices and everyday actions tell us about local theories of mind and modes of achieving intersubjectivity, broadly conceived? What might be the limits of such methodologies?

How are theories of mind, intentionality, and intersubjectivity expressed through and across cultural domains, linguistic repertoires, and language ideologies? Are such constructs socially variable (gender, age, status)?

What are the consequences for local theories of mind during periods of contact and change, such as the introduction of Christianity, which usually brings new languages, cosmologies, social structures, and cultural practices?

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My knowledge base for theories of mind consists of two major projects that both focus on Chinese language and Chinese medicine.

The first consists of over ten years of wrangling with the Chinese expressions of and for mind, including especially the language that describes different kinds of mental experience in Chinese: heart-bitterness, heart-sourness, a sinking heart, dizziness, thinking-not-moving-through, a heavy brain-sack (Pritzker 2003, 2007). Several specific research endeavors focused on this question of how to understand, and translate, the Chinese language of mind into terms that made sense for psychology, and from there, how to translate Western psychology into Chinese (Pritzker 2001; Phillips et al. 2007). In studying the intersections of psychology and Chinese medicine, focusing all along on the language used to describe mental and emotional experience in both Chinese and English, I have learned a lot about cultural differences in theories of mind, though I never specifically thought about it these terms. I have also learned about the creative adaptability of human minds to very quickly learn and work comfortably with multiple theories of mind that on paper seem incompatible and culturally at odds.

The second major project examined the translation of Chinese medicine in the US. Chinese medicine is a highly developed, extremely textual tradition. In the richly interdiscursive web that comprises textuality in Chinese medicine, canonical, classic texts are articulated with commentaries, case studies, and treatises on 'integrative medicine'. Authors of Chinese medical texts—both in Chinese and in translation—often explain the meaning of illness concepts by strategically weaving a whole network of quotes from classic and modern texts into a particular inscription. Translating in this context is a challenge wrought with immense social, political, and economic considerations (Pritzker 2011a). Debates abound over what it means to faithfully represent Chinese medicine, whether or not there should be an officially adopted standard terminology for the translation of Chinese medicine, and whether or not biomedical terminology should be used to translate Chinese medical concepts into English. All of these debates are framed by struggles over the cultural rights to translate, the authority to publish, and the epistemological foundations of knowledge in this diverse healing tradition. The

specific goals of the individuals involved in these struggles have led to the development of multiple strategies for translating Chinese medical terms, with one Chinese term often carrying up to five different English translations.

My ethnographic research for this project, which in many ways is still ongoing, was carried out over two years in the US in a Southern California school of Chinese medicine and with several major publishers and over 30 translators in the US and China. One key aspect I have considered in this work is the relationships that form between translators and the texts that they are translating. For example, how do translators make sense of the intentions of multiple authors working as part of a two thousand-year-old textual tradition? How do they anticipate the intentions (and desires) of their audience? What is the relationship that emerges between a reader of an English translation and the author of the original Chinese text? I have thought deeply about these questions, and have paid particular attention to the ways in which students and teachers in the classroom discuss the meanings and intentions of translators (which they often do): the way they try, in conversation, to relate back to the intentions of original authors with the ultimate goal of discovering how the ancients saw the body, diagnosed the mind, treated illness, and promoted health. There is a very practical goal to this interpretive activity, and so I have also attempted to track the ways in which different kinds of clinical interpretations and practices emerge from acts of translation that themselves use different kinds of evidence to determine the 'actual' or 'authentic' meaning of certain Chinese medical terms. Aside from a few key anthropologists and sociolinguists who have looked at the dialogic, emergent nature of translation in social context (see, for example, Wadensjo 1998; Schieffelin 2007; Hanks 2010), most discussions of translation have focused on the message itself—the 'content' to be translated and the way this content is transformed in translation. Instead of focusing on this content, I have become more and more attuned to the multiple conversations and meaning-making encounters that together comprise the translation of Chinese medicine. I have come to understand translation as a lived event where interactions with language and about language serve as the basis for interpretive moves that constitute the 'living translation' of Chinese medicine (Pritzker 2011b).

In this work, I have also been particularly interested in the translation of Chinese medical theories of mind into US communities of practice and linguistic repertoires. It has been fascinating to witness the process by which students learn new theories of mind as a self-process unfolding through interaction, and in language: how their experience of themselves shifts, for example, when they begin to interpret their patterns of thinking as a result of a tendency to 'dampness in the middle *jiao*' rather than through the lens of their 'personalities'. These types of shifts then cascade into the choices they make in daily living, for example by choosing soup, which is considered to be 'warming' instead of salad, which is 'cold'. It also fans out into the way they interpret and interact with others.

Most relevant to the subject of theory of mind, for example, is the observation that Western students of Chinese medicine seem particularly keen to discover alternative ways of accessing the mind in Chinese medical diagnosis and treatment (Pritzker 2011c). Rather than needing a theory to make inferences about a patient's interior state of mind, students discover, in Chinese medicine the mind can be observed exteriorly, even touched: felt in the pulse, seen in the tongue, and described in simple language that indexes complex states of being. Astute fingers can touch a wrist and can feel the rapid and chaotic bouncing of

'heart fire' or the sopping, droopy languidness of 'phlegm misting the mind' (Wiseman and Ellis 1996; Maciocia 2005, 2009). A trained eye can similarly see the state of the fire-tormented mind in the peeled tongue coat and burnt red tongue tip, or the confusion of the phlegm soaked mind in the thick, white tongue coat and swollen tongue body. This evidence, in the Western treatment room, often still requires confirmation, and so it doesn't necessarily wipe out the old stand-by Western theories of mind that demand more explanation and discussion in order to parse out how someone is really feeling or thinking. The 'psychologization' of Chinese medicine in the US is alive and well actually, and often functions to transform Chinese theories of mind into a 'hybrid' of New Age psycho-spiritual Chinese medicine (Barnes 1998). However, in the precarious balance of needing to find an authentic way of reaching the minds of suffering patients, and the desire to learn a culturally rooted system of healing in translation, there is often a noticeable shift as students transform the standard Western theories of mind in order to fit their new practice.

My claim is that language not only plays an enormous role in the way we imagine our minds and the minds of others, and the way we act based on such imaginings, but that when we bring in the notions of translation, cultural complexity, bilingualism, and medical diagnosis, we have the opportunity to witness the ways in which multiple theories of mind articulate with each other—how they are learned, how they function in concert with each other, how individuals selectively draw upon them in everyday life, and at least in medical contexts, the impact that shifting theories of mind have on practice and in healing.

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BROKEN AND DESPAIRING MINDS

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As an ethnographer who has conducted extensive fieldwork in Indonesia (Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994, 1996), and a part-time psychoanalyst and psychotherapist for over twenty years, I am particularly interested in this issue of the accuracy of our theorizing about others. As Throop and I have discussed (Hollan and Throop 2008, 2011), people around the world often fear others' intimate knowledge of themselves and attempt to defend themselves against it. In part, this is a fear that accurate knowledge can be used to hurt rather to help or understand, but it is also partly a concern that others frequently misunderstand and mischaracterize, sometimes accidentally and sometimes for sinister purposes. Such 'hiding' is clearly evident in clinical settings as well and even there poses a challenge to the accurate understanding of others, even though the therapist's or healer's right to theorize is explicitly acknowledged and sanctioned (Hollan 2008). Given the

strong evidence that misunderstanding of others is common, I believe we need to be examining how and why people theorize inaccurately about others as well as accurately.

Much recent research on theory of mind and empathy, inspired by neurobiological findings about mirror neurons, sensitivity to facial expressions, emotional contagion, and other embodied forms of imitation and attunement, imply that our simulations of others' minds must be fairly fast and accurate, given how automatic and biologically based they are. Indeed, some go so far as to define and limit 'empathy' to this capacity to detect, in a visceral or perceptual way, that another is in a certain emotional state or involved in a certain goal-directed behavior, ignoring the question as to why someone might be thinking, feeling, or acting the way they do (Hollan and Throop 2008, 2011; Hollan in press). Such a restricted definition is a pale shade of what many people would understand as empathy, especially in cultural anthropology, and raises the question of just what kind of 'minds' we are positing when we imagine ourselves or others developing theories about them. What do people want or need to know about others? Can we know anything beyond another person's most basic actions and intentions? How deep or extensive is the knowledge or understanding implied when we speak about someone having a 'theory of mind' about another?

The 'why' question about someone else's behavior raises another important issue: if theory of mind implies something more than understanding another's most basic intentions (e.g. that a person is about to eat when he or she picks up a piece of food), how accurate do we assume these theories or understandings of others to be? Those who emphasize that simulation processes are embedded in visceral and perceptional sensitivities that have evolved over long periods of time, imply that our theories of others' minds are fast and fairly accurate. And yet as the philosopher, Karsten Stueber (2006), points out, our knowledge of others is dependent upon cognitive, emotional, and imaginative capacities that allow us to use our own first-person, folk psychological knowledge and experience as engaged actors to model and understand the experience of others. Our knowledge of others is thus both culturally and historically bound in a double sense: the subjects of our theorizing are people who think, act, and feel in very specific culturally and historically constituted moral worlds while we ourselves, as theorizers and empathizers, are similarly bound and constrained. Given the challenges this poses for accurate understanding of others' behavior, especially in a cross-cultural context, Stueber underscores the fallibility and limitations of our theorizing about others and why it can never be as rote and automatic as some simulation theorists would suggest.

My basic question:

What are the social, cultural, political, and economic conditions that promote accurate theorizing about others, and what are the conditions that impede it?

My basic claim:

That while all people theorize about others' thoughts, feelings, and intentions, a number of factors will affect the accuracy of this theorizing, including whether it is culturally

encouraged or not and whether the theorizer can 'afford' (economically and politically) to think or feel seriously about another's state of mind.

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• ALEXA HAGERTY •

I have been carrying out fieldwork on the home funeral movement for two years. The home funeral movement advocates that families and friends care for the bodies of their dead at home, without intervention from professional funeral directors. They eschew embalming and encourage direct and intimate care of the corpse—washing, dressing, placing ice, filing paperwork such as the death certificate, and transporting the body to the crematorium or cemetery. It is a fledging North American movement, largely middle class and white, but increasingly being taken up by immigrant communities in urban areas such as Los Angeles. Leaders of the movement often position it as belonging to a genealogy of care that includes the hospice and home birth movements.

The movement is rapidly organizing and professionalizing. Within the last three years organizers have hosted the first national conferences, formalized a non-profit (the National Home Funeral Alliance), fought the funeral industry in state legislatures for the legal right to care for and transport corpses, and established a training and certification process for 'home funeral guides'.

My own training to become a certified home funeral guide (also sometimes called a 'death midwife') has been the backbone of my fieldwork and the means through which I have sought to better understand the ethics of care in the movement. I have been particularly interested in the care of the corpse and the home funeral practice of keeping the body at home for three days (sometimes more), during which time the corpse shows its marks of death—the subtle but unmistakable onset of decay.

The relationship between the living and the dead that I think can enrich our discussion of theory of mind emerges in the presence of the corpse during these three days. The ethics of care in the home funeral movement is not best understood as one in which the living care for the dead, in a simple uni-directional movement. The dead also are seen as caring for the living. Mourners are encouraged to spend time in the presence of the dead. The living are encouraged to talk softly when in the presence of the dead and to choose their words with care. The dead are understood to continue to understand and even respond to the words of the living. The dead might respond through facial expressions, through scent, through signs in the immediate environment or nature. The dead may also speak to the living through the thoughts or memories that occur to those in their presence. In these exchanges the living are seen as helping the dead 'get used to being dead' as someone in the movement once described it to me. In this equation, the dead are helping the mourners 'get used to' being bereaved.

The relationship between the living and the dead can continue in the absence of the corpse through practices of meditation, prayer, and dream work. People in the movement informally—and increasingly formally—share tips and ideas for connecting with the dead. This communication is seen as a skill that can be acquired through practice. Contact is understood to be beneficial to both the living and dead. The living experience the pleasure of their loved ones presence, have an opportunity to address issues that may have been left unsatisfactorily resolved at the time of death, and sometimes even receive useful or comforting information. The dead are seen as being nurtured and nourished by this contact. In some instances, people describe the dead as continuing to live—for example, continuing to age—through the process of these exchanges. One mother described conversations with her daughter who died at age seven as now being held with a young woman of twenty. This mother relates a process of bringing her daughter into being through what she calls a relationship that exists 'across the threshold' just as she was brought into being through her mother's body at birth.

Claim:

The home funeral practices of communicating with the dead, both in the presence and absence of the corpse, disrupt common assumptions about middle-class North American experiences and conceptions of death and grief: that death is a moment rather than a process; that consciousness ends at death; that corpses are material artifacts that cannot be understood to listen, respond, or feel and as such are not involved in intersubjective exchange.

The disruption of these assumptions can illuminate something about theory of mind. In the example above, the mother and daughter in some sense share the mother's mind—and through this sharing they bring each other into being—the daughter is brought into being as twenty-year old and the mother as mother. This disrupts the model of a singular bounded individual mind. Importantly, it also challenges ideas about grief that emerge from such a model, namely the Freudian imperative to withdraw object-cathexes from the lost object. This sense of the danger of mourning slipping into melancholia is seen in the everyday encouragements offered to mourners (and made explicit on commercial sympathy cards) to 'move through' grief and 'get over' loss.

Home funerals offer a model of grief in which it is not something to get over, but to cultivate. Rather than arriving on the other side of grief, the bereaved travel with it, sometimes for many years, moving deeper into relationship with the dead. Home funerals offer a particular (but I suspect not singular) lens through which to consider grief as an experience in which boundaries of mind are destabilized, negotiated, and even purposefully re-configured.

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Between November 2010 and April 2011, I spent time in the city of Chennai, South India, doing ethnographic research. During my stay there I was affiliated with an NGO called The Banyan, which rescues and rehabilitates homeless women suffering from mental illness from in and around Chennai. The Banyan houses about three hundred women in a large, comfortable building in the city, and provides them with food, shelter, clothing, and medication free of charge. During their stay, clients also have access to occupational training programs, fun activities, and, to some extent, therapy. As clients improve, they 'graduate' through levels of increased independence and responsibility. If the team of mental health professionals deems a client ready, The Banyan attempts to reintegrate her into society, either by reuniting the client with her family, or by connecting her with other Banyan women who live and work together in so-called 'support groups'. For those clients who are too chronically ill to pursue either of these options, The Banyan provides a long-term care facility outside urban Chennai, in the rural town of Kovalam.

Towards the end of April, I conducted three interviews with a client living at Kovalam named Amna P. Each interview lasted about an hour and a half, and we spoke English, in which Amna was fluent. Amna was rescued by The Banyan in 2003, when she had been found, half-naked, wandering and talking to herself on the streets of Chennai. Amna had developed symptoms of schizophrenia after the birth of her fourth child, notably auditory hallucinations and delusions of grandeur, as well as some aggressive behavior. Most distressing to her family was Amna's listlessness, inertia, and general withdrawal from domestic life, which took a huge emotional and financial toll on the already impoverished household. Despite the family's pleading, Amna's husband left her for another woman. The family tried to get Amna help, but she wandered away from them at a Hindu temple they had taken her to for healing. Homelessness and begging followed, as Amna traveled aimlessly across India, intermittently spending time at mental hospitals and charitable institutions along the way until The Banyan took her in. Though The Banyan has established contact with Amna's family members, they lack the resources to care for her appropriately and have not been willing to take her back.

My aim during the interviews was to reconstruct Amna's fragmented and marginalized life before she arrived at The Banyan, and to get a sense of how she experienced her own illness. Though the prior line of inquiry was fraught with memory gaps and fanciful reconstructions, Amna spoke candidly about the voices she heard and the effects they had on her life.

On return to the States, I read a series of interviews (conducted by Tanya Luhrmann) with Americans who met criteria for schizophrenia, and who spoke in these interviews about their experience of hearing voices. I was surprised by the ways in which their experience matched Amna's, and the ways in which it did not. I would like to stress that the following impressions are very preliminary, and that more evidence is needed to draw any conclusions. Nevertheless, I hope this might shed some light on a model of the psychotic mind that may be different from the one we are accustomed to in the US, and provide a jumping-off point for further discussion.

It was clear from the interviews that the voices heard by Amna and the Americans were remarkably similar: the 'characters' were alike (sometimes familiar, sometimes

supernatural), and they spoke the same cruel taunts and criticisms. In addition, the voices universally caused a great deal of distress: both Amna and the Americans often expressed a sense of fear, helplessness, and exhaustion when talking about the voices they heard.

The reason for this distress, however, was quite different. Amna was mainly troubled by how much the voices interfered with her daily functioning; the Americans complained about interference, but also expressed great concern that 'hearing voices' meant there was something fundamentally different, wrong, or broken about them. This emerges, I think, from the different way in which Amna and the Americans conceptualize the connection between the voices and their minds, selves, and sanity. Amna spoke about the voices as instigators of madness; they 'drove her mad' by taunting, threatening, and distracting her. The Americans, on the other hand, spoke of the voices more as evidence of madness; as a symptom, not a cause.

In the interviews I looked at, the Americans often grappled with the paradox of voices which seemed alien to their persons, and yet emanated from them, lived inside them, and, (a terrifying thought), maybe even were them. These were not questions Amna posed to herself. For Amna, the voices were foreign invaders who staged an assault on her: they battered her badly, but she remained whole. For the Americans, on the other hand, the voices seemed to attack from without (certainly, that was their sensory experience), but the voices also seemed to flow forth from the cracks within, from their own broken minds. Given the way Amna places herself in relationship to the voices she hears, I am not sure that this 'broken mind' construct is a salient one for her, and, possibly, for Indians in general.

Both Amna and the Americans were extremely distressed and disturbed by the voices. Across the board, the interviewees complained about how constantly they heard the voices: even if medications were able to turn down the 'volume', the voices still hounded them ceaselessly by day, and drove away all hope of sleep at night. Though some Americans (as well as Amna) said that the voices spoke nicely on occasion, the content of the voices was most often negative, critical, or threatening. Amna, for example, was visited by two categories of voices: those she called 'spirits', who hailed from her home-town of Puna (the most powerful of these was a ghostly version of a young woman she knew years before), and, less commonly, by important figures in Indian politics. Though the politicians flattered her, the spirits were extremely malicious, and repeatedly threatened to wound, kill, rape, or rob Amna.

Indeed, the voices harassed Amna so much, she told me, that she 'became mad'. Their insistent chatter distracted her from the real world, their ominous threats frightened her into paralysis—she couldn't sleep, couldn't sit, couldn't eat, let alone work in the house and take care of her children. This, to Amna, was the essence of 'madness'. The Americans also bemoaned the toll that the voices took on their lives. One interviewee found she could no longer play sports comfortably, because the voices kept criticizing her performance; another found herself breaking into tears when the voices would share her innermost secrets aloud (she thought) for everyone to hear. But the core of the pain the Americans felt, it seemed to me, lay not so much in the practical effects of the voices, but in the metaphysical implications of hearing voices that others could not. These abnormal, extraordinary experiences were signal and symbol of a structural defect, a 'broken mind'.

These different approaches are probably shaped, to some extent, by cultural understandings of mental illness. In India, *bhoot* (ghosts) are widely recognized as beings who spread discord and often cause insanity. In America, on the other hand, psychosis is more often attributed to a chemical imbalance, or a genetic predisposition (environmental causes are not as popular nowadays). Indeed, I was shocked by how immediately, even eagerly, the Americans mentioned their medications, and how fluently they discussed their effects and side-effects. Amna had no idea what medications she was taking, and did not seem particularly convinced of their usefulness.

If it is true that people in India conceive of the psychotic mind in a different way than people in America, there may also be implications for the approach to recovery. That is, if madness is the result of a supernatural attack or possession, the cure would be to drive out, to purge, and to protect. If madness is the expression of a broken mind, on the other hand, the treatment should aim to mend, fill, and consolidate. It would be interesting to explore whether these strategies underlie current treatments in India and America, and if not, whether it would be useful if they did.

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